From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Alex Murray <alex.murray@canonical.com>, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] x86/cpu/bugs: Consider having old Intel microcode to be a vulnerability
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 08:00:26 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7fc07eff-b4a1-4f8d-a9de-dba057d5c9c6@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87iksrhkv8.fsf@canonical.com>
On 11/12/24 19:29, Alex Murray wrote:
>> No, I don't think so. First, I honestly don't want to have this
>> discussion every three months where folks can argue about whether a
>> given microcode release is functional or security. Or, even worse,
>> which individual microcode *image* is which.
> I don't think there is an argument here - releases at
> https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
> clearly say if they contain Security updates or updates for functional
> issues - so if a release like the previous 20241029 one only contains an
> update for functional issues it should not be treated as a security
> issue if a system is not running it.
While I applaud your trust in my employer, I don't see quite as bright
of a line between security and functional problems.
Here's the bottom line: I agree that setting a taint flag for old
microcode seems like a good idea. But I also think that there's enough
of a "vulnerability" (security or otherwise) to justify placing
"old_microcode" alongside the CPU security vulnerabilities that have
known exploits.
I'm lazy and don't want to read and filter the microcode changelogs. I
also don't want to have to trust my colleagues to precisely agree on
where that line is between a security and functional problem.
So I'm leaning toward setting:
TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
plus
X86_BUG_OLD_MICROCODE
and calling it a day.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-13 16:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-07 17:06 Dave Hansen
2024-11-08 23:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-11-12 17:15 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-12 6:37 ` Alex Murray
2024-11-12 15:51 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-13 3:29 ` Alex Murray
2024-11-13 16:00 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-11-13 23:58 ` Alex Murray
2024-11-14 0:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-18 8:35 ` Alex Murray
2024-11-13 9:28 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-11-14 2:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-11-18 20:02 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-19 17:45 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-19 18:49 ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-19 19:31 ` Pawan Gupta
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