From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>, Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) [BZ #26831]
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 23:41:42 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c99cc8e-41af-d066-b786-53ac13c2af8a@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201103173438.GD5545@sirena.org.uk>
Hi,
On 11/3/20 11:34 AM, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 10:25:37AM +0000, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
>
>> Re-mmap executable segments instead of mprotecting them in
>> case mprotect is seccomp filtered.
>
>> For the kernel mapped main executable we don't have the fd
>> for re-mmap so linux needs to be updated to add BTI. (In the
>> presence of seccomp filters for mprotect(PROT_EXEC) the libc
>> cannot change BTI protection at runtime based on user space
>> policy so it is better if the kernel maps BTI compatible
>> binaries with PROT_BTI by default.)
>
> Given that there were still some ongoing discussions on a more robust
> kernel interface here and there seem to be a few concerns with this
> series should we perhaps just take a step back and disable this seccomp
> filter in systemd on arm64, at least for the time being? That seems
> safer than rolling out things that set ABI quickly, a big part of the
So, that's a bigger hammer than I think is needed and punishes !BTI
machines. I'm going to suggest that if we need to carry a temp patch its
more like the glibc patch I mentioned in the Fedora defect. That patch
simply logs a message, on the mprotect failures rather than aborting.
Its fairly non-intrusive.
That leaves seccomp functional, and BTI generally functional except when
seccomp is restricting it. I've also been asked that if a patch like
that is needed, its (temporary?) merged to the glibc trunk, rather than
just being carried by the distro's.
Thanks,
> reason we went with having the dynamic linker enable PROT_BTI in the
> first place was to give us more flexibility to handle any unforseen
> consequences of enabling BTI that we run into. We are going to have
> similar issues with other features like MTE so we need to make sure that
> whatever we're doing works with them too.
>
> Also updated to Will's current e-mail address - Will, do you have
> thoughts on what we should do here?
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-04 5:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-03 10:25 Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:25 ` [PATCH 1/4] elf: Pass the fd to note processing " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] elf: Move note processing after l_phdr is updated " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:38 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 12:36 ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 15:04 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 15:27 ` H.J. Lu
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] aarch64: Use mmap to add PROT_BTI instead of mprotect " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 10:34 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-03 10:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] aarch64: Remove the bti link_map field " Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-03 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/4] aarch64: avoid mprotect(PROT_BTI|PROT_EXEC) " Mark Brown
2020-11-04 5:41 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2020-11-04 8:57 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 14:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 14:45 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 10:50 ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04 18:47 ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-04 18:53 ` Mark Brown
2020-11-04 9:02 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 9:20 ` Will Deacon
2020-11-04 9:29 ` Florian Weimer
2020-11-04 9:55 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 14:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-04 15:19 ` Topi Miettinen
2020-11-04 16:08 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-11-04 15:20 ` Mark Rutland
2020-11-04 18:59 ` Jeremy Linton
2020-11-05 11:31 ` Szabolcs Nagy
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