From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 18:34:14 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <65cad52616ffa_29b129412@dwillia2-mobl3.amr.corp.intel.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <afabdd17-7f1e-4d8c-a7c2-dbbbb230fccf@amd.com>
Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 2/2/24 01:10, Dan Williams wrote:
> > Tom Lendacky wrote:
> >> When an SVSM is present, the guest can also request attestation reports
> >> from the SVSM. These SVSM attestation reports can be used to attest the
> >> SVSM and any services running within the SVSM.
> >>
> >> Extend the config-fs attestation support to allow for an SVSM attestation
> >> report. This involves creating four (4) new config-fs attributes:
> >>
> >> - 'svsm' (input)
> >> This attribute is used to determine whether the attestation request
> >> should be sent to the SVSM or to the SEV firmware.
> >>
> >> - 'service_guid' (input)
> >> Used for requesting the attestation of a single service within the
> >> SVSM. A null GUID implies that the SVSM_ATTEST_SERVICES call should
> >> be used to request the attestation report. A non-null GUID implies
> >> that the SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE call should be used.
> >>
> >> - 'service_version' (input)
> >> Used with the SVSM_ATTEST_SINGLE_SERVICE call, the service version
> >> represents a specific service manifest version be used for the
> >> attestation report.
> >>
> >> - 'manifestblob' (output)
> >> Used to return the service manifest associated with the attestation
> >> report.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> >> ---
> >> Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm | 55 ++++++++++
> >> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 31 +++++-
> >> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 50 +++++++++
> >> drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c | 95 +++++++++++++++-
> >> include/linux/tsm.h | 11 ++
> >> 6 files changed, 376 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm
> >> index dd24202b5ba5..c5423987d323 100644
> >> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm
> >> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm
> >> @@ -31,6 +31,21 @@ Description:
> >> Standardization v2.03 Section 4.1.8.1 MSG_REPORT_REQ.
> >> https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/56421.pdf
> >>
> >> +What: /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/$name/manifestblob
> >> +Date: January, 2024
> >> +KernelVersion: v6.9
> >> +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
> >> +Description:
> >> + (RO) Optional supplemental data that a TSM may emit, visibility
> >> + of this attribute depends on TSM, and may be empty if no
> >> + manifest data is available.
> >> +
> >> + When @provider is "sev_guest" and the "svsm" attribute is set
> >> + this file contains the service manifest used for the SVSM
> >> + attestation report from Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP
> >> + Guests v1.00 Section 7.
> >> + https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf
> >
> > I wish configfs had better dynamic visibility so that this could be
> > hidden when not active... oh well.
>
> So do I. I played with the idea of having two different structs and
> registering one or the other based on whether an SVSM was present. Thoughts?
That's the status quo for the differences between TDX vs SEV
(tsm_report_default_type vs tsm_report_extra_type). I think a
"tsm_report_service_type " can be a new superset of
tsm_report_extra_type. That that just starts to get messy if
implementations start to pick and choose on a finer granularity what
they support. For example, what if TDX supports these new service
attributes, but not privlevel.
It seems straightforward to add an is_visible() callback to
'struct configfs_item_operations'. Then a common superset of all the
attributes could be specified, but with an is_visible() implementation
that consults with data registered with tsm_register() rather than the
@type argument directly.
[..]
> >> +What: /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/$name/svsm
> >> +Date: January, 2024
> >> +KernelVersion: v6.9
> >> +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
> >> +Description:
> >> + (WO) Attribute is visible if a TSM implementation provider
> >> + supports the concept of attestation reports for TVMs running
> >> + under an SVSM, like SEV-SNP. Specifying any non-zero value
> >
> > Just use kstrtobool just to have a bit more form to it, and who knows
> > maybe keeping some non-zero numbers reserved turns out useful someday.
> >
> > ...or see below, maybe this shouldn't be an "svsm" flag.
> >
> >> + implies that the attestation report should come from the SVSM.
> >> + Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests v1.00 Section 7.
> >> + https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf
> >
> > So this affects the output format of outblob? I think @outblob should
> > probably document the fact that it depends on @provider, @privlevel, and
> > now @svsm. Probably all of the format links should live under @outblob
> > not @provider.
>
> It doesn't change the output format, it is still a standard SNP
> attestation report. What changes is that a SHA-512 hash of the nonce and
> the manifest are taken and passed as report data as opposed to just the
> nonce value.
If it is the same format, and the input is user controlled then I am
confused what the new ABI is selecting? Could it not be inferred by
privlevel?
[..]
> >> +
> >> +What: /sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/$name/service_version
> >> +Date: January, 2024
> >> +KernelVersion: v6.9
> >> +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
> >> +Description:
> >> + (WO) Attribute is visible if a TSM implementation provider
> >> + supports the concept of attestation reports for TVMs running
> >> + under an SVSM, like SEV-SNP. Indicates the service manifest
> >> + version requested for the attestation report.
> >> + Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests v1.00 Section 7.
> >> + https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf
> >
> > Perhaps document that version 1 is assumed and is always compatible?
>
> Can do.
>
> >
> > What prompts new versions and how does that discovered by guest software?
>
> New versions will depend on the service that is running. Changes or
> updates to that service would document the new versions manifest output.
> There isn't currently a discoverable way other than calling with the
> requested version and seeing if an error is returned.
>
> A possible extension to the SVSM attestation protocol could create a
> version query call.
Can the version be made to not matter, or be inferred by the presence of
a new enumerated service capability? For example, make the same compat
guarantees that ACPI methods do between versions where extensions are
optional and software can always use v1 without breaking? Otherwise, I
am not grokking what software should do with this version.
Separately, is this a version for the service protocol or a version of
the manifest format? The description makes it sound like the latter, but
the "service_version" name makes it sound like the former.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-13 2:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-26 22:15 [PATCH 00/11] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under " Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 01/11] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 0:05 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 02/11] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 03/11] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 04/11] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 0:45 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 14:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 0:59 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 15:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:15 ` [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:16 ` [PATCH 07/11] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-01-29 10:41 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-29 15:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:16 ` [PATCH 08/11] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 1:06 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-27 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:16 ` [PATCH 09/11] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:16 ` [PATCH 10/11] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-01-27 1:27 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-01-29 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-29 20:04 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-02-01 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-02 7:10 ` Dan Williams
2024-02-05 23:29 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-02-06 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-06 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-13 2:34 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2024-02-16 19:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-16 20:46 ` Dan Williams
2024-02-23 20:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-24 0:02 ` Dan Williams
2024-02-26 14:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26 22:16 ` [PATCH 11/11] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
2024-02-12 10:40 ` [PATCH 00/11] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Reshetova, Elena
2024-02-16 19:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-19 16:57 ` Shutemov, Kirill
2024-02-19 17:54 ` Reshetova, Elena
2024-02-23 20:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-27 14:56 ` Reshetova, Elena
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