From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"michael.roth@amd.com" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 21:03:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <74d38bf8d327ab7c9ec4809ba12c59ac98c316d8.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZfCIz8JIziuvl8Xp@google.com>
On Tue, 2024-03-12 at 09:54 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > On 28/02/2024 12:20 pm, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> > >
> > > To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE. For TDX, KVM uses the
> > > suppress #VE bit in EPT entries selectively, in order to be able to trap
> > > non-present conditions. However, #VE isn't used for VMX and it's a bug
> > > if it happens. To be defensive and test that VMX case isn't broken
> > > introduce an option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, BUG the vm.
> >
> > I am wondering from HW's point of view, is it OK for the kernel to
> > explicitly send #VE IPI, in which case, IIUC, the guest can legally get the
> > #VE w/o being a TDX guest?
>
> Ooh, fun. Short answer: there's nothing to worry about here.
>
> Legally, no. Vectors 0-31 are reserved. However, I do _think_ the guest could
> technically send IPIs on vectors 16-31, as the local APIC doesn't outright reject
> such vectors. But such software would be in clear violation of the SDM.
>
> 11.5.2 Valid Interrupt Vectors
>
> The Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures define 256 vector numbers, ranging from
> 0 through 255 (see Section 6.2, “Exception and Interrupt Vectors”). Local and
> I/O APICs support 240 of these vectors (in the range of 16 to 255) as valid
> interrupts.
>
> When an interrupt vector in the range of 0 to 15 is sent or received through
> the local APIC, the APIC indicates an illegal vector in its Error Status
> Register (see Section 11.5.3, “Error Handling”). The Intel 64 and IA-32
> architectures reserve vectors 16 through 31 for predefined interrupts,
> exceptions, and Intel-reserved encodings (see Table 6-1). However, the local
> APIC does not treat vectors in this range as illegal.
>
> When an illegal vector value (0 to 15) is written to an LVT entry and the delivery
> mode is Fixed (bits 8-11 equal 0), the APIC may signal an illegal vector error,
> without regard to whether the mask bit is set or whether an interrupt is actually
> seen on the input.
I hate the "may" here :-)
>
> where Table 6-1 defines the various exceptions, including #VE, and for vectors
> 22-31 says "Intel reserved. Do not use." Vectors 32-255 are explicitly described
> as "User Defined (Non-reserved) Interrupts" that can be generated via "External
> interrupt or INT n instruction."
>
> However, INTn is far more interesting than IPIs, as INTn can definitely generate
> interrupts for vectors 0-31, and the legality of software generating such interrupts
> is questionable. E.g. KVM used to "forward" NMI VM-Exits to the kernel by doing
> INTn with vector 2.
>
> Key word "interrupts"! IPIs are hardware interrupts, and INTn generates software
> interrupts, neither of which are subject to exception bitmap interception:
>
> Exceptions (faults, traps, and aborts) cause VM exits based on the exception
> bitmap (see Section 25.6.3). If an exception occurs, its vector (in the range
> 0–31) is used to select a bit in the exception bitmap. If the bit is 1, a VM
> exit occurs; if the bit is 0, the exception is delivered normally through the
> guest IDT. This use of the exception bitmap applies also to exceptions generated
> by the instructions INT1, INT3, INTO, BOUND, UD0, UD1, and UD2.
>
> with a footnote that further says:
>
> INT1 and INT3 refer to the instructions with opcodes F1 and CC, respectively,
> and not to INT n with value 1 or 3 for n.
>
> So while a misbehaving guest could generate a software interrupt on vector 20,
> it would not be a true #VE, i.e. not an exception, and thus would not generate
> an EXCEPTION_NMI VM-Exit. I.e. the KVM_BUG_ON() can't be triggered by the guest
> (assuming hardware isn't broken).
>
Ah, right, software-interrupts but not exceptions.
Thanks for the full explanation!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-12 21:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-27 23:20 [PATCH 00/21] TDX/SNP part 1 of n, for 6.9 Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 2:09 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 6:24 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 6:55 ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-26 15:56 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-13 20:38 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-13 20:51 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-13 20:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:50 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 7:09 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 04/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 7:00 ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-29 13:55 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-11 23:26 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to EPT shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-01 7:26 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 13:17 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-01 7:44 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 8:35 ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12 1:21 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 1:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 1:35 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 21:03 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to dispatch VMX and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04 8:09 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 13:42 ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12 1:43 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 2:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 17:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-03 4:47 ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-25 23:32 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04 8:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04 8:56 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-04 15:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-05 17:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: x86/mmu: pass error code back to MMU when async pf is ready Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 2:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 13:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 15/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-03 14:41 ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 17/21] filemap: add FGP_CREAT_ONLY Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 2:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:17 ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-02-28 13:15 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-28 13:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 19:24 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-28 20:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04 2:55 ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 20:29 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: guest_memfd: add API to undo kvm_gmem_get_uninit_pfn Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04 4:44 ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:21 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-12 0:39 ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12 0:48 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28 1:24 ` [PATCH 00/21] TDX/SNP part 1 of n, for 6.9 Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 13:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 16:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 17:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:11 ` Sean Christopherson
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