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From: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
To: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org
Cc: anshuman.khandual@arm.com, quic_zhenhuah@quicinc.com,
	kevin.brodsky@arm.com, yangyicong@hisilicon.com,
	joey.gouly@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: Enable vmalloc-huge with ptdump
Date: Fri, 30 May 2025 15:27:57 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <97b215cf-7f01-48f2-88ff-3b815114b974@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6280e181-9f05-4aa0-9fe7-23d4e86000e5@arm.com>


On 30/05/25 3:17 pm, Ryan Roberts wrote:
> On 30/05/2025 10:14, Dev Jain wrote:
>> On 30/05/25 2:10 pm, Ryan Roberts wrote:
>>> On 30/05/2025 09:20, Dev Jain wrote:
>>>> arm64 disables vmalloc-huge when kernel page table dumping is enabled,
>>>> because an intermediate table may be removed, potentially causing the
>>>> ptdump code to dereference an invalid address. We want to be able to
>>>> analyze block vs page mappings for kernel mappings with ptdump, so to
>>>> enable vmalloc-huge with ptdump, synchronize between page table removal in
>>>> pmd_free_pte_page()/pud_free_pmd_page() and ptdump pagetable walking. We
>>>> use mmap_read_lock and not write lock because we don't need to synchronize
>>>> between two different vm_structs; two vmalloc objects running this same
>>>> code path will point to different page tables, hence there is no race.
>> My "correction" from race->no problem was incorrect after all :) There will
>> be no race too since the vm_struct object has exclusive access to whatever
>> table it is clearing.
>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h | 6 ++----
>>>>    arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c              | 7 +++++++
>>>>    2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h
>>>> index 38fafffe699f..28b7173d8693 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vmalloc.h
>>>> @@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ static inline bool arch_vmap_pud_supported(pgprot_t prot)
>>>>        /*
>>>>         * SW table walks can't handle removal of intermediate entries.
>>>>         */
>>>> -    return pud_sect_supported() &&
>>>> -           !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS);
>>>> +    return pud_sect_supported();
>>>>    }
>>>>      #define arch_vmap_pmd_supported arch_vmap_pmd_supported
>>>>    static inline bool arch_vmap_pmd_supported(pgprot_t prot)
>>>>    {
>>>> -    /* See arch_vmap_pud_supported() */
>>>> -    return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS);
>>>> +    return true;
>>>>    }
>>>>      #endif
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>>>> index ea6695d53fb9..798cebd9e147 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>>>> @@ -1261,7 +1261,11 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr)
>>>>        }
>>>>          table = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, addr);
>>>> +
>>>> +    /* Synchronize against ptdump_walk_pgd() */
>>>> +    mmap_read_lock(&init_mm);
>>>>        pmd_clear(pmdp);
>>>> +    mmap_read_unlock(&init_mm);
>>> So this works because ptdump_walk_pgd() takes the write_lock (which is mutually
>>> exclusive with any read_lock holders) for the duration of the table walk, so it
>>> will either consistently see the pgtables before or after this removal. It will
>>> never disappear during the walk, correct?
>>>
>>> I guess there is a risk of this showing up as contention with other init_mm
>>> write_lock holders. But I expect that pmd_free_pte_page()/pud_free_pmd_page()
>>> are called sufficiently rarely that the risk is very small. Let's fix any perf
>>> problem if/when we see it.
>> We can avoid all of that by my initial approach - to wrap the lock around
>> CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS.
>> I don't have a strong opinion, just putting it out there.
>>
>>>>        __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable(addr);
>>> And the tlbi doesn't need to be serialized because there is no security issue.
>>> The walker can be trusted to only dereference memory that it sees as it walks
>>> the pgtable (obviously).
>>>
>>>>        pte_free_kernel(NULL, table);
>>>>        return 1;
