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From: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:18:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <858a3c30-08ab-4b9b-b74c-a3917a247841@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aFrR5Nk1Ge3_ApWy@google.com>

On 6/24/2025 9:27 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> +
>> +static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>> +{
>> +	preempt_disable();
>> +	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
>> +		vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0);
>> +	preempt_enable();
>> +	return vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
>> +{
>> +	preempt_disable();
>> +	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
>> +		wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data);
>> +	preempt_enable();
>> +	vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = data;
>> +}
>>   #endif
> 
> Maybe add helpers to deal with the preemption stuff?  Oh, never mind, FRED

This is a good idea.

Do you want to upstream the following patch?

So I can rebase this patch on top of it in the next iteration.

> uses WRMSRNS.  Hmm, actually, can't these all be non-serializing?  KVM is
> progating *guest* values to hardware, so a VM-Enter is guaranteed before the
> CPU value can be consumed.

I see your point.  It seems that only a new MSR write instruction could
achieve this: consistently performing a non-serializing write to a MSR
with the assumption that the target is a guest MSR.  So software needs
to explicitly specify the type, host or guest, of the target MSR to the CPU.

(WRMSRNS writes to an MSR in either a serializing or non-serializing
manner, only based on its index.)

> 
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 *cache)
> {
> 	preempt_disable();
> 	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> 		*cache = read_msr(msr);
> 	preempt_enable();
> 	return *cache;
> }
> 
> static u64 vmx_write_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 data,
> 				    u64 *cache)
> {
> 	preempt_disable();
> 	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> 		wrmsrns(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
> 	preempt_enable();
> 	*cache = data;
> }
> 
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> {
> 	return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
> 				       &vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
> }
> 
> static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> {
> 	vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data,
> 				 &vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
> }
> 
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> {
> 	return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0,
> 				       &vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
> }
> 
> static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> {
> 	return vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data,
> 				        &vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
> }
> #endif
> 
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> +static u32 fred_msr_vmcs_fields[] = {
> 
> This should be const.

Will add.

> 
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3,
>> +	GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
>> +};
> 
> I think it also makes sense to add a static_assert() here, more so to help
> readers follow along than anything else.
> 
> static_assert(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ==
> 	      ARRAY_SIZE(fred_msr_vmcs_fields) - 1);

Good idea!

I tried to make fred_msr_to_vmcs() fail at build time, but couldn’t get
it to work.

> 
>> +
>> +static u32 fred_msr_to_vmcs(u32 msr)
>> +{
>> +	return fred_msr_vmcs_fields[msr - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1];
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -1849,6 +1852,23 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
>>   
>>   		data = (u32)data;
>>   		break;
>> +	case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
>> +		if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
>> +			return 1;
> 
> Yeesh, this is a bit of a no-win situation.  Having to re-check the MSR index is
> no fun, but the amount of overlap between MSRs is significant, i.e. I see why you
> bundled everything together.  Ugh, and MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS is buried smack dab
> in the middle of everything.
> 
>> +
>> +		/* Bit 11, bits 5:4, and bit 2 of the IA32_FRED_CONFIG must be zero */
> 
> Eh, the comment isn't helping much.  If we want to add more documentation, add
> #defines.  But I think we can documented the reserved behavior while also tidying
> up the code a bit.
> 
> After much fiddling, how about this?
> 
> 	case MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS:
> 		if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> 			return 1;
> 		break;			
> 
> 	case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
> 	case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG: {
> 		u64 reserved_bits;
> 
> 		if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> 			return 1;
> 
> 		if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu))
> 			return 1;
> 
> 		switch (index) {
> 		case MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> 			reserved_bits = BIT_ULL(11) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 4) | BIT_ULL(2);
> 			break;
> 		case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
> 			reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(5, 0);
> 			break;
> 		case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3:
> 			reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(2, 0);
> 			break;
> 		default:
> 			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> 			return 1;
> 		}
> 		if (data & reserved_bits)
> 			return 1;
> 		break;
> 	}
> 

Easier to read, I will use it :)

Thanks!
     Xin

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-25 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14  7:41   ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10  8:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18     ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16       ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:18     ` Xin Li [this message]
2025-06-26 17:22       ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:38     ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05     ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43     ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47       ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02         ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40           ` H. Peter Anvin

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