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From: alan@wylie.me.uk (Alan J. Wylie)
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	christoffer.dall@arm.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] arm64: spectre-v1 write fixes (CVE-2018-3693)
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:28:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87d0vuao1n.fsf@wylie.me.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180710180123.56461-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> (Mark Rutland's message of "Tue, 10 Jul 2018 19:01:21 +0100")

Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> writes:

> These patches inhibit spectre-v1-write gadgets found in arch/arm64, using the
> same mitigation applied to existing spectre-v1-read gadgets.
>
> This issue is also known as CVE-2018-3693, or "bounds check bypass store".
> More details can be found in the Arm Cache Speculation Side-channels
> whitepaper, available from the Arm security updates site [1].

> [1] https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability

From that web page:

| Variant 1: bounds check bypass store (CVE-2017-5753) and bounds check
| bypass store (CVE-2018-3693)

Isn't -5753 a "read" vulnerability, not "store"?

-- 
Alan J. Wylie                                          https://www.wylie.me.uk/

Dance like no-one's watching. / Encrypt like everyone is.
Security is inversely proportional to convenience

      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-10 19:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-10 18:01 Mark Rutland
2018-07-10 18:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] arm64: fix possible spectre-v1 write in ptrace_hbp_set_event() Mark Rutland
2018-07-10 18:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: fix possible spectre-v1 write in vgic_mmio_write_apr() Mark Rutland
2018-07-10 19:28 ` Alan J. Wylie [this message]

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