From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 03:42:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <85zfd2upub.fsf@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aHeyNvzvbgrWAob5@google.com>
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:
> On Wed, Jul 16, 2025, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 7/16/25 00:53, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> > From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> >
>> > Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the
>> > intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response
>> > incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual
>> > VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly
>> > documented.
>> >
>> > Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
>> > * Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the
>> > guest
>> > * Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
>> >
>> > Add a WARN_ONCE to log the incident, as well-behaved SNP guest kernels
>> > should never attempt to write to these MSRs.
>> >
>> > However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
>> > GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate
>> > an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>
> Feel free to drop me as author and just give me a Reported-by or Suggested-by.
> At this point, I ain't doing a whole lot of anything for this patch :-)
Sure
>
>> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(write)) {
>>
>> Do we want to capture individual WARNs for each MSR? I guess I'm ok with
>> a single WARN for either MSR, but just asking the question.
>
> Or don't WARN at all. If the caller is doing a bare wrmsrq(), then the kernel
> will WARN in ex_handler_msr(). If the caller is doing wrmsrq_safe(), do we care
> that they're being deliberately weird?
Agree, we can drop the WARN.
Regards,
Nikunj
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-18 3:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-16 5:53 Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-16 13:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-16 13:59 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-16 14:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-18 3:42 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
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