From: Harshal Dev <harshal.dev@oss.qualcomm.com>
To: Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi@oss.qualcomm.com>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@oss.qualcomm.com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>,
Konrad Dybcio <konradybcio@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>,
Basant Kumar <basantk@qti.qualcomm.com>,
Apurupa Pattapu <apurupa@qti.qualcomm.com>,
Arun Kumar Neelakantam <aneelaka@qti.qualcomm.com>,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] firmware: qcom: Add support for TEE based EFI-var client driver
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 16:04:48 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <74b6139b-a767-41fd-a628-a7d42a6c3aec@oss.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ba0522df-8cdf-4510-96f8-748e0a419742@oss.qualcomm.com>
Hi Amir,
On 09-10-2026 08:04 am, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote:
>
>
> On 10/6/2026 10:33 PM, Harshal Dev wrote:
>> On Qualcomm SoC based platforms, UEFI stores EFI variables within the
>> Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) located within either the UFS,
>> eMMC or SPI-NOR storage. The RPMB key which is one-time programmed into
>> the storage controller to allow authentication of the RPMB frames is
>> generated by and only available to the Qualcomm Trusted Execution
>> Environment (QTEE).
>>
>> The legacy QSEECOM protocol used for communicating with the QTEE is
>> deprecated and replaced with the use-case agnostic SMCInvoke protocol
>> starting with the Qualcomm SM8x50 series. On platforms where the QSEECOM
>> driver still probes, it does not support a listener interface with QTEE
>> to enable writing of non-volatile EFI variables to the RPMB for UFS and
>> eMMC storage.
>> Therefore on such platforms, a TEE client driver which communicates with
>> QTEE via the SMCInvoke protocol implemented by the QCOMTEE driver (and
>> registered with the TEE subsystem) must be used to update such EFI
>> variables.
>>
>> Add support for a TEE based uefisecapp client driver which installs efivar
>> operations after obtaining an object reference to the uefisecapp service.
>> This enables the kernel/user-space to access or modify both volatile EFI
>> variables stored by the Secure Application (in-memory) and non-volatile
>> ones stored within RPMB.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Harshal Dev <harshal.dev@oss.qualcomm.com>
>> ---
>> MAINTAINERS | 6 +
>> drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig | 31 ++
>> drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile | 1 +
>> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee_uefisecapp.c | 648 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 686 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
>> index 30c1cdd0fb38..7ccedad8d388 100644
>> --- a/MAINTAINERS
>> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
>> @@ -22981,6 +22981,12 @@ L: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
>> S: Maintained
>> F: drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.c
>>
>> +QUALCOMM TEE UEFISECAPP DRIVER
>> +M: Harshal Dev <harshal.dev@oss.qualcomm.com>
>> +L: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
>> +S: Maintained
>> +F: drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee_uefisecapp.c
>> +
>> QUALCOMM PINCTRL DRIVERS
>> M: Bartosz Golaszewski <brgl@kernel.org>
>> L: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig
>> index 3ad22f8fc3e5..694d98fef4f4 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig
>> @@ -79,4 +79,35 @@ config QCOM_QSEECOM_UEFISECAPP
>> Select Y here to provide access to EFI variables on the aforementioned
>> platforms.
>>
>> +config QCOM_TEE_UEFISECAPP
>> + tristate "Qualcomm TEE UEFI Secure App client driver"
>> + depends on QCOMTEE
>> + depends on EFI
>> + help
>> + The QSEECOM protocol used for communicating with the Qualcomm Trusted
>> + Execution Environment (QTEE) is deprecated and replaced with the SMCInvoke
>> + protocol starting with the Qualcomm SM8x50 series. On platforms where the
>> + QSEECOM protocol still works (the QSEECOM driver probes) the driver does
>> + not support a listener interface with QTEE to enable writing of
>> + non-volatile EFI variables (via listener requests to Linux) in the Replay
>> + Protected Memory Block (RPMB) located on UFS/eMMC storage.
