From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: KPrateek.Nayak@amd.com, Michael.Roth@amd.com,
Nathan.Fontenot@amd.com, Tycho.Andersen@amd.com, aik@amd.com,
ardb@kernel.org, babu.moger@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
darwi@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
davem@davemloft.net, dyoung@redhat.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, hpa@zytor.com, jackyli@google.com,
jacobhxu@google.com, john.allen@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, nikunj@amd.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
peterz@infradead.org, pgonda@google.com, rientjes@google.com,
seanjc@google.com, tglx@kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, xin@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] x86/sev: add support for RMPOPT instruction
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 21:14:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <66ddc571-1d3f-4cfd-a2a6-8e66be861e83@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4698d9ba-7030-4447-89c0-c992b776377b@amd.com>
On 3/25/2026 9:02 PM, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>
> On 3/25/2026 7:40 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 25/03/2026 9:53 pm, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>>> On 3/4/2026 9:56 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> It should be:
>>>>
>>>> static inline bool __rmpopt(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fn)
>>>> {
>>>> bool res;
>>>>
>>>> asm volatile (".byte 0xf2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfc"
>>>> : "=ccc" (res)
>>>> : "a" (addr), "c" (fn));
>>>>
>>>> return res;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>> The above constraints to use on_each_cpu_mask() is forcing the use of:
>>>
>>> void rmpopt(void *val)
>>
>> No. You don't break your thin wrapper in order to force it into a
>> wrong-shaped hole.
>>
>> You need something like this:
>>
>> void do_rmpopt_optimise(void *val)
>> {
>> unsigned long addr = *(unsigned long *)val;
>>
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(__rmpopt(addr, OPTIMISE));
>> }
>>
>> to invoke the wrapper safely from the IPI. That will at obvious when
>> something wrong occurs.
>
> This wrapper i can/will use, but doing a WARN_ON_ONCE() is probably avoidable as
> there will be ranges where RMPOPT will always fail, such as while checking
> the RMP table entries itself, so there is a good chance that we will always trigger
> the WARN_ON_ONCE() on the memory range containing the RMP table.
>
To add, the above is in context of the current implementation, where we scan all
memory up-to 2TB for applying RMP optimizations when SNP is enabled (and/or SNP_INIT).
We will *always* get this stack trace during booting, so i think it makes sense
to avoid this WARN_ON_ONCE().
Thanks,
Ashish
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-26 2:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-02 21:35 [PATCH v2 0/7] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 21:35 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_RMPOPT feature flag Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 23:00 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-05 12:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-02 21:35 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] x86/sev: add support for enabling RMPOPT Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 22:32 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-02 22:55 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-02 23:00 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-02 23:11 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-02 22:33 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-06 15:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-06 15:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-03-02 21:36 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] x86/sev: add support for RMPOPT instruction Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 22:57 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-02 23:09 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-02 23:15 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-04 15:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-04 16:03 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-25 21:53 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-26 0:40 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-26 2:02 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-26 2:14 ` Kalra, Ashish [this message]
2026-03-04 15:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-04 15:25 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-04 15:32 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-05 1:40 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-05 19:22 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-05 19:40 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-11 21:24 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-11 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-16 19:03 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-18 14:00 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-02 21:36 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] x86/sev: Add interface to re-enable RMP optimizations Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 21:36 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] KVM: guest_memfd: Add cleanup interface for guest teardown Ashish Kalra
2026-03-09 9:01 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-03-10 22:18 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-11 6:00 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-03-11 21:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-27 17:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-03-31 4:45 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-03-02 21:37 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] KVM: SEV: Implement SEV-SNP specific guest cleanup Ashish Kalra
2026-03-02 21:37 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] x86/sev: Add debugfs support for RMPOPT Ashish Kalra
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