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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
To: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>, Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>,
	Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>,
	Dai Ngo <Dai.Ngo@oracle.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] NFSD: harden svcxdr_dupstr() and svcxdr_tmpalloc() against integer overflows
Date: Thu, 9 May 2024 16:26:19 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <70f5c9cf-aa7d-4309-8ed7-48e303ea1be7@moroto.mountain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZjzNdLynC7WxwLno@tissot.1015granger.net>

On Thu, May 09, 2024 at 09:19:48AM -0400, Chuck Lever wrote:
> On Thu, May 09, 2024 at 01:48:28PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > These lengths come from xdr_stream_decode_u32() and so we should be a
> > bit careful with them.  Use size_add() and struct_size() to avoid
> > integer overflows.  Saving size_add()/struct_size() results to a u32 is
> > unsafe because it truncates away the high bits.
> > 
> > Also generally storing sizes in longs is safer.  Most systems these days
> > use 64 bit CPUs.  It's harder for an addition to overflow 64 bits than
> > it is to overflow 32 bits.  Also functions like vmalloc() can
> > successfully allocate UINT_MAX bytes, but nothing can allocate ULONG_MAX
> > bytes.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > I think my patch 1 fixes any real issues.  It's hard to assign a Fixes
> > tag to this.
> 
> I agree that this is a defensive change only. As it is late in the
> cycle and this doesn't seem urgent, I would prefer to queue this
> change for v6.11.
> 

Sounds good.  I would imagine that eventually it will make its way back
to the stable kernels but it's not a rush.

regards,
dan carpenter


      reply	other threads:[~2024-05-09 13:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-09 10:47 [PATCH 0/2] NFSD: prevent " Dan Carpenter
2024-05-09 10:48 ` [PATCH 1/2] SUNRPC: prevent integer overflow in XDR_QUADLEN() Dan Carpenter
2024-05-09 20:22   ` kernel test robot
2024-05-09 21:34   ` kernel test robot
2024-05-09 10:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] NFSD: harden svcxdr_dupstr() and svcxdr_tmpalloc() against integer overflows Dan Carpenter
2024-05-09 13:19   ` Chuck Lever
2024-05-09 13:26     ` Dan Carpenter [this message]

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