>> + Therefore on such platforms, the TEE based uefisecapp client driver
>> + (which communicates with QTEE via the SMCInvoke protocol) must be used
>> + to update such EFI variables through the RPMB service hosted in the QTEE
>> + supplicant user-space daemon (github.com/qualcomm/minkipc) which forwards
>> + RPMB packets to the RPMB device.
>> + NOTE: Qualcomm Compute platforms with SPI-NOR storage are an exception to
>> + this scenario. Since they do not have a firmware running on their SPI-NOR
>> + storage controller which must be programmed with a RPMB key, QTEE has a
>> + SPI-NOR driver which holds the key, and so the QSEECOM driver can be used
>> + for updating EFI variables on these platforms because QTEE never makes a
>> + listener request to Linux (QTEE doesn't need the Linux SPI-NOR driver).
>> +
>> + This module provides a TEE client driver for uefisecapp, installing efivar
>> + operations to allow the kernel and user-space access to EFI variables.
>> +
>> + Select m here to provide access to EFI variables on the aforementioned
>> + platforms if your Linux distribution has QTEE supplicant installed and
>> + running.
>> +
>> endmenu
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile
>> index 88ce74d74c3e..237192b74de3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile
>> @@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ CFLAGS_qcom_scm-smc.o := -I$(src)
>> obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_TZMEM) += qcom_tzmem.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_QSEECOM) += qcom_qseecom.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_QSEECOM_UEFISECAPP) += qcom_qseecom_uefisecapp.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_TEE_UEFISECAPP) += qcom_tee_uefisecapp.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_PAS) += qcom_pas.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_PAS_TEE) += qcom_pas_tee.o
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee_uefisecapp.c b/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee_uefisecapp.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..acb1709c0a53
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee_uefisecapp.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (c) Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/efi.h>
>> +#include <linux/tee.h>
>> +#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
>> +#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
>> +
>> +#define QCOMTEE_OP_CLIENT_ENV_OPEN 0
>> +#define QCOMTEE_ROOT_OP_REG_WITH_CREDENTIALS 5
>> +
>> +/* Each service exposed by QTEE is identified by a 32-bit UID */
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_UID 413
>> +
>> +/* Operations supported by the UEFI Sec App service */
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_VAR 0
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_SET_VAR 1
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_QUERY_VAR_INFO 2
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_NEXT_VAR_NAME 3
>> +
>> +#define QCOMTEE_GET_VAR_NPARAMS 5
>> +#define QCOMTEE_SET_VAR_NPARAMS 4
>> +#define QCOMTEE_QUERY_VAR_NPARAMS 2
>> +#define QCOMTEE_GET_NEXT_VAR_NPARAMS 4
>> +#define QCOMTEE_GET_UEFI_SVC_NPARAMS 2
>> +#define QCOMTEE_GET_CLIENT_ENV_NPARAMS 2
>> +
>> +/* Error codes returned by the UEFI Sec App service */
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_SUCCESS 0
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER 10
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED 11
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_WRITE_PROTECTED 12
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SECURITY_VIOLATION 13
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_DEVICE_ERROR 14
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_RESOURCES 15
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_VOLUME_CORRUPTED 16
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SIZE_OUT 17
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_NOT_FOUND 18
>> +#define QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_ALREADY_STARTED 19
>> +
>> +/* Operations for objects are 32-bit. QCOMTEE transport uses the upper 16 bits. */
>> +#define QCOMTEE_MSG_OBJECT_OP_MASK GENMASK(15, 0)
>> +#define QCOMTEE_MSG_OBJECT_OP_RELEASE (QCOMTEE_MSG_OBJECT_OP_MASK - 0)
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * struct qcomtee_uefisec_app - An instance of UEFI Secure Application.
>> + * @dev: TEE client device on the TEE bus which represents uefisecapp.
>> + * @ctx: The context opened with the TEE subsystem by the uefisecapp client.
>> + * @uefisec_svc_obj: A TEE object representing the uefisecapp service.
>> + * @efivars: EFI variables registered with the EFI subsystem.
