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From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>,
	benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: nathanl@linux.ibm.com, cheloha@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: export LPAR security flavor in lparcfg
Date: Fri, 05 Mar 2021 22:43:55 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wnulrfk4.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2c67c119-c1ec-b079-da54-0bf2f316c734@linux.ibm.com>

Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> Le 05/03/2021 à 07:23, Michael Ellerman a écrit :
>> Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> writes:
>>> This is helpful to read the security flavor from inside the LPAR.
>> 
>> We already have /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/security_features.
>> 
>> Is that not sufficient?
>
> Not really, it only reports that security mitigation are on or off but not the 
> level set through the ASMI menu. Furthermore, reporting it through
> /proc/powerpc/lparcfg allows an easy processing by the lparstat command (see below).
>
>> 
>>> Export it like this in /proc/powerpc/lparcfg:
>>>
>>> $ grep security_flavor /proc/powerpc/lparcfg
>>> security_flavor=1
>>>
>>> Value means:
>>> 0 Speculative execution fully enabled
>>> 1 Speculative execution controls to mitigate user-to-kernel attacks
>>> 2 Speculative execution controls to mitigate user-to-kernel and
>>>    user-to-user side-channel attacks
>> 
>> Those strings come from the FSP help, but we have no guarantee it won't
>> mean something different in future.
>
> I think this is nailed down, those strings came from:
> https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/715841
>
> Where it is written (regarding AIX):
>
> On an LPAR, one can use lparstat -x to display the current mitigation mode:
> 0 = Speculative execution fully enabled
> 1 = Speculative execution controls to mitigate user-to-kernel side-channel attacks
> 2 = Speculative execution controls to mitigate user-to-kernel and user-to-user 
> side-channel attacks
>
> We have been requested to provide almost the same, which I proposed in 
> powerpc-utils:
> https://groups.google.com/g/powerpc-utils-devel/c/NaKXvdyl_UI/m/wa2stpIDAQAJ

OK. Do you mind sending a v2 with all those details incorporated into
the change log?

cheers

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-05 11:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-04 11:42 Laurent Dufour
2021-03-05  6:23 ` Michael Ellerman
2021-03-05  8:04   ` Laurent Dufour
2021-03-05 11:43     ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2021-03-05 11:45       ` Laurent Dufour

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