From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Zixi Chen <zixchen@redhat.com>, Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/cpu: fix invalid MTRR mask values for SEV or TME
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 13:42:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <897a31a7-7ec3-41b7-867b-0229c0addf5f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2b5e6d68-007e-48bd-be61-9a354be2ccbf@intel.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 153 bytes --]
On 2/1/24 10:29, Dave Hansen wrote:
> Could we instead do something more like the (completely untested)
> attached patch?
... actually attaching it here
[-- Attachment #2: enc_phys_bits.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2069 bytes --]
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 26620d7642a9..415ae443ef79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
#endif
__u8 x86_virt_bits;
__u8 x86_phys_bits;
+ __u8 enc_phys_bits;
/* CPUID returned core id bits: */
__u8 x86_coreid_bits;
/* Max extended CPUID function supported: */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index f3abca334199..40fc44dfa7a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -618,11 +618,13 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
goto clear_all;
/*
- * Always adjust physical address bits. Even though this
- * will be a value above 32-bits this is still done for
- * CONFIG_X86_32 so that accurate values are reported.
+ * Record the number of physical address bits that
+ * have been repurposed for memory encryption. Do
+ * this even on CONFIG_X86_32 configs that do can
+ * not support memory encryption so it is still
+ * reported accurately.
*/
- c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+ c->enc_phys_bits = (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
goto clear_all;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0b97bcde70c6..b998ae7fbbfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1098,6 +1098,10 @@ void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
bool vp_bits_from_cpuid = true;
+ WARN_ON(c->x86_clflush_size ||
+ c->x86_phys_bits ||
+ c->x86_virt_bits);
+
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID) ||
(c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008))
vp_bits_from_cpuid = false;
@@ -1122,6 +1126,8 @@ void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
}
}
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= c->enc_phys_bits;
+
c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-01 21:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-31 23:09 Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-31 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpu: allow reducing x86_phys_bits during early_identify_cpu() Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 8:33 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2024-02-01 15:44 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-31 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/cpu/intel: Detect TME keyid bits before setting MTRR mask registers Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-01 8:34 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2024-02-01 15:42 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-01 18:29 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/cpu: fix invalid MTRR mask values for SEV or TME Dave Hansen
2024-02-01 21:42 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-02-01 23:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-04 17:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-13 15:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-13 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-13 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-20 12:22 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-22 18:06 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-26 1:57 ` Yin Fengwei
2024-02-26 16:21 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 2:02 ` Yin Fengwei
2024-02-27 6:08 ` Yin Fengwei
2024-02-27 13:30 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-28 0:07 ` Yin Fengwei
2024-02-13 17:07 ` Dave Hansen
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