From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 14:31:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8219df49-321d-d032-48b5-cf1cd5a46664@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-4-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
On 6/12/2017 9:56 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> Creation of a new LSM hook that can be used to authorize or deauthorize
> new USB devices via the usb authorization interface.
> The same hook can also prevent the authorization of a USB device via
> "/sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized".
> Using this hook an LSM could provide an higher level of granularity
> than the current authorization interface.
>
> Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
> Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 4 ++++
> drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c | 6 +++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> security/security.c | 5 +++++
> 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
> index b8bb20d..58be4f0 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
> #include <linux/random.h>
> #include <linux/pm_qos.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
> @@ -4831,6 +4832,9 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
> if (udev->quirks & USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT)
> msleep(1000);
>
> + if (security_usb_device_auth(udev))
> + usb_deauthorize_device(udev);
> +
> /* consecutive bus-powered hubs aren't reliable; they can
> * violate the voltage drop budget. if the new child has
> * a "powered" LED, users should notice we didn't enable it
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
> index dfc68ed..fce9d39 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> #include <linux/usb.h>
> #include <linux/usb/quirks.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include "usb.h"
>
> /* Active configuration fields */
> @@ -742,8 +743,11 @@ static ssize_t authorized_store(struct device *dev,
> result = -EINVAL;
> else if (val == 0)
> result = usb_deauthorize_device(usb_dev);
> - else
> + else {
> + if (security_usb_device_auth(usb_dev))
> + return -EPERM;
Return the error reported by the hook rather than -EPERM.
> result = usb_authorize_device(usb_dev);
> + }
> return result < 0 ? result : size;
> }
> static DEVICE_ATTR_IGNORE_LOCKDEP(authorized, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index bd274db..cc0937e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1189,6 +1189,10 @@
> * to the @parent process for tracing.
> * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @usb_device_auth:
> + * Check if @udev device should be authorized or not.
> + * @udev contains the usb_device structure for the USB device.
> + * Return 0 if the device is allowed.
> * @capget:
> * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
> * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to
> @@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@
> int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode);
> int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent);
> + int (*usb_device_auth)(const struct usb_device *udev);
> int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> @@ -1670,6 +1675,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
> struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
> struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
> + struct list_head usb_device_auth;
> struct list_head capget;
> struct list_head capset;
> struct list_head capable;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index af675b5..19bc364 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/usb.h>
>
> struct linux_binprm;
> struct cred;
> @@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
> struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
> int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> +int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev);
> int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> @@ -434,6 +436,11 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
> }
>
> +static inline int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 42c8028..e390f99 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -214,6 +214,11 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
> }
>
> +int security_usb_device_auth(const struct usb_device *udev)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(usb_device_auth, 0, udev);
> +}
> +
> int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> kernel_cap_t *effective,
> kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-12 21:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-12 16:56 [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-13 7:43 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-27 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-04 10:12 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:35 ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-13 7:47 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 19:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-13 7:50 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2017-06-13 7:51 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 1:15 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13 3:11 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20 7:07 ` Pavel Machek
2017-06-20 7:53 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13 7:55 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13 7:52 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-13 7:41 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13 0:02 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-09 19:35 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-10 7:59 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10 23:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-11 16:58 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 17:49 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 19:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 12:39 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 15:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 19:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 22:33 ` Matt Brown
2017-07-24 0:58 ` Casey Schaufler
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