From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:54:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87eh9cyrxj.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ob8gys0d.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 29 Aug 2013 16:52:18 -0700")
As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
---
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-29 23:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-29 23:52 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/5] A couple of lingering namespace patches Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:53 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/5] namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-30 16:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-29 23:54 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2013-08-30 1:15 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-29 23:55 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/5] pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-30 16:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-08-30 23:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-31 5:31 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-09-08 17:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2013-08-29 23:55 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/5] capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-29 23:56 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/5] userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy Eric W. Biederman
2013-08-30 1:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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