From: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com, xin3.li@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:18:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <858a3c30-08ab-4b9b-b74c-a3917a247841@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aFrR5Nk1Ge3_ApWy@google.com>
On 6/24/2025 9:27 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> +
>> +static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>> +{
>> + preempt_disable();
>> + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
>> + vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0);
>> + preempt_enable();
>> + return vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
>> +{
>> + preempt_disable();
>> + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
>> + wrmsrns(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data);
>> + preempt_enable();
>> + vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0 = data;
>> +}
>> #endif
>
> Maybe add helpers to deal with the preemption stuff? Oh, never mind, FRED
This is a good idea.
Do you want to upstream the following patch?
So I can rebase this patch on top of it in the next iteration.
> uses WRMSRNS. Hmm, actually, can't these all be non-serializing? KVM is
> progating *guest* values to hardware, so a VM-Enter is guaranteed before the
> CPU value can be consumed.
I see your point. It seems that only a new MSR write instruction could
achieve this: consistently performing a non-serializing write to a MSR
with the assumption that the target is a guest MSR. So software needs
to explicitly specify the type, host or guest, of the target MSR to the CPU.
(WRMSRNS writes to an MSR in either a serializing or non-serializing
manner, only based on its index.)
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 *cache)
> {
> preempt_disable();
> if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> *cache = read_msr(msr);
> preempt_enable();
> return *cache;
> }
>
> static u64 vmx_write_guest_host_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr, u64 data,
> u64 *cache)
> {
> preempt_disable();
> if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
> wrmsrns(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
> preempt_enable();
> *cache = data;
> }
>
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> {
> return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
> &vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
> }
>
> static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> {
> vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data,
> &vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
> }
>
> static u64 vmx_read_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> {
> return vmx_read_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0,
> &vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
> }
>
> static void vmx_write_guest_fred_rsp0(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
> {
> return vmx_write_guest_host_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, data,
> &vmx->msr_guest_fred_rsp0);
> }
> #endif
>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> +static u32 fred_msr_vmcs_fields[] = {
>
> This should be const.
Will add.
>
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3,
>> + GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
>> +};
>
> I think it also makes sense to add a static_assert() here, more so to help
> readers follow along than anything else.
>
> static_assert(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1 ==
> ARRAY_SIZE(fred_msr_vmcs_fields) - 1);
Good idea!
I tried to make fred_msr_to_vmcs() fail at build time, but couldn’t get
it to work.
>
>> +
>> +static u32 fred_msr_to_vmcs(u32 msr)
>> +{
>> + return fred_msr_vmcs_fields[msr - MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1];
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -1849,6 +1852,23 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
>>
>> data = (u32)data;
>> break;
>> + case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
>> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
>> + return 1;
>
> Yeesh, this is a bit of a no-win situation. Having to re-check the MSR index is
> no fun, but the amount of overlap between MSRs is significant, i.e. I see why you
> bundled everything together. Ugh, and MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS is buried smack dab
> in the middle of everything.
>
>> +
>> + /* Bit 11, bits 5:4, and bit 2 of the IA32_FRED_CONFIG must be zero */
>
> Eh, the comment isn't helping much. If we want to add more documentation, add
> #defines. But I think we can documented the reserved behavior while also tidying
> up the code a bit.
>
> After much fiddling, how about this?
>
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS:
> if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> return 1;
> break;
>
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG: {
> u64 reserved_bits;
>
> if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
> return 1;
>
> if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu))
> return 1;
>
> switch (index) {
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
> reserved_bits = BIT_ULL(11) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 4) | BIT_ULL(2);
> break;
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3:
> reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(5, 0);
> break;
> case MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3:
> reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(2, 0);
> break;
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return 1;
> }
> if (data & reserved_bits)
> return 1;
> break;
> }
>
Easier to read, I will use it :)
Thanks!
Xin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-25 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-28 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-14 7:41 ` Chao Gao
2025-04-14 16:53 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/19] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/19] x86/cea: Export per CPU array 'cea_exception_stacks' for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-04-10 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-10 14:18 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-11 16:16 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/19] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/19] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR interception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/19] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 15:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/19] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:18 ` Xin Li [this message]
2025-06-26 17:22 ` Xin Li
2025-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/19] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/19] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/19] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/19] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 14/19] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 17:38 ` Xin Li
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 15/19] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS to be advertised to guests Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-25 18:05 ` Xin Li
2025-06-25 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 16/19] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-06-24 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 17/19] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context management Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 18/19] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 19/19] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-03-28 17:25 ` [PATCH v4 00/19] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-24 17:43 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 17:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-06-24 18:02 ` Xin Li
2025-06-24 18:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
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