mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ #26831]
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 23:41:42 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c99cc8e-41af-d066-b786-53ac13c2af8a@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103173438.GD5545@sirena.org.uk>

Hi,

On 11/3/20 11:34 AM, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 10:25:37AM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> 
>> Re-mmap executable segments instead of mprotecting them in
>> case mprotect is seccomp filtered.
> 
>> For the kernel mapped main executable we don't have the fd
>> for re-mmap so linux needs to be updated to add BTI. (In the
>> presence of seccomp filters for mprotect(PROT_EXEC) the libc
>> cannot change BTI protection at runtime based on user space
>> policy so it is better if the kernel maps BTI compatible
>> binaries with PROT_BTI by default.)
> 
> Given that there were still some ongoing discussions on a more robust
> kernel interface here and there seem to be a few concerns with this
> series should we perhaps just take a step back and disable this seccomp
> filter in systemd on arm64, at least for the time being?  That seems
> safer than rolling out things that set ABI quickly, a big part of the

So, that's a bigger hammer than I think is needed and punishes !BTI 
machines. I'm going to suggest that if we need to carry a temp patch its 
more like the glibc patch I mentioned in the Fedora defect. That patch 
simply logs a message, on the mprotect failures rather than aborting. 
Its fairly non-intrusive.

That leaves seccomp functional, and BTI generally functional except when 
seccomp is restricting it. I've also been asked that if a patch like 
that is needed, its (temporary?) merged to the glibc trunk, rather than 
just being carried by the distro's.

Thanks,

> reason we went with having the dynamic linker enable PROT_BTI in the
> first place was to give us more flexibility to handle any unforseen
> consequences of enabling BTI that we run into.  We are going to have
> similar issues with other features like MTE so we need to make sure that
> whatever we're doing works with them too.
> 
> Also updated to Will's current e-mail address - Will, do you have
> thoughts on what we should do here?
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-04  5:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-03 10:25 Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:25 ` [PATCH 1/4] elf: Pass the fd to note processing " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] elf: Move note processing after l_phdr is updated " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:38   ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 12:36     ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 15:04       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 15:27         ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] aarch64: Use mmap to add PROT_BTI instead of mprotect " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:34   ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] aarch64: Remove the bti link_map field " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) " Mark Brown
2020-11-04  5:41   ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2020-11-04  8:57     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 14:41       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 14:45         ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 10:50     ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04 18:47       ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04 18:53         ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04  9:02   ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04  9:20   ` Will Deacon
2020-11-04  9:29     ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04  9:55       ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 14:35         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 15:19           ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 16:08             ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 15:20         ` Mark Rutland
2020-11-04 18:59           ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-05 11:31     ` Szabolcs Nagy

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=8c99cc8e-41af-d066-b786-53ac13c2af8a@arm.com \
    --to=jeremy.linton@arm.com \
    --cc=broonie@kernel.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=libc-alpha@sourceware.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mzxreary@0pointer.de \
    --cc=s.mesoraca16@gmail.com \
    --cc=szabolcs.nagy@arm.com \
    --cc=toiwoton@gmail.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®