From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 4/5] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:09:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7862dbc387213d8b3bb208c421caaf92623be856.1713559768.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1713559768.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Duplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options
in two separate places is unwieldy and error-prone. Instead just add a
reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 84 ++-----------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 25a04cda4c2c..f9797ab6b38f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
-Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
-kernel command line.
+In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the
+current CPU.
+
+Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel
+command line with the following options:
nospectre_v1
-
- [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
- (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
- possible in the system.
-
nospectre_v2
+ spectre_v2={option}
+ spectre_v2_user={option}
+ spectre_bhi={option}
- [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
- (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
- allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
- to spectre_v2=off.
-
-
- spectre_v2=
-
- [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
- (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
- The default operation protects the kernel from
- user space attacks.
-
- on
- unconditionally enable, implies
- spectre_v2_user=on
- off
- unconditionally disable, implies
- spectre_v2_user=off
- auto
- kernel detects whether your CPU model is
- vulnerable
-
- Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
- mitigation method at run time according to the
- CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
- CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
- and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
-
- Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
- against user space to user space task attacks.
-
- Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
- the user space protections.
-
- Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
-
- retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence
- retpoline,generic Retpolines
- retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch
- retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence
- eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS
- eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
- eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
- ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel
-
- Not specifying this option is equivalent to
- spectre_v2=auto.
-
- In general the kernel by default selects
- reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
- disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
- spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
- cannot be disabled.
-
- spectre_bhi=
-
- [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
- (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment
- of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
-
- on
- (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
- needed.
- off
- Disable the mitigation.
-
-For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
--
2.44.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-19 21:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-19 21:09 [PATCH 0/5] x86/bugs: more BHI fixes Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-22 8:09 ` Yujie Liu
2024-05-07 5:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-20 5:21 ` Yujie Liu
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] cpu/speculation: Fix CPU mitigation defaults for !x86 Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20 0:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-23 14:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-24 5:35 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-20 13:58 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-21 5:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-21 20:40 ` Paul McKenney
2024-04-21 21:47 ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-02 23:48 ` Paul McKenney
2024-05-03 15:38 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 19:56 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 20:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-03 23:33 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-05-03 23:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-05-04 16:48 ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-04-19 21:09 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-04-19 21:09 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option Josh Poimboeuf
2024-04-19 21:46 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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