mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>
To: Peter Dolding <oiaohm@gmail.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	<plautrba@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks
Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2018 14:34:10 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <63eaa2d5-3662-2240-15fb-ab2227b6903a@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANA3KFX_sVhqvV7C0kR1nkLijiwWc286KcPBfY94LOe=YKGBwg@mail.gmail.com>



On 05/04/18 13:31, Peter Dolding wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 7:55 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote:

[...]

>> A) hooks that are either const or marked as RO after init
>>
>> B) hooks that are writable for a short time, long enough to load
>> additional, non built-in modules, but then get locked down
>> I provided an example some time ago [1]
>>
>> C) hooks that are unloadable (and therefore always attackable?)

[...]

>> Do you have any specific case in mind where this trade-off would be
>> acceptable?
>>
> 
> A useful case for loadable/unloadable LSM is development automate QA.

I did not consider this case, but I see the point.

[...]

> I would say normal production machines being able to swap LSM like
> this does not have much use.

yes, this is what I had in mind

[...]

> There is a shade of grey between something being a security hazard and
> something being a useful feature.

Maybe the problem I see is only in the naming: if what right now is
addressed as "mutable" were to be called in some other way that does not
imply that it's impossible to lock it down, then I think there wouldn't
be much of a problem anymore.

How about s/mutable/protectable/g ?

Then it could be a boot time parameter to decide if the "extra" hooks
should be protected or stay writable, for example for performing more
extensive testing.

--
igor

  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-05 11:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-01  5:41 Sargun Dhillon
2018-04-01  5:41 ` [PATCH v4 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time Sargun Dhillon
2018-04-05  9:55 ` [PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks Igor Stoppa
2018-04-05 10:31   ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 11:34     ` Igor Stoppa [this message]
2018-04-05 12:28       ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-05 16:29     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-04-06  1:50       ` Sargun Dhillon
     [not found]       ` <CAMp4zn95V1BLg5n0MT6F1qGdu=aHxC7_kZr36tZ=pqYB80aQ7g@mail.gmail.com>
2018-04-06  4:12         ` Peter Dolding
2018-04-06 16:31           ` Casey Schaufler
2018-04-07  9:26             ` Peter Dolding

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=63eaa2d5-3662-2240-15fb-ab2227b6903a@huawei.com \
    --to=igor.stoppa@huawei.com \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=oiaohm@gmail.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=plautrba@redhat.com \
    --cc=sargun@sargun.me \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®