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[2003:cb:c709:8000:b502:8c1c:3624:99d4]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-37cd566a41fsm2476804f8f.45.2024.09.27.05.59.40 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 27 Sep 2024 05:59:41 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <813b9bcb-afde-40b6-a604-cdb71b4b6d7a@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2024 14:59:39 +0200 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] support for mm-local memory allocations and use it To: Fares Mehanna Cc: nh-open-source@amazon.com, Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Zenghui Yu , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Andrew Morton , Kemeng Shi , =?UTF-8?Q?Pierre-Cl=C3=A9ment_Tosi?= , Ard Biesheuvel , Mark Rutland , Javier Martinez Canillas , Arnd Bergmann , Fuad Tabba , Mark Brown , Joey Gouly , Kristina Martsenko , Randy Dunlap , Bjorn Helgaas , Jean-Philippe Brucker , "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" , Roman Kagan , "moderated list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)" , "open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)" , open list , "open list:MEMORY MANAGEMENT" References: <20240911143421.85612-1-faresx@amazon.de> From: David Hildenbrand Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; keydata= xsFNBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABzSREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT7CwZgEEwEIAEICGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQW AgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl8Ox4kFCRKpKXgACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1oHcA//a6Tj7SBNjFNM1iNhWUo1lxAja0lpSodSnB2g4FCZ4R61SBR4l/psBL73xktp rDHrx4aSpwkRP6Epu6mLvhlfjmkRG4OynJ5HG1gfv7RJJfnUdUM1z5kdS8JBrOhMJS2c/gPf wv1TGRq2XdMPnfY2o0CxRqpcLkx4vBODvJGl2mQyJF/gPepdDfcT8/PY9BJ7FL6Hrq1gnAo4 3Iv9qV0JiT2wmZciNyYQhmA1V6dyTRiQ4YAc31zOo2IM+xisPzeSHgw3ONY/XhYvfZ9r7W1l pNQdc2G+o4Di9NPFHQQhDw3YTRR1opJaTlRDzxYxzU6ZnUUBghxt9cwUWTpfCktkMZiPSDGd KgQBjnweV2jw9UOTxjb4LXqDjmSNkjDdQUOU69jGMUXgihvo4zhYcMX8F5gWdRtMR7DzW/YE BgVcyxNkMIXoY1aYj6npHYiNQesQlqjU6azjbH70/SXKM5tNRplgW8TNprMDuntdvV9wNkFs 9TyM02V5aWxFfI42+aivc4KEw69SE9KXwC7FSf5wXzuTot97N9Phj/Z3+jx443jo2NR34XgF 89cct7wJMjOF7bBefo0fPPZQuIma0Zym71cP61OP/i11ahNye6HGKfxGCOcs5wW9kRQEk8P9 M/k2wt3mt/fCQnuP/mWutNPt95w9wSsUyATLmtNrwccz63XOwU0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAHCwXwEGAEIACYCGwwWIQQb2cqtc1xMOkYN/MpN3hD3 AP+DWgUCXw7HsgUJEqkpoQAKCRBN3hD3AP+DWrrpD/4qS3dyVRxDcDHIlmguXjC1Q5tZTwNB boaBTPHSy/Nksu0eY7x6HfQJ3xajVH32Ms6t1trDQmPx2iP5+7iDsb7OKAb5eOS8h+BEBDeq 3ecsQDv0fFJOA9ag5O3LLNk+3x3q7e0uo06XMaY7UHS341ozXUUI7wC7iKfoUTv03iO9El5f XpNMx/YrIMduZ2+nd9Di7o5+KIwlb2mAB9sTNHdMrXesX8eBL6T9b+MZJk+mZuPxKNVfEQMQ a5SxUEADIPQTPNvBewdeI80yeOCrN+Zzwy/Mrx9EPeu59Y5vSJOx/z6OUImD/GhX7Xvkt3kq Er5KTrJz3++B6SH9pum9PuoE/k+nntJkNMmQpR4MCBaV/J9gIOPGodDKnjdng+mXliF3Ptu6 3oxc2RCyGzTlxyMwuc2U5Q7KtUNTdDe8T0uE+9b8BLMVQDDfJjqY0VVqSUwImzTDLX9S4g/8 kC4HRcclk8hpyhY2jKGluZO0awwTIMgVEzmTyBphDg/Gx7dZU1Xf8HFuE+UZ5UDHDTnwgv7E th6RC9+WrhDNspZ9fJjKWRbveQgUFCpe1sa77LAw+XFrKmBHXp9ZVIe90RMe2tRL06BGiRZr jPrnvUsUUsjRoRNJjKKA/REq+sAnhkNPPZ/NNMjaZ5b8Tovi8C0tmxiCHaQYqj7G2rgnT0kt WNyWQQ== Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: <20240911143421.85612-1-faresx@amazon.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 11.09.24 16:33, Fares Mehanna wrote: > In a series posted a few years ago [1], a proposal was put forward to allow the > kernel to allocate memory local to a mm and thus push it out of reach for > current and future speculation-based cross-process attacks. We still believe > this is a nice thing to have. > > However, in the time passed since that post Linux mm has grown quite a few new > goodies, so we'd like to explore possibilities to implement this functionality > with less effort and churn leveraging the now available facilities. > > An RFC was posted few months back [2] to show the proof of concept and a simple > test driver. > > In this RFC, we're using the same approach of implementing mm-local allocations > piggy-backing on memfd_secret(), using regular user addresses but pinning the > pages and flipping the user/supervisor flag on the respective PTEs to make them > directly accessible from kernel. > In addition to that we are submitting 5 patches to use the secret memory to hide > the vCPU gp-regs and fp-regs on arm64 VHE systems. I'm a bit lost on what exactly we want to achieve. The point where we start flipping user/supervisor flags confuses me :) With secretmem, you'd get memory allocated that (a) Is accessible by user space -- mapped into user space. (b) Is inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map (c) GUP will fail, but copy_from / copy_to user will work. Another way, without secretmem, would be to consider these "secrets" kernel allocations that can be mapped into user space using mmap() of a special fd. That is, they wouldn't have their origin in secretmem, but in KVM as a kernel allocation. It could be achieved by using VM_MIXEDMAP with vm_insert_pages(), manually removing them from the directmap. But, I am not sure who is supposed to access what. Let's explore the requirements. I assume we want: (a) Pages accessible by user space -- mapped into user space. (b) Pages inaccessible by kernel space -- not mapped into the direct map (c) GUP to fail (no direct map). (d) copy_from / copy_to user to fail? And on top of that, some way to access these pages on demand from kernel space? (temporary CPU-local mapping?) Or how would the kernel make use of these allocations? -- Cheers, David / dhildenb