From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23095C433FE for ; Mon, 7 Mar 2022 00:50:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234570AbiCGAu6 (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Mar 2022 19:50:58 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50842 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230094AbiCGAu5 (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Mar 2022 19:50:57 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 679513B3C8 for ; Sun, 6 Mar 2022 16:50:04 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1646614203; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=X0WG0rMGlmRyCSVW27fz8I+A01cj7PGLERfFubH34gE=; b=FfSH6FreMu+tWomu+esqGZR+vG5qo1eyq0rdeSceI1xgvqW1HvkszG9VWe7Ljel+Jte5O6 cGW84g+8B2uj4k5R2NvGaII+oaAnvfteSRtoeJUeLTVWml6sGwEjK7thSokBovWfCVoK47 dnCnaFl35MzyTcZTxZXYmq1c1pxHGx0= Received: from mail-pg1-f199.google.com (mail-pg1-f199.google.com [209.85.215.199]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-441-cigbggRyN9GM8cYU-ywGJg-1; Sun, 06 Mar 2022 19:50:02 -0500 X-MC-Unique: cigbggRyN9GM8cYU-ywGJg-1 Received: by mail-pg1-f199.google.com with SMTP id v4-20020a63f844000000b003745fd0919aso7549137pgj.20 for ; Sun, 06 Mar 2022 16:50:02 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding :content-language; bh=X0WG0rMGlmRyCSVW27fz8I+A01cj7PGLERfFubH34gE=; b=zT/vqcynht+IEDIDg19C7rkzKg/VX/cpLPEGIiFoocr1FCb/30BI3iRil59MlWsipN 2hBp8t5iLCKGR2+64bK5eJnYBRYLewR3IbEhRbQ7uuO/tanPLKA70lDCml9Bob5TOsak T3ijFwm6BUBdGR/uOrKz5nj1qmy2Owurg/ftM66vvNK++lfPTN2pWlWBU40OvhaZGkfk E6eItwMH5u3qF9+GwcNWk2UbtirzOJI6QiQ9UvkepZ4xLESjyRxqPJ6iX+UkU9xx4X18 FLD3hfGjzhEQz753e0XhzgaYCSTDaGPt8KkpWbLmfr/pidpErBfRz64H/3csdGUKP7/w c1Zg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530I1eZt2D442gEoLIqHESYkLi7xNlnjVGvXpJfxoYX0knJQfD1d ObeyVaJrJ6gQWxQMIpcQZSaf1ZQZj2wbMQ8ZH1fr5dQugLjenoH8eXUwOnDm8DpUUfvjr1u5Dvx M23zUfrbXkPA9ugQ1H3w0/fYdVjtPICe+APjYB8QsdFs/++StxQi1K1/og1c7SQygAHKhzGqD2Q == X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:33d2:b0:1bf:3b3f:cb60 with SMTP id lk18-20020a17090b33d200b001bf3b3fcb60mr10361469pjb.109.1646614200782; Sun, 06 Mar 2022 16:50:00 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxC9zybjienDQLfBb7NOhznbeTld6GwzNfEZil7xkCfHpWgcb+T0CDdcoM0zmVBwdrCx4gnzw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:33d2:b0:1bf:3b3f:cb60 with SMTP id lk18-20020a17090b33d200b001bf3b3fcb60mr10361444pjb.109.1646614200441; Sun, 06 Mar 2022 16:50:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.72.13.171] ([209.132.188.80]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s8-20020a056a0008c800b004f664655937sm14066594pfu.157.2022.03.06.16.49.57 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 06 Mar 2022 16:49:59 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] ceph: minor fixes and encrypted snapshot names To: =?UTF-8?Q?Lu=c3=ads_Henriques?= , Jeff Layton Cc: Ilya Dryomov , ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20220304161403.19295-1-lhenriques@suse.de> <87fsnx4rb3.fsf@brahms.olymp> <878rtoo3bi.fsf@brahms.olymp> From: Xiubo Li Message-ID: <66d31a84-2774-3fa1-2a0e-e9125c484755@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2022 08:49:54 +0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.10.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <878rtoo3bi.fsf@brahms.olymp> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 3/5/22 10:56 PM, Luís Henriques wrote: > Jeff Layton writes: > >> On Fri, 2022-03-04 at 16:26 +0000, Luís Henriques wrote: >>> Luís Henriques writes: >>> >>>> Hi! >>>> >>>> I'm sending another iteration of the encrypted snapshot names patch. This >>>> patch assumes PR#45224 [1] to be merged as it adds support for the >>>> alternate names. >>>> >>>> Two notes: >>>> >>>> 1. Patch 0001 is just a small fix from another fscrypt patch. It's >>>> probably better to simply squash it. >>>> >>>> 2. I'm not sure how easy it is to hit the UAF fixed by patch 0002. I can >>>> reproduce it easily by commenting the code that adds the >>>> DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in patch 0003. >>> Obviously, immediately after sending this patchset I realized I failed to >>> mention a very (*VERY*) important note: >>> >>> Snapshot names can not start with a '_'. I think the reason is related >>> with the 'long snapshot names', but I can't really remember the details >>> anymore. The point is that an encrypted snapshot name base64-encoded >>> *may* end-up starting with an '_' as we're using the base64-url variant. >>> >>> I really don't know if it's possible to fix that. I guess that in that >>> case the user will get an error and fail to create the snapshot but he'll >>> be clueless because the reason. Probably a warning can be added to the >>> kernel logs, but maybe there are other ideas. >>> >> >> Ouch. Is that imposed by the MDS? It'd be best if we could remove that >> limitation from it altogether if we can. > I do remember hitting this limitation in the past, but a quick grep didn't > show anything in the documentation about it. This seems to have been > added to the MDS a *long* time ago, with commit 068553473c82 ("mds: adjust > trace encoding, clean up snap naming") but (as usual) there aren't a lot > of details. When making a snapshot and in MDS code: 10458   if (snapname.length() == 0 || 10459       snapname[0] == '_') { 10460     respond_to_request(mdr, -CEPHFS_EINVAL); 10461     return; 10462   } >> If we can't, then we might be able to get away with prepending all the >> encrypted names with some legal characte. Then when we go to decrypt it >> we just strip that off. > This is probably the best way to fix it, but it's worth trying to find > out the origins of this limitation. I do seem to remember some obscure > reasons, related with the long snap names (for which Xiubo has a patch), > which will start with '_'. But yeah I'll have to go dig deeper. It will recognize the encrypted "_XYZ_${DIGIT}" snapshot name as the long snapshot name inherited from its parent snap realm, and will parse the "${DIGIT}" as an ino in other places. Maybe in MDS we should fail the request only when snapshot name is in type of "_XYZ_${DIGIT}" instead of only "_XYZ", and in client side should also print one error or warn log about this ? This why added the ceph PR[1] to tell the kclient current snapshot name is a long snap name in lssnap. So if we can forbid the snap shot name begin with '_' it will simple in kclient code to handle the long snap name, or it will be complex in both MDS and kclient. [1] https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/45208 -- Xiubo >> We could also consider changing the base64 routine to use something else >> in lieu of '_' but that's more of a hassle. > Cheers,