>> + */
>> +struct qcomtee_uefisec_app {
>> + struct device *dev;
>> + struct tee_context *ctx;
>> + struct tee_param_objref uefisec_svc_obj;
>> + struct efivars efivars;
>> +};
>> +
>> +#define UEFISECAPP_UUID \
>> + UUID_INIT(0x01f95dcd, 0x2d7e, 0x58be, \
>> + 0xa1, 0x43, 0x81, 0x32, 0xa1, 0x72, 0xdb, 0x7d)
>> +
>> +/* Short-hands for these long attribute names */
>> +#define UBUF_INPUT TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_UBUF_INPUT
>> +#define UBUF_OUTPUT TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_UBUF_OUTPUT
>> +#define OBJREF_INPUT TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF_INPUT
>> +#define OBJREF_OUTPUT TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF_OUTPUT
>> +
>> +/* Init instance of 'struct tee_param_objref'. */
>> +#define SET_TEE_PARAM_OBJREF(param, attri, obj_id, obj_flag) do { \
>> + (param).attr = (attri); \
>> + (param).u.objref.id = (obj_id); \
>> + (param).u.objref.flags = (obj_flag); \
>> + } while (0)
>> +
>> +/* Init instance of 'struct tee_param_ubuf'. */
>> +#define SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param, attri, ubuff) do { \
>> + (param).attr = (attri); \
>> + (param).u.ubuf = (ubuff); \
>> + } while (0)
>> +
>> +#define TEE_PARAM_UBUF(x) ((struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = &(x), sizeof(x) })
>> +
>> +#define SET_INVOKE_ARG(arg, object_id, opp, nparam) do { \
>> + (arg).id = (object_id); \
>> + (arg).op = (opp); \
>> + (arg).num_params = (nparam); \
>> + } while (0)
>> +
>> +static inline efi_status_t uefisecapp_err_to_efi_status(u32 err)
>> +{
>> + switch (err) {
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_SUCCESS:
>> + return EFI_SUCCESS;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER:
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED:
>> + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_WRITE_PROTECTED:
>> + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
>> + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_DEVICE_ERROR:
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_RESOURCES:
>> + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SIZE_OUT:
>> + return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
>> +
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_NOT_FOUND:
>> + return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
>> +
>> + /* No matching on EFI_* list. */
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_ALREADY_STARTED: /* EFI_ALREADY_STARTED. */
>> + case QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_VOLUME_CORRUPTED: /* EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED. */
>> + default:
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct qcomtee_uefisec_app uefisec_app;
>
> Should not this singleton be protected, for instance against concurrent call and driver unbound?
>
The top-level efi_var framework which invokes the efivar_operations callbacks
defined below always takes an efivar_lock() before calling them, see:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.3-rc5/source/fs/efivarfs/vars.c#L501
Also, when this driver is being unbound the efivar_unregister() function called
at the start of qcomtee_uefisecapp_remove() attempts to take the same lock.
So a concurrent call efi-var call and driver remove are protected by
efivar_lock().
Since this singleton is always accessed under the same efivar_lock()
everywhere in this driver, it is also implicitly protected.
This is the reason why the STM efivar driver also doesn't protect its
singleton:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.3-rc5/source/drivers/firmware/efi/stmm/tee_stmm_efi.c#L27
I will add a comment on top of this singleton to explain that it is implictly
protected by efivar_lock().
Please do point out if there is some other corner case which you believe is
still not covered by the efivar_lock().
