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Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2010 11:48:06 +0800
Message-ID: <628d1651003222048k1eaf6929r81fd06e401190e0@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Netfilter: Fix integer overflow in net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
From: wzt wzt <wzt.wzt@gmail.com>
To: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Cc: Xiaotian Feng <xtfeng@gmail.com>, Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
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1、 suppose *len = 35,  sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) = 36
2、 set get.size = 0xffffffff from user space
3、 sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size = 36  + 0xffffffff = 35;
4、 if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size) was bypassed.

you can test with c code:

#include <stdio.h>

int main(void)
{
        unsigned int arg = 0xffffffff;

        printf("%u\n", arg + 36);
        if (35 != arg + 36) {
                printf("not over flow.\n");
                return -1;
        }
        printf("arg over flow.\n");

        return 0;
}

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 11:04 AM, Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de> wrote:
>
> On Tuesday 2010-03-23 03:37, wzt wzt wrote:
>>> And, for the addition overflow, can it be caught by
>>>
>>> "if (*len != sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size)"  ???
>>
>>sizeof(struct ipt_get_entries) + get.size can be overflow as *len,
>>get.size is control by user space with copy_from_user().
>
> The != should catch it.
>
> For 64-bit environments:
> * + invoked with size_t, unsigned int
>  => right side promoted to size_t, result type is size_t
> * != invoked with int and size_t
>  => left-side promoted to ssize_t (probably; but something as large as size_t)
> * get.size is 32-bit bounded, as is *len,
>  so no overflow to worry about at all unless you make
>  sizeof(X) hilariously big close to 2^64 which is rather unlikely.
>
> For 32-bit environments:
> * Let *len be a number of choice (e.g. 36)
> * Find a sizeof(X)+get.size that equals 36 mod 2^32.
> * Since sizeof(X) is const, get.size must be 0 mod 2^32.
> * So get.size must be a multiple of 2^32 to fool the system.
> * Since get.size itself is only a 32-bit quantity, you cannot
>  represent any value larger than 4294967295.
>
>
> What Was What Was Wanted.
>