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From: "Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	syzbot ci <syzbot+ci493c6d734b63e050@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, osteffen@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	sgarzare@redhat.com, stable@vger.kernel.org, tglx@kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, syzbot@lists.linux.dev,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot ci] Re: KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:19:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <79c59d84-80bc-41f6-950f-41ff2e6b2b5b@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <airudX6N4oL5X_wE@google.com>

On 6/11/26 7:20 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 11, 2026, syzbot ci wrote:
>> syzbot ci has tested the following series
>>
>> [v2] KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260610214523.2905255-2-clopez@suse.de
>> * [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update
>>
>> and found the following issue:
>> WARNING in vmx_update_cr8_intercept
> 
> ...
> 
>> ------------[ cut here ]------------
>> debug_locks && !(lock_is_held(&(&vcpu->mutex)->dep_map) || !refcount_read(&vcpu->kvm->users_count))
>> WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline], CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879
>> WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879, CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879
>> Modules linked in:
>> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5879 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) 
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
>> RIP: 0010:get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline]
>> RIP: 0010:vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879
>>  apic_update_ppr arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:984 [inline]
>>  kvm_lapic_reset+0x1c24/0x2980 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3023
>>  kvm_vcpu_reset+0x44c/0x1bf0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12986
>>  kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x746/0x8b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12847
>>  kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu+0x428/0x930 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4201
>>  kvm_vm_ioctl+0x893/0xd50 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5159
>>  vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
>>  __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
>>  __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
>>  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
>>  do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
>>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
> This is "fine", the assertion just wants to make sure KVM isn't access vmcs12
> without holding vcpu->mutex, otherwise any queries are inherently unstable.
> It's just that vCPU creation runs without taking vcpu->mutex, because the vCPU
> is otherwise unreachable.
> 
> I'm pretty sure we can squash the WARN by grabbing vmcs12 if and only if the vCPU
> is actually in guest mode.

Will you add this on top or should I send a v3?

> diff --git arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index c548f22375ad..332fbcd924f2 100644
> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -6876,11 +6876,10 @@ int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
>  
>  void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
>  {
> -       struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
>         int tpr_threshold;
>  
>         if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
> -               nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
> +           nested_cpu_has(get_vmcs12(vcpu), CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
>                 return;
>  
>         guard(vmx_vmcs01)(vcpu);
> 
> 
> Longer term, I'll work on figuring out how to handle this in get_vmcs12(), because
> to_hv_vcpu() has the solve the same fundamental problem:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/aeqRzanSaa9P_EPg@google.com


  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-15 10:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-10 21:45 [PATCH v2] " Carlos López
2026-06-11 16:15 ` [syzbot ci] " syzbot ci
2026-06-11 17:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-15 10:19     ` Carlos López [this message]
2026-06-15 18:37       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-17  9:31         ` Stefano Garzarella

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