Regards,
Harshal
>> +
>> +static int qcuefi_get_variable(struct tee_param_ubuf in_variable, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf in_attributes,
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf *data,
>> + u32 *out_attributes, u32 *out_errno)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + u64 obj_id = uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj.id;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_GET_VAR_NPARAMS];
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + efi_guid_t guid;
>> + u32 in_data_size;
>> + } in_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + u32 out_data_size;
>> + u32 attributes;
>> + u32 errno;
>> + } out_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + in_cong.guid = *guid;
>> + in_cong.in_data_size = data->size;
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, obj_id,
>> + QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_VAR,
>> + QCOMTEE_GET_VAR_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[0], UBUF_INPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(in_cong));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[1], UBUF_INPUT, in_variable);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[2], UBUF_INPUT, in_attributes);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[3], UBUF_OUTPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(out_cong));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[4], UBUF_OUTPUT, *data);
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(uefisec_app.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_VAR invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + data->size = out_cong.out_data_size;
>> + *out_attributes = out_cong.attributes;
>> + *out_errno = out_cong.errno;
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static efi_status_t qcomtee_uefi_get_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> + u32 *attr, unsigned long *data_size,
>> + void *data)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + u32 in_attr, out_attributes, out_errno;
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf in_data, in_var, in_attributes;
>> +
>> + if (!name || !guid)
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + /* 'attr' can be NULL, however an input attribute is always expected
>> + * by UefiSecApp TA
>> + */
>> + in_attr = 0;
>> + if (attr)
>> + in_attr = *attr;
>> +
>> + in_data = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = data, *data_size };
>> + in_var = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = name,
>> + (ucs2_strlen(name) + 1) * sizeof(*name) };
>> + in_attributes = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = &in_attr, sizeof(u32) };
>> +
>> + /* On SUCCESS, 'data' member of 'in_data' has already been updated. */
>> + ret = qcuefi_get_variable(in_var, guid, in_attributes, &in_data,
>> + &out_attributes, &out_errno);
>> +
>> + if (ret)
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> +
>> + if (!out_errno || out_errno == QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SIZE_OUT) {
>> + /* If 'attr' is NULL 'out_attributes' is not updated. */
>> + if (attr)
>> + *attr = out_attributes;
>> +
>> + *data_size = in_data.size;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return uefisecapp_err_to_efi_status(out_errno);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int qcuefi_set_variable(struct tee_param_ubuf in_variable, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> + u32 attributes, struct tee_param_ubuf data,
>> + u32 *out_errno)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + u64 obj_id = uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj.id;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_SET_VAR_NPARAMS];
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + efi_guid_t guid;
>> + u32 attributes;
>> + u32 in_data_size;
>> + } in_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + in_cong.guid = *guid;
>> + in_cong.attributes = attributes;
>> + in_cong.in_data_size = data.size;
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, obj_id,
>> + QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_SET_VAR,
>> + QCOMTEE_SET_VAR_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[0], UBUF_INPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(in_cong));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[1], UBUF_INPUT, in_variable);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[2], UBUF_INPUT, data);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[3], UBUF_OUTPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(*out_errno));
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(uefisec_app.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_SET_VAR invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static efi_status_t qcomtee_uefi_set_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> + u32 attr, unsigned long data_size,
>> + void *data)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + u32 out_errno;
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf in_data, in_var;
>> +
>> + if (!name || !guid)
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + in_data = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = data, data_size };
>> + in_var = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = name,
>> + (ucs2_strlen(name) + 1) * sizeof(*name) };
>> +
>> + ret = qcuefi_set_variable(in_var, guid, attr, in_data, &out_errno);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> +
>> + return uefisecapp_err_to_efi_status(out_errno);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int qcuefi_get_next_variable(struct tee_param_ubuf in_variable, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf *out_variable,
>> + efi_guid_t *out_vendor_guid, u32 *out_errno)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + u64 obj_id = uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj.id;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_GET_NEXT_VAR_NPARAMS];
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + efi_guid_t guid;
>> + u32 in_data_size;
>> + } in_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + efi_guid_t guid;
>> + u32 out_data_size;
>> + u32 errno;
>> + } out_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + /* Pass size of available buffer */
>> + in_cong.in_data_size = out_variable->size;
>> + in_cong.guid = *guid;
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, obj_id,
>> + QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_NEXT_VAR_NAME,
>> + QCOMTEE_GET_NEXT_VAR_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[0], UBUF_INPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(in_cong));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[1], UBUF_INPUT, in_variable);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[2], UBUF_OUTPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(out_cong));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[3], UBUF_OUTPUT, *out_variable);
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(uefisec_app.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_GET_NEXT_VAR_NAME invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* UefiSecApp TA does not touch 'out_variable.size'. Update it here.
