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Shutemov" , Dave Hansen , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Xin Li , Tim Merrifield , Ard Biesheuvel , Kai Huang , Kevin Loughlin , Thomas Zimmermann , Rick Edgecombe , Kees Cook , Mike Rapoport , Brian Gerst , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ajay Kaher , Alexey Makhalov , Broadcom internal kernel review list , virtualization@lists.linux.dev, alex.james@broadcom.com, doug.covelli@broadcom.com, jeffrey.sheldon@broadcom.com, kevin.christopher@broadcom.com, aravind-as.srinivasan@broadcom.com, ravindra.kumar@broadcom.com Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] Add prctl to allow userlevel TDX hypercalls Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2024 18:58:00 +0000 Message-Id: <651ceb5a89721621d522419e8a5d901632a78a22.1722019360.git.tim.merrifield@broadcom.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.40.1 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a new process-level prctl option to enable/disable user-level hypercalls when running in a confidential VM. Add support for checking this flag on VMCALL #VE for TDX and transfer control to a hypervisor vendor-specific handler. Signed-off-by: Tim Merrifield --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 078e2bac2553..02580fcf6157 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static int ve_instr_len(struct ve_info *ve) case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE: case EXIT_REASON_CPUID: case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION: + case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: /* It is safe to use ve->instr_len for #VE due instructions */ return ve->instr_len; case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION: @@ -634,6 +635,26 @@ void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve) ve->instr_info = upper_32_bits(args.r10); } +/* + * Handle user-initiated, hypervisor-specific VMCALLs. + */ +static int handle_user_vmcall(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve) +{ + int err; + + if (!x86_platform.hyper.tdx_hcall) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (!test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_COCO_USER_HCALL, ¤t->mm->context.flags)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + err = x86_platform.hyper.tdx_hcall(regs); + if (err) + return err; + + return ve_instr_len(ve); +} + /* * Handle the user initiated #VE. * @@ -645,6 +666,8 @@ static int virt_exception_user(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve) switch (ve->exit_reason) { case EXIT_REASON_CPUID: return handle_cpuid(regs, ve); + case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: + return handle_user_vmcall(regs, ve); default: pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason); return -EIO; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h index ce4677b8b735..626ab327e34c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #define MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM 2 /* Allow LAM and SVA coexisting */ #define MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA 3 +/* Allow COCO user-level hypercalls. */ +#define MM_CONTEXT_COCO_USER_HCALL 4 /* * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h index 213cf5379a5a..04d43b91d32a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ struct x86_hyper_runtime { void (*sev_es_hcall_prepare)(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs); bool (*sev_es_hcall_finish)(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs); bool (*is_private_mmio)(u64 addr); + int (*tdx_hcall)(struct pt_regs *regs); }; /** diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h index 384e2cc6ac19..37d154e503a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ #define ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM 0x1024 #define ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM 0x1025 +#define ARCH_GET_COCO_USER_HCALL 0x1030 +#define ARCH_SET_COCO_USER_HCALL 0x1031 + #define ARCH_XCOMP_TILECFG 17 #define ARCH_XCOMP_TILEDATA 18 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index f63f8fd00a91..198431919fd2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -1042,6 +1042,24 @@ unsigned long __get_wchan(struct task_struct *p) return addr; } +static int get_coco_user_hcall_mode(void) +{ + return !test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_COCO_USER_HCALL, + ¤t->mm->context.flags); +} + +static int set_coco_user_hcall_mode(unsigned long enabled) +{ + if (enabled) + set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_COCO_USER_HCALL, + ¤t->mm->context.flags); + else + clear_bit(MM_CONTEXT_COCO_USER_HCALL, + ¤t->mm->context.flags); + + return 0; +} + long do_arch_prctl_common(int option, unsigned long arg2) { switch (option) { @@ -1055,6 +1073,10 @@ long do_arch_prctl_common(int option, unsigned long arg2) case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: case ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM: return fpu_xstate_prctl(option, arg2); + case ARCH_GET_COCO_USER_HCALL: + return get_coco_user_hcall_mode(); + case ARCH_SET_COCO_USER_HCALL: + return set_coco_user_hcall_mode(arg2); } return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.1