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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"the arch\/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
	H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL ] signal/vm86_32: Remove pointless test in BUG_ON
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 15:37:11 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y25toy2g.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjU1Nf+zzFgwE5bAGSq2W9DifmKDsAOFuZcaaHq3vEQ8w@mail.gmail.com> (Linus Torvalds's message of "Fri, 12 Nov 2021 13:24:37 -0800")


Linus,

Please pull the exit-cleanups-for-v5.16 branch from the git tree:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git exit-cleanups-for-v5.16

  HEAD: c7a9b6471c8ee6a2180fc5f2f7a1e284754bdfc5 signal/vm86_32: Remove pointless test in BUG_ON


This branch has only one unpulled change.  Just the removal of an
unnecessary test from a BUG_ON.  Which in my running of the fuzzer
locally fixes the issue.

kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> writes[1]:
>
> Greeting,
>
> FYI, we noticed the following commit (built with gcc-9):
>
> commit: 1a4d21a23c4ca7467726be7db9ae8077a62b2c62 ("signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON")
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
>
> in testcase: trinity
> version: trinity-static-i386-x86_64-1c734c75-1_2020-01-06
> with following parameters:
>
>
> [ 70.645554][ T3747] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109!
> [ 70.646185][ T3747] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 70.646682][ T3747] CPU: 0 PID: 3747 Comm: trinity-c6 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-00009-g1a4d21a23c4c #1
> [ 70.647598][ T3747] EIP: save_v86_state (arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109 (discriminator 3))
> [ 70.648113][ T3747] Code: 89 c3 64 8b 35 60 b8 25 c2 83 ec 08 89 55 f0 8b 96 10 19 00 00 89 55 ec e8 c6 2d 0c 00 fb 8b 55 ec 85 d2 74 05 83 3a 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 8b 86 10 19 00 00 8b 4b 38 8b 78 48 31 cf 89 f8 8b 7a 4c 81
> [ 70.650136][ T3747] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f5f49fac ECX: 0000000b EDX: f610b600
> [ 70.650852][ T3747] ESI: f5f79cc0 EDI: f5f79cc0 EBP: f5f49f04 ESP: f5f49ef0
> [ 70.651593][ T3747] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 70.652413][ T3747] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00004000 CR3: 35fc7000 CR4: 000406d0
> [ 70.653169][ T3747] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
> [ 70.653897][ T3747] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400
> [ 70.654382][ T3747] Call Trace:
> [ 70.654719][ T3747] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:792 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:867)
> [ 70.655288][ T3747] exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:174 kernel/entry/common.c:209)
> [ 70.655854][ T3747] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:126 kernel/entry/common.c:317)
> [ 70.656450][ T3747] irqentry_exit (kernel/entry/common.c:406)
> [ 70.656897][ T3747] exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1535)
> [ 70.657369][ T3747] ? sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1488)
> [ 70.657989][ T3747] handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1085)

vm86_32.c:109 is: "BUG_ON(!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86)"

When trying to understand the failure Brian Gerst pointed out[2] that
the code does not need protection against vm86->user_vm86 being NULL.
The copy_from_user code will already handles that case if the address
is going to fault.

Looking futher I realized that if we care about not allowing struct
vm86plus_struct at address 0 it should be do_sys_vm86 (the system
call) that does the filtering.  Not way down deep when the emulation
has completed in save_v86_state.

So let's just remove the silly case of attempting to filter a
userspace address with a BUG_ON.  Existing userspace can't break and
it won't make the kernel any more attackable as the userspace access
helpers will handle it, if it isn't a good userspace pointer.

