From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, stefan.wahren@i2se.com,
mlangsdo@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
steven.price@arm.com, Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, ykaukab@suse.de,
dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/12] arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 12:54:22 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7fa79e1a-3b35-520a-676b-031030108c50@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190215182037.GI100037@arrakis.emea.arm.com>
Hi,
Thanks for taking a look at this:
On 2/15/19 12:20 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 06:04:15PM +0000, Andre Przywara wrote:
>> On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:02 -0600
>> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> wrote:
>>> Buried behind EXPERT is the ability to build a kernel without
>>> SSBD, this needlessly clutters up the code as well as creates
>>> the opportunity for bugs. It also removes the kernel's ability
>>> to determine if the machine its running on is vulnerable.
>>
>> I don't know the original motivation for this config option, typically
>> they are not around for no reason.
>> I see the benefit of dropping those config options, but we want to make
>> sure that people don't start hacking around to remove them again.
>>
>>> Since its also possible to disable it at boot time, lets remove
>>> the config option.
>>
>> Given the level of optimisation a compiler can do with the state being
>> known at compile time, I would imagine that it's not the same (though
>> probably very close).
>>
>> But that's not my call, it would be good to hear some maintainer's
>> opinion on this.
>
> Having spoken to Will, we'd rather keep the config options if possible.
> Even if they are behind EXPERT and default y, they come in handy when
> debugging.
>
> Can we still have the sysfs information regardless of whether the config
> is enabled or not? IOW, move the #ifdefs around to always have the
> detection while being able to disable the actual workarounds via config?
Yes, that is possible, but the ifdef'ing gets even worse. (see v3).
> Are the code paths between config and cmdline disabling identical? At a
> quick look I got the impression they are not exactly the same.
No, they do vary slightly. For debugging I would expect that the CONFIG
disabled code paths to be the one that accumulates bugs over time. The
command line options just force the runtime vulnerable/not-vulnerable
decision, which should be the code paths in general use. For benchmark
the run-time options are also a better choice because they don't have
any 2nd order affects caused by code alignment/etc changes.
Maybe your implying the CONFIG_ options should basically force the
command line? That both reduces the code paths, and simplifies the
ifdef'ing.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-15 18:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-25 18:06 [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:02 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-06 19:24 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-06 21:06 ` André Przywara
2019-01-31 17:58 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-07 0:25 ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:03 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-15 18:20 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-15 18:54 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without hardened branch predictors Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without kpti Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:05 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:52 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 9:28 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 21:48 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 21:53 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:56 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-08 20:05 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren
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