From: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Amerigo Wang <amwang@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, esandeen@redhat.com,
eteo@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Patch 1/2] selinux: ajust rules for ATTR_FORCE
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 06:03:42 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87my5yxidt.fsf@devron.myhome.or.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87fxbq19qs.fsf@devron.myhome.or.jp> (OGAWA Hirofumi's message of "Tue, 18 Aug 2009 05:11:23 +0900")
OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> writes:
>>> > ATTR_FORCE is supposed to suppress permission checking altogether, and
>>> > shouldn't be mixed with multiple attribute changes if some should be
>>> > subject to permission checks while others should not.
>>>
>>> I disagree. In fact, ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID, and
>>> notify_change() is disallowing the mixed ATTR_MODE and ATTR_KILL_*. I
>>> think it should be enough.
>>
>> Ok, then we just need to adjust selinux_inode_setattr to understand that
>> ATTR_FORCE only means to bypass checking on ATTR_MODE.
>
> Ok, sure. I'll try it.
Could you review this? I've added ATTR_TIMES_SET to check explicit
utimes(), and tried it with minimum change.
[I'm not sure this handles notify_change() usage of nfsd (and perhaps
other network fs too) correctly, and whether selinux may want to check
it. I guess network fs _may_ try to change the multiple attributes at a
time. Well, even if it's true, it would be another topic...]
Thanks.
--
OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
From: Amerigo Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
As suggested by OGAWA Hirofumi in thread: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/8/7/132,
we should let selinux_inode_setattr() to match our ATTR_* rules.
ATTR_FORCE should not force things like ATTR_SIZE.
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
[tweaks]
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff -puN security/selinux/hooks.c~selinux-truncate-fix security/selinux/hooks.c
--- linux-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c~selinux-truncate-fix 2009-08-18 03:50:09.000000000 +0900
+++ linux-2.6-hirofumi/security/selinux/hooks.c 2009-08-18 05:35:11.000000000 +0900
@@ -2711,12 +2711,17 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
- if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
- return 0;
+ /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+ ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE);
+ if (!ia_valid)
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
- ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+ if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+ ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
_
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-08-17 21:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-08-17 7:07 [V4 Patch 0/2] fix file truncations when both suid and write permissions set Amerigo Wang
2009-08-17 7:07 ` [Patch 1/2] selinux: ajust rules for ATTR_FORCE Amerigo Wang
2009-08-17 8:46 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-17 12:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-17 18:46 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-17 19:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-17 19:46 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-17 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-17 20:11 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-17 21:03 ` OGAWA Hirofumi [this message]
2009-08-18 6:56 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-18 7:39 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-18 8:46 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-18 12:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2009-08-18 17:26 ` OGAWA Hirofumi
2009-08-19 2:34 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-17 7:07 ` [Patch 2/2] vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions set Amerigo Wang
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