From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Linus Torvalds' <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
'Arnd Bergmann' <arnd@kernel.org>,
"'Mikel Rychliski'" <mikel@mikelr.com>,
'Thomas Gleixner' <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"'Ingo Molnar'" <mingo@redhat.com>,
'Borislav Petkov' <bp@alien8.de>,
'Dave Hansen' <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"'H. Peter Anvin'" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86: Allow user accesses to the base of the guard page
Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 18:48:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <680c14b5af9d43d6bc70d2c1e9321e01@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
A user buffer can validly end with the last valid user address.
In that case access_ok(ptr, size) will check that 'ptr + size'
is a valid user address - and it needs to succeed.
access_ok() can't decrement the length because access_ok(ptr, 0)
also has to be valid.
Any actual access will fault.
Fixes: 86e6b1547b3d0 ("x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue")
Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 06a516f6795b..ca327cfa42ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -2389,12 +2389,12 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
alternative_instructions();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
- unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX-1;
+ unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
/*
* Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
- USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+ USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE;
*/
runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX);
--
2.17.1
-
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next reply other threads:[~2024-11-23 18:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-23 18:48 David Laight [this message]
2024-11-23 19:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-23 22:36 ` David Laight
2024-11-23 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-24 0:24 ` Mikel Rychliski
2024-11-24 0:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-24 3:10 ` Mikel Rychliski
2024-11-24 10:28 ` David Laight
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