mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	labbott@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 17:29:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <822ef031e3589a5cda5972eeeb457bbad69ecde6.camel@opteya.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180718142625.GA5942@thunk.org>

Hi,

Le mercredi 18 juillet 2018 à 10:26 -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o a écrit :
> On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 09:22:13AM +0200, Yann Droneaud wrote:
> > 
> > The text message should explain this is only relevant during
> > initialization / early boot.
> > 
> > The config option name should state this.
> 
> There are other workarounds for hangs that happen after
> initialization / early boot, yes.  They are of varying levels of
> quality / safely, but that's neither here nor there.
> 
> However, enabling config option means that the CRNG will be
> initialized with potentially information available to the CPU
> manufacturer and/or Nation States, and this persists *after*
> initialization / early boot.  So to say, "we're perfectly safe after
> we leave initialization / early boot" is not true.
> 

Sure, but, AFAICT, RDRAND is already in use through arch_get_random_*()
functions when CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is enabled.

From an outside PoV, there's a conflict: why one would want its kernel
to use CPU hwrng if one has purposely disabled CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
?

> So I'd much rather make it clear that we are trusting the CPU
> manufacturer far more than just during early boot.
> 

Then, should CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM depends on CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU  (on
x86 at least) ?

Regards.

-- 
Yann Droneaud
OPTEYA


  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-18 15:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-18  1:43 Theodore Ts'o
2018-07-18  1:51 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-18 15:14   ` Sandy Harris
2018-07-18 17:36     ` [PATCH] random: addu " Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-18 20:22       ` Sandy Harris
2018-07-19 14:21         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-19 20:17       ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 17:36   ` [PATCH] random: add " Ken Moffat
2018-07-19  0:19     ` Ken Moffat
2018-07-18  5:09 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-07-18  6:46 ` Jeffrey Walton
2018-07-18  7:22 ` Yann Droneaud
2018-07-18 14:26   ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-18 15:29     ` Yann Droneaud [this message]
2018-07-18 19:17       ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-04 21:52     ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-05  0:25       ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-05  0:28         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-08-05  9:44         ` Pavel Machek
2018-07-20 19:09 ` Laura Abbott

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=822ef031e3589a5cda5972eeeb457bbad69ecde6.camel@opteya.com \
    --to=ydroneaud@opteya.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome