From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DDF4C3F8EC3; Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:41:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1782484888; cv=none; b=QRNZGfVWtY2E4z7e9aYaxW3uf6ZdJv50rOf6OecQ0rtn4TahqAUNxNoqd9IlNxd5KYk5QpvU15qWiLEMDv1Csz6tqtYt1u9LHIHtopSG204MYcQg8CHjnmtCldHj53IJkTyag26MOIiOgj/Yy1asmuCjXVaralg1Lcd+0+lXuO4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1782484888; c=relaxed/simple; bh=bEtbEdNWtqOMxT+oy22G/4tu6AhANjxbf1WsnF93zwI=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=E+rigr7tTqghrJYMtT47rbnOm6NqHXXPHq1qFwD3H+twZZiBmr6NM0pTYzR1EQ9YJkPG4f3aHsJDK9wiOIEZRv8pLMet7eOK2Ist07ozqQP8s6DwoCA48TaNU/iAqtFAVV9DrBej5ZeXgZmHgmyzyxdlO2nT3+6g2QjR+p9nxUQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Jsbn6NIx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Jsbn6NIx" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5B7261F000E9; Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:41:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1782484886; bh=j8XGeGFmEocugFI9gz5oMoSnIsxLpV060sj+N7xRZ+U=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To; b=Jsbn6NIxVX46djM81aCv3IWkt5UPG+pi7DIrD2i2MXD2S7Ta2jGW/1hmBvxLR430T V3HDHYwc+SiVzQi0y+/JoVoOMURAtg4BKGZKze7gZFd1NtJCR2xVpgwfZYTmJBR+9P o7GwDsVF7vYaCBqcCvjGWAyjX6xGW5vBQbmwkVVf7ByUtDYQaXZqyanbSTYZxbG1Np Ib5uTh1S4pMfFP6kMVxYu0lT6i4IcPygJo6JDrLmuH5Kfizs3sCBa1bWzZkdfJdiX+ VIUAL6wv+PDwXCQNLIwM9QKijcxEjcHhzyn5aeVbYBoIhOFr+KS7oI/h038M1hJ7Xw LqKWq5Fx5zGgg== Message-ID: <91776136-ecaf-4687-be63-a2c074435462@kernel.org> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 16:41:22 +0200 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm/slab: handle allow_spin in slab_free_hook() instead of open coding Content-Language: en-US To: "Harry Yoo (Oracle)" , Johannes Weiner , Michal Hocko , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Muchun Song , Andrew Morton , Hao Li , Christoph Lameter , David Rientjes , Alexei Starovoitov , Pedro Falcato Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org References: <20260624-kmalloc-nolock-fixes-v1-0-fdf4d17351dd@kernel.org> <20260624-kmalloc-nolock-fixes-v1-2-fdf4d17351dd@kernel.org> From: "Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" Autocrypt: addr=vbabka@kernel.org; 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charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 6/24/26 15:11, Harry Yoo (Oracle) wrote: > kfree_nolock() deliberately skips slab free hooks that should not be > called in unknown context. However, there is one more place that > needs the same thing: memcg_alloc_abort_single(). > > Instead of open coding slab_free_hook(), let it handle the allow_spin > parameter. This is required to correctly handle allocation failures due > to memcg. > > There are two functional changes from this. > > First, memcg_alloc_abort_single() -> slab_free_hook() path no longer > calls free hooks that acquire spinlocks if !allow_spin. > > Second, kfree_nolock() now follows init_on_free which has been ignored. > > Besides that, no functional change intended. > > Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) > --- > mm/slub.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------- > 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c > index 32672a92581b..85760c8ff2e2 100644 > --- a/mm/slub.c > +++ b/mm/slub.c > @@ -2611,41 +2611,52 @@ struct rcu_delayed_free { > * - memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook() > * - alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook() > * > + * slab_free_hook() assumes that memcg_slab_free_hook() and > + * alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook() are already invoked. > + * > * Free hooks that must handle missing corresponding alloc hooks: > * - kmemleak_free_recursive() > * - kfence_free() > * > - * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call: > + * Free hooks that have no alloc hook counterpart, and thus safe to call > + * when spinning is allowed: > * - debug_check_no_locks_freed() > * - debug_check_no_obj_freed() > * - __kcsan_check_access() > */ > static __always_inline > bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init, > - bool after_rcu_delay) > + bool after_rcu_delay, bool allow_spin) > { > /* Are the object contents still accessible? */ > bool still_accessible = (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) && !after_rcu_delay; > > - kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags); > kmsan_slab_free(s, x); > > - debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size); > - > - if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS)) > - debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size); > - > - /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */ > - if (!still_accessible) > - __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size, > - KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT); > - > - if (kfence_free(x)) > - return false; > + if (likely(allow_spin)) { > + /* These hooks acquire spinlocks */ > + kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags); > + debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size); This line shouldn't be here? > + if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS)) > + debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size); > + /* Use KCSAN to help debug racy use-after-free. */ > + if (!still_accessible) > + __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size, > + KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT); > + if (kfence_free(x)) > + return false; The whole block now misses free space lines that it had. > + } > > /* > * Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we > * modify the object. > + * > + * If KASAN finds a bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() which > + * will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically unsafe from > + * NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. The sequence of > + * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI > + * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU > + * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock. > */ > if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x)) > return