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From: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
To: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>,
	Gilles Muller <Gilles.Muller@lip6.fr>,
	Nicolas Palix <nicolas.palix@imag.fr>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cocci@systeme.lip6.fr
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data
Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 15:28:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <878tz22peb.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <874m9rcmzx.fsf@gmail.com> (Nicolai Stange's message of "Sat, 21 May 2016 19:57:38 +0200")

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2719 bytes --]

Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> writes:

> Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> writes:
>
>> On 05/18/2016 12:05 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 11:18:16AM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
>>>> On 05/18/2016 11:01 AM, Nicolai Stange wrote:
>>>>> Thanks a million for reporting!
>>>>>
>>>>> 1.) Do you have lockdep enabled?
>>>>
>>>> Yup, nothing there.
>>>>
>>>>> 2.) Does this happen before or after userspace init has been spawned,
>>>>>     i.e. does the lockup happen at debugfs file creation time or
>>>>>     possibly at usage time?
>>>>
>>>> So I looked closer, and it seems to happen after starting syzkaller, which
>>>> as far as I know tries to open many different debugfs files.
>>>>
>>>> Is there debug code I can add it that'll help us figure out what's up?
>>> 
>>> Trying to figure out _which_ debugfs file is causing this would be
>>> great, if at all possible.  strace?
>>
>> What seems to be failing is syzkaller's attempt to mmap the coverage
>> debugfs file. So this isn't actually a kernel deadlock but syzkaller
>> misbehaves when that scenario happens.
>>
>> Either way, it only fails to mmap with that commit that I've pointed
>> out.
>
> That info is really helpful here: the proxy file_operations introduced by
> this commit doesn't have a ->mmap() defined, i.e. it is NULL from the
> VFS layer's point of view.
>
> The simple reason is that at the time I submitted this series, my
> Coccinelle script didn't find any debugfs user with a ->mmap()
> defined. Thus either that script was broken or things have changed in
> the meanwhile.

Thankfully, it's the latter :)
See the attached cocci script I used back then.

It now reports:

  ./drivers/staging/android/sync_debug.c:330:1-20: unsupported file_operations given to debugfs
  ./kernel/kcov.c:267:6-25: unsupported file_operations given to debugfs

The kcov's ->mmap() has been introduced by

  5c9a8750a640 ("kernel: add kcov code coverage")

dated from March this year.

Since that kcov debugfs file is never removed, it needs no protecting
proxy and thus, a replacement of debugfs_create_file() by
debugfs_create_file_unsafe() will do the trick here.

I'll send patches addressing the above two issues.

>>
>> 	th->cover_fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
>> 	if (th->cover_fd == -1)
>> 		fail("open of /sys/kernel/debug/kcov failed");
>> 	if (ioctl(th->cover_fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, kCoverSize))
>> 		fail("cover enable write failed");
>> 	th->cover_data = (uintptr_t*)mmap(NULL, kCoverSize * sizeof(th->cover_data[0]), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, th->cover_fd, 0);
>> 	if ((void*)th->cover_data == MAP_FAILED)
>> 		fail("cover mmap failed");
>>
>> And it's the mmap() that fails with -ENODEV.


[-- Attachment #2: debugfs_unsupp_fops.cocci --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 644 bytes --]

virtual report
virtual org

@unsupp_fops@
identifier fops;
expression e;
identifier m != {owner, open, release, llseek, read, write, poll, unlocked_ioctl};
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
 .m = e,
};

@unsupp_debugfs_fops@
expression name, mode, parent, data;
identifier unsupp_fops.fops;
position p;
@@
debugfs_create_file@p(name, mode, parent, data, &fops)



@script:python depends on report@
p << unsupp_debugfs_fops.p;
@@
coccilib.report.print_report(p[0], "unsupported file_operations given to debugfs")

@script:python depends on org@
p << unsupp_debugfs_fops.p;
@@
cocci.print_main("unsupported file_operations given to debugfs", p)

  reply	other threads:[~2016-05-22 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-22 13:11 [PATCH v6 0/8] fix debugfs file removal races Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] debugfs: prevent access to possibly dead file_operations at file open Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data Nicolai Stange
2016-05-18 14:48   ` Sasha Levin
2016-05-18 15:01     ` Nicolai Stange
2016-05-18 15:18       ` Sasha Levin
2016-05-18 16:05         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2016-05-20 16:57           ` Sasha Levin
2016-05-21 17:57             ` Nicolai Stange
2016-05-22 13:28               ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2016-05-18 16:32         ` Nicolai Stange
2016-05-20 16:55           ` Sasha Levin
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] debugfs: add support for self-protecting attribute file fops Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] debugfs, coccinelle: check for obsolete DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() usage Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:18   ` Julia Lawall
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] debugfs: unproxify integer attribute files Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_bool() Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_blob() Nicolai Stange
2016-03-22 13:11 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] debugfs: unproxify files created through debugfs_create_u32_array() Nicolai Stange
2017-03-19 16:30 [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data Arkady

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