From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 208FEC32789 for ; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 20:14:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFE522086A for ; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 20:14:19 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org DFE522086A Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727404AbeKGFlN (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Nov 2018 00:41:13 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:33394 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725936AbeKGFlN (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Nov 2018 00:41:13 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0398581DF3; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 20:14:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.remote.csb (ovpn-124-84.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.124.84]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D36801948B; Tue, 6 Nov 2018 20:14:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp To: Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <1541535149-31963-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com> From: Waiman Long Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=longman@redhat.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFgsZGsBEAC3l/RVYISY3M0SznCZOv8aWc/bsAgif1H8h0WPDrHnwt1jfFTB26EzhRea XQKAJiZbjnTotxXq1JVaWxJcNJL7crruYeFdv7WUJqJzFgHnNM/upZuGsDIJHyqBHWK5X9ZO jRyfqV/i3Ll7VIZobcRLbTfEJgyLTAHn2Ipcpt8mRg2cck2sC9+RMi45Epweu7pKjfrF8JUY r71uif2ThpN8vGpn+FKbERFt4hW2dV/3awVckxxHXNrQYIB3I/G6mUdEZ9yrVrAfLw5M3fVU CRnC6fbroC6/ztD40lyTQWbCqGERVEwHFYYoxrcGa8AzMXN9CN7bleHmKZrGxDFWbg4877zX 0YaLRypme4K0ULbnNVRQcSZ9UalTvAzjpyWnlnXCLnFjzhV7qsjozloLTkZjyHimSc3yllH7 VvP/lGHnqUk7xDymgRHNNn0wWPuOpR97J/r7V1mSMZlni/FVTQTRu87aQRYu3nKhcNJ47TGY evz/U0ltaZEU41t7WGBnC7RlxYtdXziEn5fC8b1JfqiP0OJVQfdIMVIbEw1turVouTovUA39 Qqa6Pd1oYTw+Bdm1tkx7di73qB3x4pJoC8ZRfEmPqSpmu42sijWSBUgYJwsziTW2SBi4hRjU h/Tm0NuU1/R1bgv/EzoXjgOM4ZlSu6Pv7ICpELdWSrvkXJIuIwARAQABzR9Mb25nbWFuIExv bmcgPGxsb25nQHJlZGhhdC5jb20+wsF/BBMBAgApBQJYLGRrAhsjBQkJZgGABwsJCAcDAgEG FQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQbjBXZE7vHeYwBA//ZYxi4I/4KVrqc6oodVfwPnOVxvyY oKZGPXZXAa3swtPGmRFc8kGyIMZpVTqGJYGD9ZDezxpWIkVQDnKM9zw/qGarUVKzElGHcuFN ddtwX64yxDhA+3Og8MTy8+8ZucM4oNsbM9Dx171bFnHjWSka8o6qhK5siBAf9WXcPNogUk4S fMNYKxexcUayv750GK5E8RouG0DrjtIMYVJwu+p3X1bRHHDoieVfE1i380YydPd7mXa7FrRl 7unTlrxUyJSiBc83HgKCdFC8+ggmRVisbs+1clMsK++ehz08dmGlbQD8Fv2VK5KR2+QXYLU0 rRQjXk/gJ8wcMasuUcywnj8dqqO3kIS1EfshrfR/xCNSREcv2fwHvfJjprpoE9tiL1qP7Jrq 4tUYazErOEQJcE8Qm3fioh40w8YrGGYEGNA4do/jaHXm1iB9rShXE2jnmy3ttdAh3M8W2OMK 4B/Rlr+Awr2NlVdvEF7iL70kO+aZeOu20Lq6mx4Kvq/WyjZg8g+vYGCExZ7sd8xpncBSl7b3 99AIyT55HaJjrs5F3Rl8dAklaDyzXviwcxs+gSYvRCr6AMzevmfWbAILN9i1ZkfbnqVdpaag QmWlmPuKzqKhJP+OMYSgYnpd/vu5FBbc+eXpuhydKqtUVOWjtp5hAERNnSpD87i1TilshFQm TFxHDzbOwU0EWCxkawEQALAcdzzKsZbcdSi1kgjfce9AMjyxkkZxcGc6Rhwvt78d66qIFK9D Y9wfcZBpuFY/AcKEqjTo4FZ5LCa7/dXNwOXOdB1Jfp54OFUqiYUJFymFKInHQYlmoES9EJEU yy+2ipzy5yGbLh3ZqAXyZCTmUKBU7oz/waN7ynEP0S0DqdWgJnpEiFjFN4/ovf9uveUnjzB6 lzd0BDckLU4dL7aqe2ROIHyG3zaBMuPo66pN3njEr7IcyAL6aK/IyRrwLXoxLMQW7YQmFPSw drATP3WO0x8UGaXlGMVcaeUBMJlqTyN4Swr2BbqBcEGAMPjFCm6MjAPv68h5hEoB9zvIg+fq M1/Gs4D8H8kUjOEOYtmVQ5RZQschPJle95BzNwE3Y48ZH5zewgU7ByVJKSgJ9HDhwX8Ryuia 79r86qZeFjXOUXZjjWdFDKl5vaiRbNWCpuSG1R1Tm8o/rd2NZ6l8LgcK9UcpWorrPknbE/pm MUeZ2d3ss5G5Vbb0bYVFRtYQiCCfHAQHO6uNtA9IztkuMpMRQDUiDoApHwYUY5Dqasu4ZDJk bZ8lC6qc2NXauOWMDw43z9He7k6LnYm/evcD+0+YebxNsorEiWDgIW8Q/E+h6RMS9kW3Rv1N qd2nFfiC8+p9I/KLcbV33tMhF1+dOgyiL4bcYeR351pnyXBPA66ldNWvABEBAAHCwWUEGAEC