false; > @@ -2654,6 +2665,7 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init, > if (still_accessible) { > struct rcu_delayed_free *delayed_free; > > + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_spin); > delayed_free = kmalloc_obj(*delayed_free, GFP_NOWAIT); > if (delayed_free) { > /* > @@ -2701,8 +2713,11 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init, > set_orig_size(s, x, orig_size); > > } > - /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */ > - return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, false); > + /* > + * KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. > + * Skip quarantine when spinning is not allowed as it uses a spinlock. > + */ > + return !kasan_slab_free(s, x, init, still_accessible, !allow_spin); > } > > static __fastpath_inline > @@ -2714,9 +2729,10 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail, > void *next = *head; > void *old_tail = *tail; > bool init; > + bool allow_spin = true; > > if (is_kfence_address(next)) { > - slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false); > + slab_free_hook(s, next, false, false, allow_spin); > return false; > } > > @@ -2731,7 +2747,7 @@ bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail, > next = get_freepointer(s, object); > > /* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */ > - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false))) { > + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin))) { > /* Move object to the new freelist */ > set_freepointer(s, object, *head); > *head = object; > @@ -2954,7 +2970,7 @@ static bool __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare(struct kmem_cache *s, > memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin); > alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1); > > - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true))) { > + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, true, allow_spin))) { > p[i] = p[--sheaf->size]; > continue; > } > @@ -6225,7 +6241,7 @@ static void free_to_pcs_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, void **p) > memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1, allow_spin); > alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, p + i, 1); > > - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false))) { > + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, p[i], init, false, allow_spin))) { > p[i] = p[--size]; > continue; > } > @@ -6401,11 +6417,12 @@ void slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void *object, > unsigned long addr) > { > bool allow_spin = true; > + bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s); > > memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1, allow_spin); > alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1); > > - if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false))) > + if (unlikely(!slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin))) > return; > > if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) && > @@ -6422,10 +6439,12 @@ static noinline > void memcg_alloc_abort_single(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) > { > struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object); > + bool init = slab_want_init_on_free(s); > + bool allow_spin = true; > > alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &object, 1); > > - if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), false))) > + if (likely(slab_free_hook(s, object, init, false, allow_spin))) > __slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _RET_IP_); > } > #endif > @@ -6456,6 +6475,8 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) > void *object = delayed_free->object; > struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(object); > struct kmem_cache *s; > + bool allow_spin = true; > + bool init; > > kfree(delayed_free); > > @@ -6469,8 +6490,9 @@ static void slab_free_after_rcu_debug(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) > if (WARN_ON(!(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))) > return; > > + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s); > /* resume freeing */ > - if (slab_free_hook(s, object, slab_want_init_on_free(s), true)) { > + if (slab_free_hook(s, object, init, true, allow_spin)) { > __slab_free(s, slab, object, object, 1, _THIS_IP_); > stat(s, FREE_SLOWPATH); > } > @@ -6742,6 +6764,7 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object) > struct kmem_cache *s; > void *x = (void *)object; > bool allow_spin = false; > + bool init; > > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(object))) > return; > @@ -6756,33 +6779,10 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object) > > memcg_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1, allow_spin); > alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook(s, slab, &x, 1); > - /* > - * Unlike slab_free() do NOT call the following: > - * kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags); > - * debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size); > - * debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size); > - * __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size, ..); > - * kfence_free(x); > - * since they take spinlocks or not safe from any context. > - */ > - kmsan_slab_free(s, x); > - /* > - * If KASAN finds a kernel bug it will do kasan_report_invalid_free() > - * which will call raw_spin_lock_irqsave() which is technically > - * unsafe from NMI, but take chance and report kernel bug. > - * The sequence of > - * kasan_report_invalid_free() -> raw_spin_lock_irqsave() -> NMI > - * -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU > - * is double buggy and deserves to deadlock. > - */ > - if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x)) > + > + init = slab_want_init_on_free(s); > + if (!slab_free_hook(s, x, init, false, allow_spin)) > return; > - /* > - * memcg, kasan_slab_pre_free are done for 'x'. > - * The only thing left is kasan_poison without quarantine, > - * since kasan quarantine takes locks and not supported from NMI. > - */ > - kasan_slab_free(s, x, false, false, /* skip quarantine */true); > > if (likely(can_free_to_pcs(slab)) && > likely(free_to_pcs(s, x, allow_spin))) >