>> + * On SUCCESS (!out_errno), 'out_data_size' is length of name in 'out_variable.addr'.
>> + * On failure (out_errno == QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SIZE_OUT), 'out_data_size' is
>> + * actual name length.
>> + * Otherwise, it's undefined.
>> + */
>> + out_variable->size = out_cong.out_data_size;
>> + *out_vendor_guid = out_cong.guid;
>> + *out_errno = out_cong.errno;
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static efi_status_t qcomtee_uefi_get_next_variable(unsigned long *name_size,
>> + efi_char16_t *name,
>> + efi_guid_t *guid)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + u32 out_errno;
>> + efi_guid_t out_guid;
>> + struct tee_param_ubuf in_var, out_var;
>> +
>> + if (!name_size || !name || !guid)
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + if (*name_size == 0)
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + /* For 'in_var', 'name_size' is not necessarily size of 'name';
>> + * could be size of buffer where 'name' has been stored. TA expects a
>> + * NULL-terminated string in 'name' and ignores the size.
>> + * For 'out_var', 'name_size' is size of buffer pointed by 'name'.
>> + */
>> + in_var = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = name, *name_size };
>> + out_var = (struct tee_param_ubuf){ .addr = name, *name_size };
>> +
>> + ret = qcuefi_get_next_variable(in_var, guid, &out_var, &out_guid,
>> + &out_errno);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> +
>> + if (!out_errno)
>> + *guid = out_guid;
>> +
>> + if (!out_errno || out_errno == QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_ERROR_SIZE_OUT)
>> + *name_size = out_var.size;
>> +
>> + /* On SUCCESS, 'name' stores the next variable name. */
>> + return uefisecapp_err_to_efi_status(out_errno);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int qcuefi_query_variable_info(u32 attributes,
>> + u64 *maximum_variable_storage_size,
>> + u64 *remaining_variable_storage_size,
>> + u64 *maximum_variable_size, u32 *out_errno)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + u64 obj_id = uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj.id;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_QUERY_VAR_NPARAMS];
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + u64 max_var_storage_size;
>> + u64 remaining_var_storage_size;
>> + u64 maximum_var_size;
>> + u32 errno;
>> + } out_cong = { 0 };
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, obj_id,
>> + QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_QUERY_VAR_INFO,
>> + QCOMTEE_QUERY_VAR_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[0], UBUF_INPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(attributes));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[1], UBUF_OUTPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(out_cong));
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(uefisec_app.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_OP_QUERY_VAR_INFO invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + *maximum_variable_storage_size = out_cong.max_var_storage_size;
>> + *remaining_variable_storage_size = out_cong.remaining_var_storage_size;
>> + *maximum_variable_size = out_cong.maximum_var_size;
>> + *out_errno = out_cong.errno;
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static efi_status_t qcomtee_uefi_query_variable_info(u32 attr, u64 *storage_space,
>> + u64 *remaining_space,
>> + u64 *max_variable_size)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + u32 out_errno;
>> + u64 maximum_variable_storage_size;
>> + u64 remaining_variable_storage_size;
>> + u64 maximum_variable_size;
>> +
>> + if (!storage_space || !remaining_space || !max_variable_size)
>> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>> +
>> + ret = qcuefi_query_variable_info(attr,
>> + &maximum_variable_storage_size,
>> + &remaining_variable_storage_size,
>> + &maximum_variable_size,
>> + &out_errno);
>> +
>> + if (ret)
>> + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
>> +
>> + if (!out_errno) {
>> + *storage_space = maximum_variable_storage_size;
>> + *remaining_space = remaining_variable_storage_size;
>> + *max_variable_size = maximum_variable_size;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return uefisecapp_err_to_efi_status(out_errno);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * qcomtee_release_object() - Release an object returned by QTEE.
>> + *
>> + * Each object returned by QTEE repesents a secure service exposed to the
>> + * client. Whenever an secure service is opened, QTEE may allocate resources
>> + * on the client's behalf. Therefore, once the client is done accessing the
>> + * secure service, the object representing it should be explicitly released
>> + * so that QTEE can release the associated resources as well.
