From: graff yang <graff.yang@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gyang@blackfin.uclinux.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org,
uclinux-dist-devel@blackfin.uclinux.org,
Graff Yang <graf.yang@analog.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/nommu.c: Fix improperly call of security API in mmap
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2009 10:21:49 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7d86d44a0910141921j28ddc50cxb2d9386c5ad99db9@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18475.1255529305@redhat.com>
Hi, David,
Thanks your patch, I will test it.
On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 10:08 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> <graff.yang@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The original code calling security_file_mmap() use user's hint address
>> as it's 5th argument(addr). This is improper, as the hint address may be
>> NULL.
>> In this case, the security_file_mmap() may incorrectly return -EPERM.
>>
>> This patch moved the calling of security_file_mmap() out of
>> validate_mmap_request() to do_mmap_pgoff(), and call this
>> security API with the address that attempting to mmap.
>
> I think this is the wrong approach. Firstly, the hint is cleared in NOMMU
> mode, and secondly, I think that the check against the minimum LSM address is
> pointless in NOMMU mode too.
>
> So I think the attached patch is a better approach.
>
> David
> ---
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> NOMMU: Ignore the address parameter in the file_mmap() security check
>
> Ignore the address parameter in the various file_mmap() security checks when
> CONFIG_MMU=n as the address hint is ignored under those circumstances, and in
> any case the minimum mapping address check is pointless in NOMMU mode.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> include/linux/security.h | 1 +
> mm/nommu.c | 2 +-
> security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 239e40d..0583f16 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
> * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
> * @flags contains the operational flags.
> + * @addr contains the mapping address, and should be ignored in NOMMU mode.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> * @file_mprotect:
> * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
> diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
> index 3c3b4b2..cfea46c 100644
> --- a/mm/nommu.c
> +++ b/mm/nommu.c
> @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
> }
>
> /* allow the security API to have its say */
> - ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
> + ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, 0, 0);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index fe30751..ac1f745 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> {
> int ret = 0;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
> if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
> ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> @@ -1012,5 +1013,6 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> if (ret == 0)
> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> }
> +#endif
> return ret;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index bb230d5..93d61f8 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
> {
> int rc = 0;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
> u32 sid = current_sid();
>
> /*
> @@ -3060,6 +3061,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> }
> +#endif
>
> /* do DAC check on address space usage */
> rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
>
--
-Graff
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-10-15 2:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-10-14 10:28 graff.yang
2009-10-14 14:08 ` David Howells
2009-10-15 2:21 ` graff yang [this message]
2009-10-15 3:45 ` graff yang
2009-10-15 7:07 ` David Howells
2009-10-16 7:06 ` [Uclinux-dist-devel] " Mike Frysinger
2009-10-16 15:01 ` Eric Paris
2009-10-16 15:14 ` David Howells
2009-10-16 15:21 ` Eric Paris
2009-10-16 15:43 ` David Howells
2009-10-16 15:55 ` Eric Paris
2009-11-17 22:13 ` Andrew Morton
2009-11-17 23:24 ` Mike Frysinger
2009-11-18 21:10 ` Eric Paris
2009-11-20 15:00 ` David Howells
2009-11-20 17:42 ` Andrew Morton
2009-11-20 17:54 ` David Howells
2009-11-20 19:32 ` Eric Paris
2009-11-20 19:50 ` Andrew Morton
2009-11-20 19:58 ` Eric Paris
2009-11-21 0:16 ` David Howells
2009-11-21 16:15 ` Eric Paris
2009-11-23 10:10 ` John Johansen
2009-10-16 15:43 ` [Uclinux-dist-devel] " Mike Frysinger
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