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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	eldad@fogrefinery.com, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com,
	Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>,
	"kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 20:34:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87txgoh45y.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52576E32.1050700@gmail.com> (Ryan Mallon's message of "Fri, 11 Oct 2013 14:19:14 +1100")

Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> writes:

> On 11/10/13 13:20, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> writes:
>> 
>>> Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
>>> permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which
>>> use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
>>> but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid
>>> binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
>>> permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
>>> leaked.
>>>
>>> This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu
>>> 12.04:
>>>
>>>   $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
>>>   00000000 T startup_32
>>>
>>>   $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
>>>   pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'
>>>
>>> This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
>>> setuid binaries may leak more information.
>>>
>>> Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process
>>> having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the
>>> real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses
>>> %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user
>>> is unprivileged.
>>>
>>> Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also
>>> correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.
>> 
>> Sigh.  This is all wrong.  The only correct thing to test is
>> file->f_cred.  Aka the capabilities of the program that opened the
>> file.
>> 
>> Which means that the interface to %pK in the case of kptr_restrict is
>> broken as it has no way to be passed the information it needs to make
>> a sensible decision.
>
> Would it make sense to add a struct file * to struct seq_file and set
> that in seq_open? Then the capability check can be done against
> seq->file.

It would make most sense to do the capability check at open time,
and cache the result.  Doing it generically so that seq_printf could
still use %pK doesn't sound wrong, but it does sound convoluted.

Eric


  reply	other threads:[~2013-10-11  3:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-09 21:52 [PATCH v3] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:00 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:04   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:14     ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:25       ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:33         ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:42           ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 23:09             ` [PATCH v3a] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 23:18               ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 23:21                 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-11  2:20               ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-11  3:19                 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11  3:34                   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2013-10-14 10:17                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 12:21                     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 20:41                     ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11  4:42                 ` George Spelvin
2013-10-11  5:19                   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11  5:29                     ` Joe Perches
2013-10-11 22:04                   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 22:37                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-14  9:18                       ` Ryan Mallon

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