mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: syzbot <syzbot+e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Forwarded: [PATCH] ecryptfs: validate auth_tok key payload size before use
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 21:12:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6ab2001c.3179f8cd.1e36b2.0026.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6ab152fc.71f81b7d.15fa6d.0030.GAE@google.com>

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com.

***

Subject: [PATCH] ecryptfs: validate auth_tok key payload size before use
Author: kartikey406@gmail.com

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master



ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() casts a "user" type key's raw
payload directly to struct ecryptfs_auth_tok without checking that
the key actually holds enough data to back that struct. Since a
user-type key's payload length is fully attacker-controlled via
add_key(2), an undersized key whose description matches
global_default_fnek_sig lets later code (e.g.
ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet()) read fields such as
session_key_encryption_key/session_key_encryption_key_bytes past the
end of the actual allocation, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.

Reject the key up front if its datalen is smaller than
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok).

Reported-by: syzbot+e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 51651314b7a6..81768a0e43b1 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -462,6 +462,15 @@ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (auth_tok_key->datalen < sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Auth tok key payload too small "
+                       "(have %d bytes; need %zu)\n",
+                       auth_tok_key->datalen, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok));
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		*auth_tok = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Data structure version mismatch. Userspace "
 		       "tools must match eCryptfs kernel module with major "
-- 
2.43.0


      reply	other threads:[~2026-09-22  4:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-21 15:53 [syzbot] [ecryptfs?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet syzbot
2026-09-22  4:12 ` syzbot [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=6ab2001c.3179f8cd.1e36b2.0026.GAE@google.com \
    --to=syzbot+e4391e0d6e7c89b8c84e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®