From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 01A8D2627F9; Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:48:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1762562915; cv=none; b=eFFYcXG4ciEOfuB6Q9nWCoDGXDoHxPy2QlqOoQnZPmQtW3nENYwLY8MFF/Lwf1cmvDBEHV3D2Zp/JpOHiKM6PCkzlMYBjmacSyHfoyFofrABz/E27PY23ndyr3i5aB9U0JKxpnhPqYF8mfS3BIY2LKl1FFJrtkoduTxVv85CTFY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1762562915; c=relaxed/simple; bh=lhCi1JXBZrowYMZNCBd1DSzIM50iVkagNImXrUhUvYU=; h=MIME-Version:Date:From:To:Cc:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: Subject:Content-Type; b=D3ycj4iY6WbTcf23W1c+2L6O/JiB4BQ+bKhQGtrqQ9tj3X0E2ukOHdDO+Dd+xcABhtIwpPH4IopdGXksVcgGeJUOONJYJ8/6k7+viKxx9k4WexlfTEL+AmeaQpuxc9dssyQQTo3O949h9Gd4Zz17RKgqum0vf++eQni6GpXNf1A= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=gswunZeU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="gswunZeU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F2A51C4CEF7; Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:48:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1762562914; bh=lhCi1JXBZrowYMZNCBd1DSzIM50iVkagNImXrUhUvYU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:From; b=gswunZeU6p3iEknl+EC2reiaR22VtehXJDZ+aZ2pa5OT0UZ7XCqJkhucRE8txzjzX Px+5k77qJmO4GCQ0fKkUYntLysjz5r3XvmdpeMEzGChXw2sDsQvBYpkY+6U0JmDFaa p/ucgJqPe60IJMYkPKLl0TgpKRdcgY+mD21AHHORwXR2JNfZBlHKQIjuK+OvdWamQ1 mhcUJnKbI9Ig6KHiJ29qqP5FAat/EdPILj7Rl4XmdXQ4bzqVQ+gwRlXdhS3figxlxL 1HoZPj/hN1vy8HUn+QmMc/426Ji6RmvDZxUk1eBNneiKzT0UPhPrELR/v+tK+cEteO ANi3NOiMTDF7Q== Received: from phl-compute-01.internal (phl-compute-01.internal [10.202.2.41]) by mailfauth.phl.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25301F4007E; Fri, 7 Nov 2025 19:48:33 -0500 (EST) Received: from phl-imap-02 ([10.202.2.81]) by phl-compute-01.internal (MEProxy); Fri, 07 Nov 2025 19:48:33 -0500 X-ME-Sender: X-ME-Proxy-Cause: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgeeffedrtdeggdduleduudegucetufdoteggodetrf dotffvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuhfgrshhtofgrihhlpdfurfetoffkrfgpnffqhgenuceu rghilhhouhhtmecufedttdenucesvcftvggtihhpihgvnhhtshculddquddttddmnecujf gurhepofggfffhvfevkfgjfhfutgfgsehtqhertdertdejnecuhfhrohhmpedftehnugih ucfnuhhtohhmihhrshhkihdfuceolhhuthhosehkvghrnhgvlhdrohhrgheqnecuggftrf grthhtvghrnhepjeejvddvtdehffdtgfejjeefgefgjeeggfeuteeiuedvtefgfffhvdej iefguedtnecuvehluhhsthgvrhfuihiivgeptdenucfrrghrrghmpehmrghilhhfrhhomh eprghnugihodhmvghsmhhtphgruhhthhhpvghrshhonhgrlhhithihqdduudeiudekheei fedvqddvieefudeiiedtkedqlhhuthhopeepkhgvrhhnvghlrdhorhhgsehlihhnuhigrd hluhhtohdruhhspdhnsggprhgtphhtthhopedvjedpmhhouggvpehsmhhtphhouhhtpdhr tghpthhtohepsghpsegrlhhivghnkedruggvpdhrtghpthhtohepugifmhifsegrmhgrii honhdrtghordhukhdprhgtphhtthhopegrnhgurhgvfidrtghoohhpvghrfeestghithhr ihigrdgtohhmpdhrtghpthhtohepshgvrghnjhgtsehgohhoghhlvgdrtghomhdprhgtph htthhopehpvghtvghriiesihhnfhhrrgguvggrugdrohhrghdprhgtphhtthhopehrughu nhhlrghpsehinhhfrhgruggvrggurdhorhhgpdhrtghpthhtohepuggrvhgvrdhhrghnsh gvnhesihhnthgvlhdrtghomhdprhgtphhtthhopehrihgtkhdrphdrvggughgvtghomhgs vgesihhnthgvlhdrtghomhdprhgtphhtthhopehsohhhihhlrdhmvghhthgrsehinhhtvg hlrdgtohhm X-ME-Proxy: Feedback-ID: ieff94742:Fastmail Received: by mailuser.phl.internal (Postfix, from userid 501) id DDF3F700054; Fri, 7 Nov 2025 19:48:32 -0500 (EST) X-Mailer: MessagingEngine.com Webmail Interface Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2025 16:48:05 -0800 From: "Andy Lutomirski" To: "Ard Biesheuvel" , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" Cc: "Dave Hansen" , "Sohil Mehta" , "the arch/x86 maintainers" , "Dave Hansen" , "Thomas Gleixner" , "Ingo Molnar" , "Borislav Petkov" , "Jonathan