mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"michael.roth@amd.com" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 21:03:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <74d38bf8d327ab7c9ec4809ba12c59ac98c316d8.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZfCIz8JIziuvl8Xp@google.com>

On Tue, 2024-03-12 at 09:54 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > On 28/02/2024 12:20 pm, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
> > > 
> > > To support TDX, KVM is enhanced to operate with #VE.  For TDX, KVM uses the
> > > suppress #VE bit in EPT entries selectively, in order to be able to trap
> > > non-present conditions.  However, #VE isn't used for VMX and it's a bug
> > > if it happens.  To be defensive and test that VMX case isn't broken
> > > introduce an option ept_violation_ve_test and when it's set, BUG the vm.
> > 
> > I am wondering from HW's point of view, is it OK for the kernel to
> > explicitly send #VE IPI, in which case, IIUC, the guest can legally get the
> > #VE w/o being a TDX guest?
> 
> Ooh, fun.  Short answer: there's nothing to worry about here.
> 
> Legally, no.  Vectors 0-31 are reserved.  However, I do _think_ the guest could
> technically send IPIs on vectors 16-31, as the local APIC doesn't outright reject
> such vectors.  But such software would be in clear violation of the SDM.
> 
>   11.5.2 Valid Interrupt Vectors
>   
>   The Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures define 256 vector numbers, ranging from
>   0 through 255 (see Section 6.2, “Exception and Interrupt Vectors”). Local and
>   I/O APICs support 240 of these vectors (in the range of 16 to 255) as valid
>   interrupts.
>   
>   When an interrupt vector in the range of 0 to 15 is sent or received through
>   the local APIC, the APIC indicates an illegal vector in its Error Status
>   Register (see Section 11.5.3, “Error Handling”). The Intel 64 and IA-32
>   architectures reserve vectors 16 through 31 for predefined interrupts,
>   exceptions, and Intel-reserved encodings (see Table 6-1). However, the local
>   APIC does not treat vectors in this range as illegal.
> 
>   When an illegal vector value (0 to 15) is written to an LVT entry and the delivery
>   mode is Fixed (bits 8-11 equal 0), the APIC may signal an illegal vector error,
>   without regard to whether the mask bit is set or whether an interrupt is actually
>   seen on the input.

I hate the "may" here :-)

> 
> where Table 6-1 defines the various exceptions, including #VE, and for vectors
> 22-31 says "Intel reserved. Do not use."  Vectors 32-255 are explicitly described
> as "User Defined (Non-reserved) Interrupts" that can be generated via "External
> interrupt or INT n instruction."
> 
> However, INTn is far more interesting than IPIs, as INTn can definitely generate
> interrupts for vectors 0-31, and the legality of software generating such interrupts
> is questionable.  E.g. KVM used to "forward" NMI VM-Exits to the kernel by doing
> INTn with vector 2.
> 
> Key word "interrupts"!  IPIs are hardware interrupts, and INTn generates software
> interrupts, neither of which are subject to exception bitmap interception:
> 
>   Exceptions (faults, traps, and aborts) cause VM exits based on the exception
>   bitmap (see Section 25.6.3). If an exception occurs, its vector (in the range
>   0–31) is used to select a bit in the exception bitmap. If the bit is 1, a VM
>   exit occurs; if the bit is 0, the exception is delivered normally through the
>   guest IDT. This use of the exception bitmap applies also to exceptions generated
>   by the instructions INT1, INT3, INTO, BOUND, UD0, UD1, and UD2.
> 
> with a footnote that further says:
> 
>   INT1 and INT3 refer to the instructions with opcodes F1 and CC, respectively,
>   and not to INT n with value 1 or 3 for n.
> 
> So while a misbehaving guest could generate a software interrupt on vector 20,
> it would not be a true #VE, i.e. not an exception, and thus would not generate
> an EXCEPTION_NMI VM-Exit.  I.e. the KVM_BUG_ON() can't be triggered by the guest
> (assuming hardware isn't broken).
> 

Ah, right, software-interrupts but not exceptions.  

Thanks for the full explanation!

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-12 21:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-27 23:20 [PATCH 00/21] TDX/SNP part 1 of n, for 6.9 Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28  2:09   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05  6:24   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:46   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05  6:55   ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-26 15:56     ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-13 20:38       ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-13 20:51         ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-13 20:56         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:50   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05  7:09   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 04/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29  7:00   ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-29 13:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-11 23:26   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to EPT shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-01  7:26   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 13:17   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-01  7:44   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05  8:35   ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12  1:21   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28  1:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  1:35   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12 16:54     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 21:03       ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to dispatch VMX and TDX Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04  8:09   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-05 13:42   ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12  1:43   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28  2:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 17:32     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 16:02       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-03  4:47   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-25 23:32   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04  8:29   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04  8:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-04 15:39     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-05 17:57     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: x86/mmu: pass error code back to MMU when async pf is ready Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28  2:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 13:13     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 15/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: guest_memfd: pass error up from filemap_grab_folio Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-03 14:41   ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 17/21] filemap: add FGP_CREAT_ONLY Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28  2:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:17     ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-02-28 13:15       ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-28 13:28         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 19:24           ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-28 20:17             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04  2:55           ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 20:29   ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: guest_memfd: add API to undo kvm_gmem_get_uninit_pfn Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-04  4:44   ` Xu Yilun
2024-02-27 23:20 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-27 23:21 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-12  0:39   ` Binbin Wu
2024-03-12  0:48   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  1:24 ` [PATCH 00/21] TDX/SNP part 1 of n, for 6.9 Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 13:29   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 16:39     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 17:20       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-28 18:04         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:11 ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=74d38bf8d327ab7c9ec4809ba12c59ac98c316d8.camel@intel.com \
    --to=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®