From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6EF9C34D390 for ; Mon, 9 Mar 2026 09:07:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.129.124 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1773047251; cv=none; b=EfBy0MoRBgPa1vZhXlb/jq+0TAiKmN/adMOhAh0lNncll9tAb1SVOfTC5kleFN/PqWnIiZET5IlkOzItc+f5wV1rzPkx128VT2vk8A0iX0jEewcH54FfyurEmlvLQEY1Nf4JpJSeuZWH5hInsIy/NwBtiP7jD74NGZboHHcSsMw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1773047251; c=relaxed/simple; bh=QhxXiXekcZm8Po9Np0iAPZoz/l5lb9YjQD4zTGA17gQ=; h=Date:From:To:cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=iT28tVjfnfF5DnhRZj/cEnav1eSDJtyDokSD1plI0aKQGQ0oL3Jtv+7fgMFHgDs1JX1fLyMKwD/REExAX1i5ImHXzC36AU9VZYxWztxnJbh5ANJ4J8JinEFOxszpoW+3ri6BeFQ1AS78BiqTkZ5GjFhkaZtwpaHXt4wHPt2yXVo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b=fpsxJ28O; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.129.124 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="fpsxJ28O" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1773047249; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=awTj8i86ypHKRz0ho2QP5VuJQavyhccBkYAt/5NH9HU=; b=fpsxJ28O17uzRgthIPAigfjNuXS7vlC5e6p9/egY01PUnGqOCkxxTH1O0jW/HWydmjMhKr QwT8OY6WQghLxB4ScB2bfj2P+FepTGWVZfSjw8cMIH6mLL1GN35zDmESuSSfv7CrI5Neti 8HYhuh+nTgOM6xDVurmwxcOo0ElIp6k= Received: from mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-371-0BK9Q8JGN7yG96CCMYGcdw-1; Mon, 09 Mar 2026 05:07:26 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 0BK9Q8JGN7yG96CCMYGcdw-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: 0BK9Q8JGN7yG96CCMYGcdw_1773047244 Received: from mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.4]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 13EF01955DE2; Mon, 9 Mar 2026 09:07:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from Carbon (unknown [10.45.242.17]) by mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C45CA30001BB; Mon, 9 Mar 2026 09:07:16 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2026 10:07:12 +0100 (CET) From: Michael Petlan To: Ravi Bangoria cc: Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Namhyung Kim , Ian Rogers , Dapeng Mi , James Clark , Sadasivan Shaiju , x86@kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Manali Shukla , Santosh Shukla , Ananth Narayan , Sandipan Das Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler In-Reply-To: <20260216042216.1440-5-ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Message-ID: <81204aa7-9d81-8d53-b82b-6c4ad8c89c2@redhat.com> References: <20260216042216.1440-1-ravi.bangoria@amd.com> <20260216042216.1440-5-ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.30.177.4 Hello Ravi. By evaluating the privileges at the event-init moment and using cached value later, couldn't it lead to the cached value being obsolete at some point? E.g. a setuid program later dropping the privileges but still being able to read physical addresses? I don't think it can be a solid attack-surface, but still may be worth of a thought... ? Michael On Mon, 16 Feb 2026, Ravi Bangoria wrote: > Calling perf_allow_kernel() from the NMI context is unsafe and could be > fatal. Capture the permission at event-initialization time by storing it > in event->hw.flags, and have the NMI handler rely on that cached flag > instead of making the call directly. > > Reported-by: Sadasivan Shaiju > Fixes: 50a53b60e141d ("perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace") > Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria > --- > arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c | 5 ++++- > arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h | 1 + > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c > index 05b7c9f2ec33..004226b52ac7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c > +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c > @@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ static int perf_ibs_init(struct perf_event *event) > if (ret) > return ret; > > + if (perf_allow_kernel()) > + hwc->flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED; > + > if (hwc->sample_period) { > if (config & perf_ibs->cnt_mask) > /* raw max_cnt may not be set */ > @@ -1349,7 +1352,7 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs) > * unprivileged users. > */ > if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) && > - perf_allow_kernel()) { > + (hwc->flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_UNPRIVILEGED)) { > perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(perf_ibs, &ibs_data); > } > > diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h > index 70078334e4a3..47f84ee8f540 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h > +++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event_flags.h > @@ -23,3 +23,4 @@ PERF_ARCH(PEBS_LAT_HYBRID, 0x0020000) /* ld and st lat for hybrid */ > PERF_ARCH(NEEDS_BRANCH_STACK, 0x0040000) /* require branch stack setup */ > PERF_ARCH(BRANCH_COUNTERS, 0x0080000) /* logs the counters in the extra space of each branch */ > PERF_ARCH(ACR, 0x0100000) /* Auto counter reload */ > +PERF_ARCH(UNPRIVILEGED, 0x0200000) /* Unprivileged event (wrt perf_allow_kernel()) */ > -- > 2.43.0 > > >