From: Song Liu <songliubraving@meta.com>
To: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@meta.com>,
"andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"eddyz87@gmail.com" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
"daniel@iogearbox.net" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"martin.lau@linux.dev" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"brauner@kernel.org" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"jack@suse.cz" <jack@suse.cz>,
"kpsingh@kernel.org" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart@meta.com>,
Shankaran Gnanashanmugam <shankaran@meta.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 bpf-next 1/7] fs/xattr: bpf: Introduce security.bpf. xattr name prefix
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 18:08:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7F32DAA4-1B0D-4702-AAE3-AA742092F192@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z5tbH13qK6rLJVUI@google.com>
Hi Matt,
> On Jan 30, 2025, at 2:57 AM, Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 29, 2025 at 12:59:51PM -0800, Song Liu wrote:
>> Introduct new xattr name prefix security.bpf., and enable reading these
>> xattrs from bpf kfuncs bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr().
>>
>> As we are on it, correct the comments for return value of
>> bpf_get_[file|dentry]_xattr(), i.e. return length the xattr value on
>> success.
>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Thanks for the review!
[...]
>
>> - * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
>> + * Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
>> */
>> __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__str,
>> struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
>> @@ -117,7 +123,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__st
>> if (WARN_ON(!inode))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> - if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
>> + /* Allow reading xattr with user. and security.bpf. prefix */
>> + if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) &&
>> + !match_security_bpf_prefix(name__str))
>
> I think it would be cleaner to have single function
> i.e. is_allowed_xattr_prefix(const char *name__str) which simply
> checks all the allowed xattr prefixes that can be read by this BPF
> kfunc.
Sure, we can add bpf_xattr_read_permission() which pairs with
bpf_xattr_write_permission().
Thanks,
Song
>
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
>> @@ -139,9 +147,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_dentry_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__st
>> *
>> * Get xattr *name__str* of *file* and store the output in *value_ptr*.
>> *
>> - * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." is allowed.
>> + * For security reasons, only *name__str* with prefix "user." or
> ^ prefixes
>
>> + * "security.bpf." is allowed.
> ^ are
>
>> - * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error.
>> + * Return: length of the xattr value on success, a negative value on error.
>> */
>> __bpf_kfunc int bpf_get_file_xattr(struct file *file, const char *name__str,
>> struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
>> index 9854f9cff3c6..c7c85bb504ba 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
>> @@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ struct xattr_args {
>> #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
>> #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
>>
>> +#define XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX "bpf."
>> +#define XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM (XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX)
>> +#define XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM_LEN (sizeof(XATTR_NAME_BPF_LSM) - 1)
>> +
>> #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS "posix_acl_access"
>> #define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS
>> #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT "posix_acl_default"
>> --
>> 2.43.5
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-30 18:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-29 20:59 [PATCH v11 bpf-next 0/7] Enable writing xattr from BPF programs Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 1/7] fs/xattr: bpf: Introduce security.bpf. xattr name prefix Song Liu
2025-01-30 10:57 ` Matt Bobrowski
2025-01-30 15:20 ` Christian Brauner
2025-01-31 8:32 ` Matt Bobrowski
2025-01-30 18:08 ` Song Liu [this message]
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 2/7] selftests/bpf: Extend test fs_kfuncs to cover security.bpf. xattr names Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 3/7] bpf: lsm: Add two more sleepable hooks Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 4/7] bpf: Extend btf_kfunc_id_set to handle kfunc polymorphism Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 5/7] bpf: Use btf_kfunc_id_set.remap logic for bpf_dynptr_from_skb Song Liu
2025-01-30 2:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-01-30 17:49 ` Song Liu
2025-01-30 20:23 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-01-30 21:24 ` Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 6/7] bpf: fs/xattr: Add BPF kfuncs to set and remove xattrs Song Liu
2025-01-29 20:59 ` [PATCH v11 bpf-next 7/7] selftests/bpf: Test kfuncs that set and remove xattr from BPF programs Song Liu
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