From: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52605: ACPI: extlog: fix NULL pointer dereference check
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 08:14:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7591f33e-d64f-49c5-b7c8-deda2b6f0fde@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e4906091-598e-4d21-9e8d-4cb088855d6f@oracle.com>
On 3/10/24 04:10, Vegard Nossum wrote:
>
> (Added author/maintainer to Cc)
>
> On 06/03/2024 07:46, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> Description
>> ===========
>>
>> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>>
>> ACPI: extlog: fix NULL pointer dereference check
>>
>> The gcc plugin -fanalyzer [1] tries to detect various
>> patterns of incorrect behaviour. The tool reports:
>>
>> drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c: In function ‘extlog_exit’:
>> drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c:307:12: warning: check of ‘extlog_l1_addr’
>> for NULL after already dereferencing it [-Wanalyzer-deref-before-check]
>> |
>> | 306 | ((struct extlog_l1_head *)extlog_l1_addr)->flags
>> &= ~FLAG_OS_OPTIN;
>> | | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~
>> | | |
>> | | (1)
>> pointer ‘extlog_l1_addr’ is dereferenced here
>> | 307 | if (extlog_l1_addr)
>> | | ~
>> | | |
>> | | (2) pointer ‘extlog_l1_addr’ is checked for
>> NULL here but it was already dereferenced at (1)
>> |
>>
>> Fix the NULL pointer dereference check in extlog_exit().
>>
>> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52605 to this issue.
>
> This code is in an __exit function:
>
> diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c b/drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c
> index e120a96e1eaee..193147769146e 100644
> --- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_extlog.c
> @@ -303,9 +303,10 @@ err:
> static void __exit extlog_exit(void)
> {
> mce_unregister_decode_chain(&extlog_mce_dec);
> - ((struct extlog_l1_head *)extlog_l1_addr)->flags &= ~FLAG_OS_OPTIN;
> - if (extlog_l1_addr)
> + if (extlog_l1_addr) {
> + ((struct extlog_l1_head *)extlog_l1_addr)->flags &=
> ~FLAG_OS_OPTIN;
> acpi_os_unmap_iomem(extlog_l1_addr, l1_size);
> + }
> if (elog_addr)
> acpi_os_unmap_iomem(elog_addr, elog_size);
> release_mem_region(elog_base, elog_size);
>
> This can only run when you unload a module, which is a privileged
> operation (restricted to CAP_SYS_MODULE).
>
> Moreover, extlog_l1_addr is only ever assigned in the corresponding
> module init function, and it looks like it will never be NULL if the
> module was loaded successfully, at least on a recent mainline kernel.
>
> Since the module exit won't be called unless module init succeeded, I
> don't see a way to trigger this bug. Is this a vulnerability?
>
This is certainly not a CVE.
> It might be better to just delete the NULL check altogether.
>
> As usual, I could be wrong...
>
When I made this code change I thought the same thing: Perhaps it's
better to remove the NULL check given the status of the code. I assumed
that the check was there as a failsafe on unload.
P.
>
> Vegard
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-11 12:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024030647-CVE-2023-52605-292a@gregkh>
2024-03-10 8:10 ` Vegard Nossum
2024-03-11 12:14 ` Prarit Bhargava [this message]
2024-03-14 11:01 ` Lee Jones
2024-03-15 19:24 ` Wysocki, Rafael J
2024-03-18 15:13 ` Lee Jones
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