>> + *
>> + * @ctx: TEE context.
>> + * @object: The object to release.
>> + */
>> +static void qcomtee_release_object(struct tee_context *ctx,
>> + struct tee_param_objref object)
>> +{
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, object.id, QCOMTEE_MSG_OBJECT_OP_RELEASE, 0);
>> + tee_client_object_invoke_func(ctx, &inv_arg, NULL);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * qcomtee_get_uefisec_svc_obj() - Get a UEFI Secure App service object to
>> + * begin communication with the service.
>> + * @ctx: TEE context.
>> + * @client_env_obj: The client environment object returned earlier by QTEE.
>> + * @uefisec_svc_obj: The UEFI Secure App service object.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success.
>> + * Returns < 0 if client environment object invocation failed.
>> + * Returns > 0 if client environment invocation was success but UEFI Secure App
>> + * service object could not be returned for some other reason (represented by the
>> + * returned value)
>> + */
>> +static int qcomtee_get_uefisec_svc_obj(struct tee_context *ctx,
>> + struct tee_param_objref client_env_obj,
>> + struct tee_param_objref *uefisec_svc_obj)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + u64 obj_id = client_env_obj.id;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_GET_UEFI_SVC_NPARAMS];
>> + u32 uefisec_uid = QCOMTEE_UEFI_SEC_UID;
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, obj_id,
>> + QCOMTEE_OP_CLIENT_ENV_OPEN,
>> + QCOMTEE_GET_UEFI_SVC_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_UBUF(param[0], UBUF_INPUT, TEE_PARAM_UBUF(uefisec_uid));
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_OBJREF(param[1], OBJREF_OUTPUT, 0, 0);
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_CLIENT_ENV_OPEN invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + *uefisec_svc_obj = param[1].u.objref;
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * qcomtee_get_client_env_obj() - Get a client environment object to begin
>> + * object exchange with QTEE.
>> + * @ctx: TEE context.
>> + * @client_env_obj: The client environment object returned by QTEE.
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success.
>> + * Returns < 0 if root object invocation failed.
>> + * Returns > 0 if root object invocation was success but client environment
>> + * object could not be returned for some other reason (represented by the
>> + * returned value)
>> + */
>> +static int qcomtee_get_client_env_obj(struct tee_context *ctx,
>> + struct tee_param_objref *client_env_obj)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg inv_arg;
>> + struct tee_param param[QCOMTEE_GET_CLIENT_ENV_NPARAMS];
>> +
>> + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
>> + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
>> +
>> + SET_INVOKE_ARG(inv_arg, TEE_OBJREF_NULL,
>> + QCOMTEE_ROOT_OP_REG_WITH_CREDENTIALS,
>> + QCOMTEE_GET_CLIENT_ENV_NPARAMS);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_OBJREF(param[0], OBJREF_INPUT, TEE_OBJREF_NULL, 0);
>> + SET_TEE_PARAM_OBJREF(param[1], OBJREF_OUTPUT, 0, 0);
>> +
>> + ret = tee_client_object_invoke_func(ctx, &inv_arg, param);
>> + if (ret < 0 || inv_arg.ret != 0) {
>> + dev_err(uefisec_app.dev, "QCOMTEE_ROOT_OP_REG_WITH_CREDENTIALS invoke ret: %d, err: 0x%x\n",
>> + ret, inv_arg.ret);
>> + return ret ?: inv_arg.ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + *client_env_obj = param[1].u.objref;
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct efivar_operations qcom_efivar_ops = {
>> + .get_variable = qcomtee_uefi_get_variable,
>> + .set_variable = qcomtee_uefi_set_variable,
>> + .get_next_variable = qcomtee_uefi_get_next_variable,
>> + .query_variable_info = qcomtee_uefi_query_variable_info,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int qcomtee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver,
>> + const void *data)
>> +{
>> + return (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_QTEE);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int qcomtee_uefisecapp_probe(struct tee_client_device *tee_dev)
>> +{
>> + int ret, err;
>> + struct tee_param_objref client_env_obj;
>> + struct tee_param_objref uefisec_svc_obj;
>> +
>> + uefisec_app.dev = &tee_dev->dev;
>> + /* Open context with QCOMTEE driver */
>> + uefisec_app.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, qcomtee_ctx_match, NULL,
>> + NULL);
>> + if (IS_ERR(uefisec_app.ctx))
>> + return -ENODEV;
>> +
>> + /* Obtain a reference to client_env object to begin object exchange
>> + * with QTEE
>> + */
>> + ret = qcomtee_get_client_env_obj(uefisec_app.ctx, &client_env_obj);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + err = -EINVAL;
>> + goto err_get_client_env;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Obtain a reference to the uefisec_svc object which provides access to
>> + * the EFI var storage.