I have run the reproducer the fuzzer gave me before I made this change
and it reproduced, and after I made this change and I have not seen
the reported failure.  So it does looks like this fixes the reported
issue.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112074030.GB19820@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAMzpN2jkK5sAv-Kg_kVnCEyVySiqeTdUORcC=AdG1gV6r8nUew@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Tested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
index f14f69d7aa3c..cce1c89cb7df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
 	 */
 	local_irq_enable();
 
-	BUG_ON(!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86);
+	BUG_ON(!vm86);
 
 	set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->veflags_mask);
 	user = vm86->user_vm86;
-- 
2.20.1


  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-12 21:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 95+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-20 17:32 [PATCH 00/20] exit cleanups Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 01/20] exit/doublefault: Remove apparently bogus comment about rewind_stack_do_exit Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:02   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 02/20] exit: Remove calls of do_exit after noreturn versions of die Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:02   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 16:25     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 03/20] reboot: Remove the unreachable panic after do_exit in reboot(2) Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:05   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 04/20] signal/sparc32: Remove unreachable do_exit in do_sparc_fault Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:05   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 05/20] signal/mips: Update (_save|_restore)_fp_context to fail with -EFAULT Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:06   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-24  4:24   ` Maciej W. Rozycki
2021-10-25 20:55     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-24 15:27   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 06/20] signal/sh: Use force_sig(SIGKILL) instead of do_group_exit(SIGKILL) Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 19:57   ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-27 14:24     ` Rich Felker
2021-10-21 16:08   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 07/20] signal/powerpc: On swapcontext failure force SIGSEGV Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:09   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 08/20] signal/sparc: In setup_tsb_params convert open coded BUG into BUG Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:12   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 09/20] signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:15   ` Kees Cook
2021-11-12 15:40   ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-11-12 17:51     ` Brian Gerst
2021-11-12 19:57       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-11-12 20:40         ` Linus Torvalds
2021-11-12 21:03           ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-11-12 21:23             ` Linus Torvalds
2021-11-12 21:24               ` Linus Torvalds
2021-11-12 21:37                 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2021-11-13 19:15                   ` [GIT PULL ] signal/vm86_32: Remove pointless test in BUG_ON pr-tracker-bot
2021-11-12 21:43                 ` [PATCH 09/20] signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 10/20] signal/vm86_32: Properly send SIGSEGV when the vm86 state cannot be saved Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:16   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 17:02     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 20:33       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 23:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-10-24 16:06     ` Eric W. Biederman
     [not found]   ` <875ytkygfj.fsf_-_@disp2133>
2021-10-25 21:12     ` [PATCH v2 10/32] " Linus Torvalds
2021-10-25 21:28       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-25 22:25     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-10-25 23:45       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-26  0:21         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 11/20] signal/s390: Use force_sigsegv in default_trap_handler Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:17   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-26  9:38   ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-10-28 15:56     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-29 19:32       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 12/20] exit/kthread: Have kernel threads return instead of calling do_exit Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 11:12   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-10-21 15:11     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:21   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH 13/20] signal: Implement force_fatal_sig Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 20:05   ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-20 21:25     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-25 22:41     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-10-25 23:15       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-26  4:45         ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-26  4:57         ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-26 16:15           ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-28 16:33             ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:24   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 16:33     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:39       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 14/20] exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:25   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 16:37     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:40       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 17:05         ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-25 22:32     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-10-21 16:35   ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 15/20] signal/sparc32: Exit with a fatal signal when try_to_clear_window_buffer fails Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:34   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-21 16:56     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 16/20] signal/sparc32: In setup_rt_frame and setup_fram use force_fatal_sig Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:34   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 17/20] signal/x86: In emulate_vsyscall force a signal instead of calling do_exit Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:36   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 18/20] exit/rtl8723bs: Replace the macro thread_exit with a simple return 0 Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21  7:06   ` Greg KH
2021-10-21 15:06     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21 16:37   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 19/20] exit/rtl8712: " Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21  7:07   ` Greg KH
2021-10-21 16:37   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 17:44 ` [PATCH 20/20] exit/r8188eu: " Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21  7:07   ` Greg KH
2021-10-21 16:37   ` Kees Cook
2021-10-20 21:51 ` [PATCH 21/20] signal: Replace force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) with force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV) Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21  8:09   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2021-10-21 13:33     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-10-21  8:32   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé

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