>>>> @@ -1289,7 +1293,10 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr)
>>>>            pmd_free_pte_page(pmdp, next);
>>>>        } while (pmdp++, next += PMD_SIZE, next != end);
>>>>    +    /* Synchronize against ptdump_walk_pgd() */
>>>> +    mmap_read_lock(&init_mm);
>>>>        pud_clear(pudp);
>>>> +    mmap_read_unlock(&init_mm);
>>> Hmm, so pud_free_pmd_page() is now going to cause us to acquire and release the
>>> (upto) lock 513 times (for a 4K kernel). I wonder if there is an argument for
>>> clearing the pud first (under the lock), then the pmds can all be cleared
>>> without a lock, since the walker won't be able to see the pmds once the pud is
>>> cleared.
>> Yes, we can isolate the PMD table in case the caller of pmd_free_pte_page is
>> pud_free_pmd_page. In this case, vm_struct_1 has exclusive access to the entire
>> pmd page, hence no race will occur. But, in case of vmap_try_huge_pmd() being the
>> caller, we cannot drop the locks around pmd_free_pte_page. So we can have something
>> like
>>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS
>> static inline void ptdump_synchronize_lock(bool flag)
>> {
>>      if (flag)
>>          mmap_read_lock(&init_mm);
>> }
>>
>> and pass false when the caller is pud_free_pmd_page.
> of something like this? (completely untested):
>
> ---8<---
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> index 8fcf59ba39db..1f3a922167e4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> @@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmdp)
>          return 1;
>   }
>
> -int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr)
> +static int __pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, bool lock)
>   {
>          pte_t *table;
>          pmd_t pmd;
> @@ -1280,12 +1280,23 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr)
>          }
>
>          table = pte_offset_kernel(pmdp, addr);
> +
> +       if (lock)
> +               mmap_read_lock(&init_mm);
>          pmd_clear(pmdp);
> +       if (lock)
> +               mmap_read_unlock(&init_mm);
> +
>          __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable(addr);
>          pte_free_kernel(NULL, table);
>          return 1;
>   }
>
> +int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +       return __pmd_free_pte_page(pmdp, addr, true);
> +}
> +
>   int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr)
>   {
>          pmd_t *table;
> @@ -1300,15 +1311,19 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr)
>                  return 1;
>          }
>
> +       /* Synchronize against ptdump_walk_pgd() */
> +       mmap_read_lock(&init_mm);
> +       pud_clear(pudp);
> +       mmap_read_unlock(&init_mm);
> +
>          table = pmd_offset(pudp, addr);
>          pmdp = table;
>          next = addr;
>          end = addr + PUD_SIZE;
>          do {
> -               pmd_free_pte_page(pmdp, next);
> +               __pmd_free_pte_page(pmdp, next, false);
>          } while (pmdp++, next += PMD_SIZE, next != end);
>
> -       pud_clear(pudp);
>          __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable(addr);
>          pmd_free(NULL, table);
>          return 1;
> ---8<---


This looks good too! Although would like to first decide on whether we want
to wrap around CONFIG_PTDUMP_DEBUGFS.


>
>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Ryan
>>>
>>>>        __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable(addr);
>>>>        pmd_free(NULL, table);
>>>>        return 1;

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-30  9:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-30  8:20 Dev Jain
2025-05-30  8:28 ` Dev Jain
2025-05-30  8:40 ` Ryan Roberts
2025-05-30  9:07   ` Anshuman Khandual
2025-05-30  9:14   ` Dev Jain
2025-05-30  9:47     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-05-30  9:57       ` Dev Jain [this message]
2025-05-30 11:50     ` Ryan Roberts
2025-05-30 12:35       ` Will Deacon
2025-05-30 13:11         ` Ryan Roberts
2025-05-30 13:36           ` Will Deacon
2025-05-30 14:07             ` Ryan Roberts
2025-06-05  4:48             ` Dev Jain
2025-06-05  8:16               ` Dev Jain
2025-06-11  9:33                 ` Will Deacon
2025-06-11 12:18                   ` Dev Jain

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