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From: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2025 09:39:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7da8d5cc-7b67-4f51-8f09-7ca401d06a3d@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aS6ylpLIyDZOvBDB@J2N7QTR9R3>

On 02/12/2025 09:35, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 10:15:22AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On Mon, 1 Dec 2025 at 19:20, Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
>>> On 28/11/2025 11:01, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 27 Nov 2025 at 12:00, Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>>>>> index 089b1432f7e6..83c7e6710f6d 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
>>>>> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>>>>>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>>>>>  #include <linux/jump_label.h>
>>>>>  #include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/prandom.h>
>>>>>
>>>>>  DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
>>>>>                          randomize_kstack_offset);
>>>>> @@ -45,9 +46,13 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
>>>>>  #define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x)   ((x) & 0b1111111100)
>>>>>  #endif
>>>>>
>>>>> +static __always_inline u32 get_update_kstack_offset(void)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +       return prandom_u32_state(&current->kstack_rnd_state);
>>>
>>> I've got bot warnings because this is being called from noinstr code. I guess
>>> the best option is to just move add_random_kstack_offset() to after
>>> instrumentation is enabled for the affected arches.
>>
>> Just put instrumentation_begin()/instrumentation_end() around the call
>> to prandom_u32_state() - that seems to be the common approach for
>> punching holes into the 'noinstr' validation.
> 
> That silences the warning, but isn't necessarily safe, so please DO NOT
> do that blindly. The instrumentation_{begin,end}() annotations are only
> supposed to be used when we know by construction that instrumentation is
> safe.
> 
> Generally, if you can move this to after instrumentation is already
> enabled, that should be safe, and so that'd be the better approach.
> 
> Ryan, can you share those warnings (e.g. link to those reports)?

https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511302137.u4iIA2kf-lkp@intel.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511302317.BGFIlAYX-lkp@intel.com/

> 
> IIUC only x86 has noinstr validation, and from a quick scan, I expect
> you see warnings from:
> 
> * do_syscall_64()
> * do_int80_syscall_32()
> * __do_fast_syscall_32()
> 
> For all of these, it is not safe to call instrumentable code before the
> calls to {syscall_,}enter_from_user_mode{,_prepare}(). You'll need to
> move the stack rnadomization after the existing instrumentation_begin()
> calls.
> 
> We'll need to go check the other architectures similarly.

OK understood. I'll do it this way then.

> 
> Mark.


  reply	other threads:[~2025-12-02  9:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-27 10:59 [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Fix bugs and performance of kstack offset randomisation Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/2] randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task Ryan Roberts
2025-11-27 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/2] randomize_kstack: Unify random source across arches Ryan Roberts
2025-11-28 11:01   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-01 18:20     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02  9:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-02  9:34         ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02  9:35         ` Mark Rutland
2025-12-02  9:39           ` Ryan Roberts [this message]
2025-12-02  9:53             ` Mark Rutland
2025-12-02 11:04               ` Ryan Roberts
2025-12-02  9:47           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-12-02 10:02             ` Mark Rutland
2025-12-02 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Fix bugs and performance of kstack offset randomisation Kees Cook

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