From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2012 14:32:12 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87bodww9hv.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121214202921.GA11450@mail.hallyn.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Fri, 14 Dec 2012 20:29:21 +0000")
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> A child user namespace having capabilities against processes in it's
>> parent seems totally bizarre and pretty dangerous from a capabilities
>> standpoint.
>
> How would it have them against its parent?
init_user_ns
userns a --- created by kuid 1
userns b -- created by kuid 2
process c in userns b with kuid 1
Serge read the first permisison check in common_cap.
Think what happens in the above example.
For the rest I understand your concern.
Serge please read and look at the patches I have posted to fix
the issues Andy found with the user namespace tree. Especially
the fix to commit_creds.
After you have looked at the patches to fix the issues I will
be happy to discuss things further with you.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-12-14 22:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-12-11 21:17 [GIT PULL] user namespace and namespace infrastructure changes for 3.8 Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-13 19:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-13 22:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-13 22:39 ` [RFC][PATCH] Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-13 22:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-12-13 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-13 23:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 2:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 2:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 3:20 ` [PATCH] " Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 3:28 ` [RFC][PATCH] " Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-14 3:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 15:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-14 15:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 16:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-14 18:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 18:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-12-14 18:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 20:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-14 21:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 20:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-14 22:32 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2012-12-15 0:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-12-13 23:02 ` [GIT PULL] user namespace and namespace infrastructure changes for 3.8 Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 4:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-12-14 5:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-12-14 17:48 ` Eric W. Biederman
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