mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Robert Święcki" <robert@swiecki.net>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Miklos Szeredi" <mszeredi@suse.cz>,
	"Kostya Serebryany" <kcc@google.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Sasha Levin" <sasha.levin@oracle.com>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 22:57:32 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87zivtj5tv.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLwwCw9wZA8QYNVrZ2+kHJn7G3sXQZchvqFMYj3bN=DpQ@mail.gmail.com> (Kees Cook's message of "Mon, 25 Jan 2016 14:34:32 -0800")

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:

> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:33 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:
>>>
>>> Well, I don't know about less weird, but it would leave a unneeded
>>> hole in the permission checks.
>>
>> To be clear the current patch has my:
>>
>> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>
>> The code is buggy, and poorly thought through.  Your lack of interest in
>> fixing the bugs in your patch is distressing.
>
> I'm not sure where you see me having a "lack of interest". The
> existing cap-checking sysctls have a corner-case bug, which is
> orthogonal to this change.

That certainly doesn't sound like you have any plans to change anything
there.

>> So broken code, not willing to fix.  No. We are not merging this sysctl.
>
> I think you're jumping to conclusions. :)

I think I am the maintainer.

What you are proposing is very much something that is only of interst to
people who are not using user namespaces.  It is fatally flawed as
a way to avoid new attack surfaces for people who don't care as the
sysctl leaves user namespaces enabled by default.  It is fatally flawed
as remediation to recommend to people to change if a new user namespace
related but is discovered.  Any running process that happens to be
created while user namespace creation was enabled will continue to
exist.  Effectively a reboot will be required as part of a mitigation.
Many sysadmins will get that wrong.

I can't possibly see your sysctl as proposed achieving it's goals.  A
person has to be entirely too aware of subtlety and nuance to use it
effectively.

> This feature is already implemented by two distros, and likely wanted
> by others. We cannot ignore that. The sysctl default doesn't change
> the existing behavior, so this doesn't get in your way at all. Can you
> please respond to my earlier email where I rebutted each of your
> arguments against it? Just saying "no" and putting words in my mouth
> isn't very productive.

Calling people who make mistakes insane is not a rebuttal.  In security
usability matters, and your sysctl has low usability.

Further you seem to have missed something crucial in your understanding.
As was explained earlier the sysctl was added to ubuntu to allow early
adopters to experiment not as a long term way of managing user
namespaces.


What sounds like a generally useful feature that would cover your use
case and many others is a per user limit on the number of user
namespaces users may create.

Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-01-26  5:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-22 22:39 Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:39 ` [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: expand use of proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin Kees Cook
2016-01-23  3:10   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-23 22:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-01-24  1:20       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24  1:43         ` Al Viro
2016-01-24  1:56           ` Jann Horn
2016-01-24  6:02             ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24  6:32               ` Jann Horn
2016-01-24  6:44                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-22 22:39 ` [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:47   ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 22:50     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:55       ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-22 23:00         ` Kees Cook
2016-01-23  0:44           ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23  0:44           ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-23  0:59           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ben Hutchings
2016-01-24 20:59             ` Kees Cook
2016-01-24 22:20               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:51                 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-22 22:49 ` [PATCH 0/2] " Richard Weinberger
2016-01-23  3:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-24 20:57   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26  7:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-24 22:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:51     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 18:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-25 18:56         ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 19:33           ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 22:34             ` Kees Cook
2016-01-25 23:33               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-26  2:27               ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-01-26  4:57               ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2016-01-26 14:38                 ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 14:46                   ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 14:56                     ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 17:20                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge Hallyn
2016-01-26 19:56                         ` Josh Boyer
2016-01-26 20:11                           ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 17:15                   ` Serge Hallyn
2016-01-26 18:09                     ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 18:27                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-26 18:45                         ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-26 23:15                         ` Kees Cook
2016-01-26 23:13                     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-27 10:27                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-27 12:32                         ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2016-01-28 14:41                         ` Robert Święcki
2016-01-26 16:37                 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-28  8:56                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2016-01-28 12:53                   ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87zivtj5tv.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org \
    --to=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=kcc@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mszeredi@suse.cz \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=robert@swiecki.net \
    --cc=sasha.levin@oracle.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

Powered by JetHome