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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jianhao.xu@seu.edu.cn
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] security/apparmor: use kfree_sensitive() in unpack_secmark()
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 12:19:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8fda1ea3-4349-4a15-a1ea-8c2c63d355e2@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418045250.1262935-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn>

On 4/17/25 21:52, Zilin Guan wrote:
> The unpack_secmark() function currently uses kfree() to release memory
> allocated for secmark structures and their labels. However, if a failure
> occurs after partially parsing secmark, sensitive data may remain in
> memory, posing a security risk.
> 
> To mitigate this, replace kfree() with kfree_sensitive() for freeing
> secmark structures and their labels, aligning with the approach used
> in free_ruleset().
> 
> I am submitting this as an RFC to seek freedback on whether this change
> is appropriate and aligns with the subsystem's expectations. If
> confirmed to be helpful, I will send a formal patch.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>

sorry I am super behind on the backlog, I will get this in to my tree today


Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>   security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++--
>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> index 992b74c50..610e09c76 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
> @@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules)
>   fail:
>   	if (rules->secmark) {
>   		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
> -			kfree(rules->secmark[i].label);
> -		kfree(rules->secmark);
> +			kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label);
> +		kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark);
>   		rules->secmark_count = 0;
>   		rules->secmark = NULL;
>   	}


      parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-28 19:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-18  4:52 Zilin Guan
2025-04-25  3:09 ` Zilin Guan
2025-04-28 19:19 ` John Johansen [this message]

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