From: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
To: Yingjie Cao <yingjcao@sigvoid.com>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] wifi: mac80211: only accept IBSS channel switch from our own BSSID
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 11:12:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9201d828365fa2b11fb6a83d1ff66365435a9072.camel@sipsolutions.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c3fd8617849368e579a56c4397b7ee8624ef27ad.camel@sipsolutions.net>
On Tue, 2026-06-23 at 11:10 +0200, Johannes Berg wrote:
> On Tue, 2026-06-23 at 17:04 +0800, Yingjie Cao wrote:
> > ieee80211_rx_bss_info() acts on a channel switch announcement (CSA)
> > carried in a received beacon or probe response before it verifies that
> > the frame's BSSID matches our own IBSS; it only checks that the SSID
> > matches. ieee80211_rx_mgmt_spectrum_mgmt() acts on a spectrum management
> > (channel switch) action frame without checking the BSSID at all.
> >
> > Because of this, any station in radio range that knows the IBSS SSID
> > (which is broadcast in cleartext) can inject a beacon or action frame
> > carrying a CSA element that points at an unsupported channel. The switch
> > then fails in ieee80211_ibss_process_chanswitch(), which queues
> > csa_connection_drop_work and tears the whole IBSS down. The members
> > rejoin and the attacker repeats, resulting in a persistent,
> > unauthenticated denial of service. Encrypted IBSS networks are equally
> > affected because beacons are not protected. Since both of these CSA
> > entry points are IBSS-specific, the impact is confined to IBSS (ad-hoc)
> > mode; managed-mode CSA is handled separately in mlme.c and is unaffected.
>
> Once you rewrite this to be more honest, you'll see that the whole Cc
> stable thing and all is fairly much pointless?
>
> Or have you not realised yet that stations can also trivially fake their
> MAC address?
Also, since you don't have a track record in wifi, I'll point once again
to https://docs.kernel.org/process/coding-assistants.html
johannes
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-23 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-23 9:04 Yingjie Cao
2026-06-23 9:10 ` Johannes Berg
2026-06-23 9:12 ` Johannes Berg [this message]
2026-06-23 19:31 ` Nathan Howard
2026-07-06 8:53 ` Johannes Berg
2026-07-07 3:20 ` Nathan Howard
2026-07-07 13:43 ` Yingjie Cao
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