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X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 07 Aug 2024 00:59:49.6479 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: d7b9d7fa-4a2f-4f1c-580d-08dcb67c3d1a X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN3PEPF0000B076.namprd04.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SJ2PR12MB8782 When restricted injection is active, only #HV exceptions can be injected into the SEV-SNP guest. Detect that restricted injection feature is active for the guest, and then follow the #HV doorbell communication from the GHCB specification to inject the interrupt or exception. Co-developed-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Melody Wang --- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 +++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 21 ++++- 4 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index bf57a824f722..f5d85174e658 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #define MC_VECTOR 18 #define XM_VECTOR 19 #define VE_VECTOR 20 +#define HV_VECTOR 28 /* Select x86 specific features in */ #define __KVM_HAVE_PIT diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 19ee3f083cad..0d330b3357bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -5022,3 +5022,156 @@ int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) return level; } + +static void prepare_hv_injection(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct hvdb *hvdb) +{ + if (hvdb->events.no_further_signal) + return; + + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = HV_VECTOR | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT | + SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = 0; + + hvdb->events.no_further_signal = 1; +} + +static void unmap_hvdb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_host_map *map) +{ + kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, map, true); +} + +static struct hvdb *map_hvdb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_host_map *map) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + + if (!VALID_PAGE(svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa)) + return NULL; + + if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa), map)) { + /* Unable to map #HV doorbell page from guest */ + vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "snp: error mapping #HV doorbell page [%#llx] from guest\n", + svm->sev_es.hvdb_gpa); + + return NULL; + } + + return map->hva; +} + +static bool __sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) + return false; + + hvdb->events.vector = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr; + + prepare_hv_injection(svm, hvdb); + + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + + return true; +} + +bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return false; + + /* + * Restricted injection is enabled, only #HV is supported. + * If the vector is not HV_VECTOR, do not inject the exception, + * then return true to skip the original injection path. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.vector != HV_VECTOR, + "restricted injection enabled, exception %u injection not supported\n", + vcpu->arch.exception.vector)) + return true; + + /* + * An intercept likely occurred during #HV delivery, so re-inject it + * using the current HVDB pending event values. + */ + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = HV_VECTOR | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT | + SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = 0; + + return true; +} + +bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return false; + + return __sev_snp_inject(type, vcpu); +} + +void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + + if (!sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return; + + if (!svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) + return; + + if ((svm->vmcb->control.event_inj & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK) != HV_VECTOR) + return; + + /* + * Copy the information in the doorbell page into the event injection + * fields to complete the cancellation flow. + */ + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) + return; + + if (!hvdb->events.pending_events) { + /* No pending events, then event_inj field should be 0 */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->vmcb->control.event_inj); + goto out; + } + + /* Copy info back into event_inj field (replaces #HV) */ + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID; + + if (hvdb->events.vector) + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj |= hvdb->events.vector | + SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR; + + hvdb->events.pending_events = 0; + +out: + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); +} + +bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_host_map hvdb_map; + struct hvdb *hvdb; + bool blocked; + + /* Indicate interrupts are blocked if doorbell page can't be mapped */ + hvdb = map_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + if (!hvdb) + return true; + + /* Indicate interrupts blocked based on guest acknowledgment */ + blocked = !!hvdb->events.vector; + + unmap_hvdb(vcpu, &hvdb_map); + + return blocked; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index d6f252555ab3..a48388d99c97 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -447,6 +447,9 @@ static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm->soft_int_old_rip = old_rip; svm->soft_int_next_rip = rip; + if (sev_snp_queue_exception(vcpu)) + return 0; + if (nrips) kvm_rip_write(vcpu, old_rip); @@ -467,6 +470,9 @@ static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu)) return; + if (sev_snp_queue_exception(vcpu)) + return; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | (ex->has_error_code ? SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR : 0) @@ -3662,10 +3668,12 @@ static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr, vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected); - ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; - svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr | - SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + if (!sev_snp_inject(INJECT_IRQ, vcpu)) + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr | + SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + + ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; } void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode, @@ -3810,6 +3818,9 @@ bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (!gif_set(svm)) return true; + if (sev_snp_is_rinj_active(vcpu)) + return sev_snp_blocked(INJECT_IRQ, vcpu); + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { /* As long as interrupts are being delivered... */ if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK) @@ -4128,6 +4139,8 @@ static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control; + sev_snp_cancel_injection(vcpu); + control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj; control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err; control->event_inj = 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index f0f14801e122..95c0a7070bd1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ extern bool x2avic_enabled; extern bool vnmi; extern int lbrv; +enum inject_type { + INJECT_IRQ, +}; + /* * Clean bits in VMCB. * VMCB_ALL_CLEAN_MASK might also need to @@ -751,6 +755,17 @@ void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order); void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end); int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn); +bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; + + return sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm) && + (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION); +}; #else static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp) { @@ -781,7 +796,11 @@ static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn) { return 0; } - +static inline bool sev_snp_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline bool sev_snp_inject(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline void sev_snp_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} +static inline bool sev_snp_blocked(enum inject_type type, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline bool sev_snp_is_rinj_active(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } #endif /* vmenter.S */ -- 2.34.1