AA8FAlgsZGsCGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQbjBXZE7vHeYxSQ/+PnnPrOkKHDHQew8Pq9w2RAOO8gMg 9Ty4L54CsTf21Mqc6GXj6LN3WbQta7CVA0bKeq0+WnmsZ9jkTNh8lJp0/RnZkSUsDT9Tza9r GB0svZnBJMFJgSMfmwa3cBttCh+vqDV3ZIVSG54nPmGfUQMFPlDHccjWIvTvyY3a9SLeamaR jOGye8MQAlAD40fTWK2no6L1b8abGtziTkNh68zfu3wjQkXk4kA4zHroE61PpS3oMD4AyI9L 7A4Zv0Cvs2MhYQ4Qbbmafr+NOhzuunm5CoaRi+762+c508TqgRqH8W1htZCzab0pXHRfywtv 0P+BMT7vN2uMBdhr8c0b/hoGqBTenOmFt71tAyyGcPgI3f7DUxy+cv3GzenWjrvf3uFpxYx4 yFQkUcu06wa61nCdxXU/BWFItryAGGdh2fFXnIYP8NZfdA+zmpymJXDQeMsAEHS0BLTVQ3+M 7W5Ak8p9V+bFMtteBgoM23bskH6mgOAw6Cj/USW4cAJ8b++9zE0/4Bv4iaY5bcsL+h7TqQBH Lk1eByJeVooUa/mqa2UdVJalc8B9NrAnLiyRsg72Nurwzvknv7anSgIkL+doXDaG21DgCYTD wGA5uquIgb8p3/ENgYpDPrsZ72CxVC2NEJjJwwnRBStjJOGQX4lV1uhN1XsZjBbRHdKF2W9g weim8xU= Organization: Red Hat Message-ID: <7788f826-1217-8f69-3622-c11b6e08efb1@redhat.com> Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 15:14:15 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1541535149-31963-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.25]); Tue, 06 Nov 2018 20:14:17 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 11/06/2018 03:12 PM, Waiman Long wrote: > The current x86 page fault handler allows stack access below the stack > pointer if it is no more than 64k+256 bytes. Any access beyond the 64k+ > limit will cause a segmentation fault. > > The gcc -fstack-check option generates code to probe the stack for > large stack allocation to see if the stack is accessible. The newer gcc > does that while updating the %rsp simultaneously. Older gcc's like gcc4 > doesn't do that. As a result, an application compiled with an old gcc > and the -fstack-check option may fail to start at all. > > % cat test.c > int main() { > char tmp[1024*128]; > printf("### ok\n"); > return 0; > } > % gcc -fstack-check -g -o test test.c > % ./test > Segmentation fault > > The old binary was working in older kernels where expand_stack() was > somehow called before the check. But it is not working in newer kernels. > Besides, the 64k+ limit check is kind of crude and will not catch a > lot of mistakes that userspace applications may be misbehaving anyway. > I think the kernel isn't the right place for this kind of tests. We > should leave it to userspace instrumentation tools to perform them. > > The 64k+ limit check is now removed to just let expand_stack() decide > if a segmentation fault should happen, when the RLIMIT_STACK limit is > exceeded, for example. > > Signed-off-by: Waiman Long > --- > arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ------------ > 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > index 71d4b9d..29525cf 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c > @@ -1380,18 +1380,6 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, > bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); > return; > } > - if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) { > - /* > - * Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. > - * The large cushion allows instructions like enter > - * and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes > - * 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.) > - */ > - if (unlikely(address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)) { > - bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); > - return; > - } > - } > if (unlikely(expand_stack(vma, address))) { > bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); > return; This v2 patch has no code change. I just updated the commit log to capture some of the conversion that I had with the reviewers. Cheers, Longman