>> + */
>> + ret = qcomtee_get_uefisec_svc_obj(uefisec_app.ctx, client_env_obj,
>> + &uefisec_svc_obj);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + err = -EINVAL;
>> + goto err_get_uefisec_svc;
>> + }
>> + uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj = uefisec_svc_obj;
>> +
>> + ret = efivars_register(&uefisec_app.efivars, &qcom_efivar_ops);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + err = ret;
>> + goto err_efi_vars_reg;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* We don't need to keep a reference to this object anymore, we only
>> + * needed it to obtain the uefisec_svc object.
>> + */
>> + qcomtee_release_object(uefisec_app.ctx, client_env_obj);
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> +err_efi_vars_reg:
>> + qcomtee_release_object(uefisec_app.ctx, uefisec_svc_obj);
>> +err_get_uefisec_svc:
>> + qcomtee_release_object(uefisec_app.ctx, client_env_obj);
>> +err_get_client_env:
>> + tee_client_close_context(uefisec_app.ctx);
>> +
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void qcomtee_uefisecapp_remove(struct tee_client_device *tee_dev)
>> +{
>> + efivars_unregister(&uefisec_app.efivars);
>> + qcomtee_release_object(uefisec_app.ctx, uefisec_app.uefisec_svc_obj);
>> + tee_client_close_context(uefisec_app.ctx);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct tee_client_device_id qcomtee_uefisecapp_id_table[] = {
>> + {UEFISECAPP_UUID},
>> + {}
>> +};
>> +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, qcomtee_uefisecapp_id_table);
>> +
>> +static struct tee_client_driver qcomtee_uefisecapp_driver = {
>> + .id_table = qcomtee_uefisecapp_id_table,
>> + .probe = qcomtee_uefisecapp_probe,
>> + .remove = qcomtee_uefisecapp_remove,
>> + .driver = {
>> + .name = "qcom-tee-uefisecapp",
>> + },
>> +};
>> +
>> +module_tee_client_driver(qcomtee_uefisecapp_driver);
>> +
>> +MODULE_AUTHOR("Qualcomm");
>> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEE client driver for Qualcomm TEE UEFI Secure App");
>> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-12 10:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 11:33 [PATCH v4 0/7] Add TEE based client driver for UEFI Secure Application Harshal Dev
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] tee: qcomtee: Track the object invocation context Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 1:01 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] tee: Add kernel client object invoke helper Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 1:03 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] tee: qcomtee: Allow object invokes from kernel clients Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 1:19 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-12 9:38 ` Harshal Dev
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] tee: Export uuidv5 generation for TEE backends Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 1:23 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-12 9:45 ` Harshal Dev
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] tee: qcomtee: Add support for registering QTEE services on TEE bus Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 2:10 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-12 9:51 ` Harshal Dev
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] firmware: qcom: Add support for TEE based EFI-var client driver Harshal Dev
2026-10-06 13:48 ` Dmitry Baryshkov
2026-10-12 9:36 ` Harshal Dev
2026-10-09 2:34 ` Amirreza Zarrabi
2026-10-12 10:34 ` Harshal Dev [this message]
2026-10-06 11:33 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] arm64: defconfig: Enable UefiSecApp TEE client driver for Qualcomm SoCs Harshal Dev
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