From: syzbot <syzbot+e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] ecryptfs: validate auth_tok key payload size before use
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 21:12:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ab2001c.3179f8cd.1e36b2.0026.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6ab152fc.71f81b7d.15fa6d.0030.GAE@google.com>
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***
Subject: [PATCH] ecryptfs: validate auth_tok key payload size before use
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com
#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() casts a "user" type key's raw
payload directly to struct ecryptfs_auth_tok without checking that
the key actually holds enough data to back that struct. Since a
user-type key's payload length is fully attacker-controlled via
add_key(2), an undersized key whose description matches
global_default_fnek_sig lets later code (e.g.
ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet()) read fields such as
session_key_encryption_key/session_key_encryption_key_bytes past the
end of the actual allocation, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Reject the key up front if its datalen is smaller than
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok).
Reported-by: syzbot+e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 51651314b7a6..81768a0e43b1 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -462,6 +462,15 @@ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
goto out;
}
+ if (auth_tok_key->datalen < sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Auth tok key payload too small "
+ "(have %d bytes; need %zu)\n",
+ auth_tok_key->datalen, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok));
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ *auth_tok = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Data structure version mismatch. Userspace "
"tools must match eCryptfs kernel module with major "
--
2.43.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-22 4:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-21 15:53 [syzbot] [ecryptfs?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet syzbot
2026-09-22 4:12 ` syzbot [this message]
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