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From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	kyle@mcmartin.ca, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing
Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 10:46:01 +0930	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87lik33mi6.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+5PVA5qCiYNppOBihKfsqvyNWwBsBsyGD7SmJaphV_67HG1aQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, 31 May 2012 11:35:23 -0400, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 1:41 AM, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> wrote:
> > On Thu, 24 May 2012 15:00:51 +0100, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> > > Why would you want multiple signatures?  That just complicates things.
> >> >
> >> > The code above stays pretty simple; if the signature fails, you set size
> >> > to i, and loop again.  As I said, if you know exactly how you're going
> >> > to strip the modules, you can avoid storing the stripped module and
> >> > simply append both signatures.
> >>
> >> You still haven't justified it.  One of your arguments about rejecting the ELF
> >> parsing version was that it was too big for no useful extra value that I could
> >> justify.  Supporting multiple signatures adds extra size and complexity for no
> >> obvious value.
> >
> > One loop is a lot easier to justify that the ELF-parsing mess.  And it
> > can be done in a backwards compatible way tomorrow: old kernels will
> > only check the last signature.
> >
> > I had assumed you'd rather maintain a stable strip util which you can
> > use on kernel modules than rework your module builds.  I guess not.
> 
> Could you elaborate on this part a bit?  Do you mean integrate a
> standalone strip utility in the kernel sources and maintain that for
> use during module builds?  Or am I misunderstanding and you meant
> something else?

In the kernel sources, no.  But could RH maintain such a thing?  Surely.

Whether they want to guarantee that their strip is stable on kernel
modules, or create a minimal 'kmod-strip' is up to them.

> I can see how that sounds simple and desirable from one aspect, but
> it seems somewhat odd to me to duplicate the existing (or create from
> scratch) strip utilities.

Mangling a module after it is signed is very odd, and odd things aren't
nice for security features.  That's how we got here; I'm trying to move
the oddness out of the verification path.

Cheers,
Rusty.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-06-04  4:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-05-22 23:02 David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 01/23] Guard check in module loader against integer overflow David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 02/23] KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 03/23] KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 04/23] KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 05/23] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 06/23] KEYS: Add signature verification facility David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 07/23] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key subtype David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 08/23] KEYS: RSA signature verification algorithm David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 09/23] Fix signature verification for shorter signatures David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 10/23] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 11/23] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 12/23] PGPLIB: Signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 13/23] KEYS: PGP data parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 14/23] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 15/23] KEYS: PGP format signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 16/23] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 17/23] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 18/23] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 19/23] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 20/23] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 21/23] MODSIGN: Module signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 22/23] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 23/23] MODSIGN: Panic the kernel if FIPS is enabled upon module signing failure David Howells
2012-05-23 12:51 ` [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing Rusty Russell
2012-05-23 14:20 ` David Howells
2012-05-24 12:04   ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-25 11:15     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-05-25 11:37     ` David Howells
2012-05-25 13:08       ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-25 13:53       ` David Howells
2012-05-25 14:40         ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-24 14:00   ` David Howells
2012-05-27  5:41     ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-31 15:35       ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-04  1:16         ` Rusty Russell [this message]
2012-06-04 13:38           ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-05  0:23             ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22  1:53       ` Greg KH
2012-06-22  3:29         ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-06-22  4:05         ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22 11:03         ` David Howells
2012-06-23  0:20           ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-31 14:11     ` David Howells
2012-05-25 12:18 ` David Howells
2012-05-25 15:42 ` David Howells
2012-06-04  1:31   ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-04 12:47     ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05  1:05       ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-05 11:39         ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05 13:37         ` David Howells
2012-06-05 14:36           ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-06-05 13:35   ` David Howells
2012-06-10  5:47     ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-11  8:30       ` Kasatkin, Dmitry

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