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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"ivanrwcm25@gmail.com" <ivanrwcm25@gmail.com>,
	"tglx@kernel.org" <tglx@kernel.org>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "brauner@kernel.org" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"sammiee5311@gmail.com" <sammiee5311@gmail.com>,
	"lirongqing@baidu.com" <lirongqing@baidu.com>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Mehta, Sohil" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	"nik.borisov@suse.com" <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/shstk: free shadow stack when copy_thread() fails
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 19:26:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <948b6b86c6b00199fc7c36779d131ac75d92db63.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015023147.519257-2-ivanrwcm25@gmail.com>

By inspection the bug looks real to me.

On Wed, 2026-10-14 at 23:31 -0300, Iván Ezequiel Rodriguez wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 346c438ac880..be840652d055 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -265,11 +265,19 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
>  	/* Set a new TLS for the child thread? */
>  	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
>  		ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
> +	if (ret) {

Having the error check happen even if !CLONE_SETTLS makes it not clear that this
condition could only happen that way. I'd maybe nest the check inside, like is
done in several cases in in copy_process(). Like (untested):

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 346c438ac8801..e40f83a02fdb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct
kernel_clone_args *args)
        struct fork_frame *fork_frame;
        struct pt_regs *childregs;
        unsigned long new_ssp;
-       int ret = 0;
+       int ret;
 
        childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
        fork_frame = container_of(childregs, struct fork_frame, regs);
@@ -263,13 +263,19 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct
kernel_clone_args *args)
        }
 
        /* Set a new TLS for the child thread? */
-       if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
+       if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
                ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
+               if (ret)
+                       goto shstk_free;
+       }
 
-       if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
+       if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
                io_bitmap_share(p);
 
        return ret;
+shstk_free:
+       shstk_free(p);
+       return ret;
 }
 
 static void pkru_flush_thread(void)



> +		/*
> +		 * copy_process() skips exit_thread() when copy_thread()
> +		 * fails. Free the shadow stack mapped before this error.
> +		 */

I'm not in favor of this comment. It is describing behavior far away. And the
idea that you cleanup what you allocated in on a later error condition is a
pretty common pattern. I tried to write something and nothing seems non-obvious.
Maybe just drop it.

> +		shstk_free(p);
> +		return ret;
> +	}
>  
> -	if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
> +	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
>  		io_bitmap_share(p);
>  
> -	return ret;
> +	return 0;
>  }



  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-21 19:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-15  2:31 [PATCH 0/2] x86/shstk: don't leak a shadow stack when clone TLS fails Iván Ezequiel Rodriguez
2026-10-15  2:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/shstk: free shadow stack when copy_thread() fails Iván Ezequiel Rodriguez
2026-10-21 19:26   ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2026-10-15  2:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests/x86: shadow stack must survive a bad TLS Iván Ezequiel Rodriguez

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