From: Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>,
Nagarajan.Muthukrishnan@oracle.com,
Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
xemul@parallels.com
Subject: Re: [RESEND RFC] translate_pid API
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 16:52:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <65625f8c-d701-7407-3999-6ca30a59c236@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0FD747Vth=VQBNeJnFVKRxmd71Xu4atU650t0WxqOuFg@mail.gmail.com>
On 03/13/2018 04:10 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Nagarathnam Muthusamy
> <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com> wrote:
>> On 03/13/2018 03:00 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Nagarathnam Muthusamy
>>> <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>> On 03/13/2018 02:28 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:20 PM, Nagarathnam Muthusamy
>>>>> <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 03/13/2018 01:47 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 10:18 AM, <nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
> [...]
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(translate_pid, pid_t, pid, u64, source,
>>>>>>>> + u64, target)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + struct pid_namespace *source_ns = NULL, *target_ns = NULL;
>>>>>>>> + struct pid *struct_pid;
>>>>>>>> + struct pid_namespace *ph;
>>>>>>>> + struct hlist_bl_head *shead = NULL;
>>>>>>>> + struct hlist_bl_head *thead = NULL;
>>>>>>>> + struct hlist_bl_node *dup_node;
>>>>>>>> + pid_t result;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (!source) {
>>>>>>>> + source_ns = &init_pid_ns;
>>>>>>>> + } else {
>>>>>>>> + shead = pid_ns_hash_head(pid_ns_hash, source);
>>>>>>>> + hlist_bl_lock(shead);
>>>>>>>> + hlist_bl_for_each_entry(ph, dup_node, shead, node) {
>>>>>>>> + if (source == ph->ns.ns_id) {
>>>>>>>> + source_ns = ph;
>>>>>>>> + break;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + if (!source_ns) {
>>>>>>>> + hlist_bl_unlock(shead);
>>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + if (!ptrace_may_access(source_ns->child_reaper,
>>>>>>>> + PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
>>>>>>> AFAICS this proposal breaks the visibility restrictions that
>>>>>>> namespaces normally create. If there are two namespaces-based
>>>>>>> containers that use the same UID range, I don't think they should be
>>>>>>> able to learn information about each other, such as which PIDs are in
>>>>>>> use in the other container; but as far as I can tell, your proposal
>>>>>>> makes it possible to do that (unless an LSM or so is interfering). I
>>>>>>> would prefer it if this API required visibility of the targeted PID
>>>>>>> namespaces in the caller's PID namespace.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am trying to simulate the same access restrictions allowed
>>>>>> on a process's /proc/<pid>/ns/pid file. If the translator has
>>>>>> access to /proc/<pid>/ns/pid file of both source and destination
>>>>>> namespaces, shouldn't it be allowed to translate the pid between
>>>>>> them?
>>>>> But the translator doesn't actually need to have access to those
>>>>> procfs files, right?
>>>> I thought it should have access to those procfs files to satisfy the
>>>> visibility constraint that targeted PID namespaces should be visible
>>>> in caller's PID namespace and ptrace_may_access checks that
>>>> constraint.
>>> If there are two containers that use the same UID range,
>>> ptrace_may_access() checks from a process in one container on a
>>> process in another container can pass. Normally, you just can't even
>>> reach the ptrace_may_access() checks because you can't reference
>>> processes in another container in any way.
>>
>> If there is no way to reference the process in another container,
>> there is no way to get to the /proc/<pid>/ns/pidns_id file which
>> exports the ID of that container right? So, a translator has to
>> first guess the container ID then try translate. Even after translation,
>> unless the translator has proper privileges, I believe it cant do
>> anything with just the pid right?
> Well, yes to both. You'd have to guess the ID of the container, and
> you wouldn't be able to do much with it, apart from finding valid PIDs
> and their mapping between namespaces.
>
>>> By the way, a related concern: The use of global identifiers will
>>> probably also negatively affect Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace?
>> Will look into this. Can you point me to the specifics of the
>> usecase which could be negatively affected?
> AFAICS you won't be able to reliably recreate namespace IDs when a
> process is checkpointed and resumed, meaning that checkpoint/resume
> won't work on processes that use these namespace IDs.
I agree. When the process is resumed, the namespace IDs
might be obsolete.
Thanks,
Nagarathnam.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-13 23:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-12 17:18 nagarathnam.muthusamy
2018-03-13 20:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-03-13 21:20 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-13 21:28 ` Jann Horn
2018-03-13 21:44 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-13 22:00 ` Jann Horn
2018-03-13 22:45 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-13 23:10 ` Jann Horn
2018-03-13 23:52 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy [this message]
2018-03-14 3:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 21:22 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-14 22:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-20 20:14 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-21 0:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:11 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 00/11] ipc: Fixing the pid namespace support Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 01/11] sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-03-28 23:20 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 02/11] shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm " Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 03/11] msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue " Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:55 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-03-24 5:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 04/11] sem: Move struct sem and struct sem_array into ipc/sem.c Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 05/11] shm: Move struct shmid_kernel into ipc/shm.c Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 06/11] msg: Move struct msg_queue into ipc/msg.c Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 07/11] ipc: Move IPCMNI from include/ipc.h into ipc/util.h Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 08/11] ipc/util: Helpers for making the sysvipc operations pid namespace aware Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 09/11] ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:17 ` NAGARATHNAM MUTHUSAMY
2018-03-23 21:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:41 ` NAGARATHNAM MUTHUSAMY
2018-03-28 23:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-28 23:18 ` Nagarathnam Muthusamy
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 10/11] ipc/msg: Fix msgctl(..., " Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-23 21:21 ` NAGARATHNAM MUTHUSAMY
2018-03-23 19:16 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 11/11] ipc/sem: Fix semctl(..., GETPID, " Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-29 0:52 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-30 19:09 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-30 20:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-30 20:45 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-04-02 11:11 ` Manfred Spraul
2018-03-24 5:40 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 12/11] ipc: Directly call the security hook in ipc_ops.associate Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-28 23:40 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-31 2:13 ` James Morris
2018-03-24 5:42 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 13/11] ipc/smack: Tidy up from the change in type of the ipc security hooks Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-25 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-03-28 23:38 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-28 23:57 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-29 1:12 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 00/11] ipc: Fixing the pid namespace support Davidlohr Bueso
2018-03-29 18:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
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