From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932243AbbCQNI2 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2015 09:08:28 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:35217 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753707AbbCQNI1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2015 09:08:27 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Dave Hansen Cc: Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , tytso@mit.edu, Oleg Nesterov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com References: <20150316230221.DA32D9BE@viggo.jf.intel.com> Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 08:04:40 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20150316230221.DA32D9BE@viggo.jf.intel.com> (Dave Hansen's message of "Mon, 16 Mar 2015 16:02:21 -0700") Message-ID: <87k2yflqqf.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX195U24nQgXRxK/XftVlbmaIehUlfhJjCX4= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 70.59.163.10 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 1.5 TR_Symld_Words too many words that have symbols inside * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa04 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ***;Dave Hansen X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 220 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.03 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.0 (1.4%), b_tie_ro: 2.1 (1.0%), parse: 0.60 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 14 (6.2%), get_uri_detail_list: 0.90 (0.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 7 (3.0%), tests_pri_-950: 1.06 (0.5%), tests_pri_-900: 0.88 (0.4%), tests_pri_-400: 16 (7.2%), check_bayes: 15 (6.8%), b_tokenize: 3.9 (1.8%), b_tok_get_all: 5 (2.4%), b_comp_prob: 1.47 (0.7%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.6 (1.2%), b_finish: 0.56 (0.3%), tests_pri_0: 172 (78.2%), tests_pri_500: 3.9 (1.8%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [RFCv2][PATCH 1/2] fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:00:52 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Dave Hansen writes: > From: Dave Hansen > > Changes from v1: > * Do not allow a child pid namespace to unset paranoid > when its parent had it set. > * Update description text to clarify the options we > have to solve this problem. Again. Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" The option name "paranoid" is entirely too general. Who knows what it referrs to. A mount option is not an appropriate place to control one small bit of policy like this. Proc mount options are a real pain in the butt to deal with and to maintain. Further a per pid namespace decision does not actually work, for having restricted policy only for a small set of processes because it is only with very careful container setup that you would expose this policy. If you really need a subset of processes with a restricted policy make it a prctl, and bloat struct task. Then disallow a process with the prctl set from reading the file. Eric