Corbet" , "H. Peter Anvin" , "Josh Poimboeuf" , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , "Xin Li" , "David Woodhouse" , "Sean Christopherson" , "Rick P Edgecombe" , "Vegard Nossum" , "Andrew Cooper" , "Randy Dunlap" , "Geert Uytterhoeven" , "Kees Cook" , "Tony Luck" , "Alexander Shishkin" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Message-Id: <99143293-1715-4c40-b937-3e7472e26732@app.fastmail.com> In-Reply-To: References: <20251029210310.1155449-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com> <20251029210310.1155449-6-sohil.mehta@intel.com> <3e9c4fdd-88a8-4597-9405-d865fb837d95@intel.com> <6dec8398-3f7c-44db-a30d-33593af0217f@intel.com> <20251107090406.GU3245006@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> <20251107094008.GA1618871@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 5/9] x86/efi: Disable LASS while mapping the EFI runtime services Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Nov 7, 2025, at 2:09 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Fri, 7 Nov 2025 at 10:40, Peter Zijlstra wro= te: >> >> On Fri, Nov 07, 2025 at 10:22:30AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> >> > > But that's just the thing EFI is *NOT* trusted! We're basically >> > > disabling all security features (not listed above are CET and CFI= ) to >> > > run this random garbage we have no control over. >> > > >> > > How about we just flat out refuse EFI runtime services? What are = they >> > > actually needed for? Why are we bending over backwards and subver= ting >> > > our security for this stuff? >> > >> > On x86, it is mostly the EFI variable services that user space has >> > come to rely on, not only for setting the boot path (which typically >> > happens only once at installation time, when the path to GRUB is set >> > as the first boot option). Unfortunately, the systemd folks have ta= ken >> > a liking to this feature too, and have started storing things in >> > there. >> >> *groan*, so booting with noefi (I just went and found that option) wi= ll >> cause a modern Linux system to fail booting? >> > > As long as you install with EFI enabled, the impact of efi=3Dnoruntime > should be limited, given that x86 does not rely on EFI runtime > services for the RTC or for reboot/poweroff. But you will lose access > to the EFI variable store. (Not sure what 'noefi' does in comparison, > but keeping EFI enabled at boot time for things like secure/measured > boot and storage encryption will probably result in a net positive > impact on security/hardening as long as you avoid calling into the > firmware after boot) > > >> > There is also PRM, which is much worse, as it permits devices in the >> > ACPI namespace to call firmware routines that are mapped privileged= in >> > the OS address space in the same way. I objected to this at the tim= e, >> > and asked for a facility where we could at least mark such code as >> > unprivileged (and run it as such) but this was ignored, as Intel and >> > MS had already sealed the deal and put this into production. This is >> > much worse than typical EFI routines, as the PRM code is ODM/OEM co= de >> > rather than something that comes from the upstream EFI implementati= on. >> > It is basically a dumping ground for code that used to run in SMM >> > because it was too ugly to run anywhere else. >> >> What the actual fuck!! And we support this garbage? Without >> pr_err(FW_BUG ) notification? >> >> How can one find such devices? I need to check my machine. >> > > Unless you have a PRMT table in the list of ACPI tables, your system > shouldn't be affected by this. > >> > It would be nice if we could >> > >> > a) Get rid of SetVirtualAddressMap(), which is another insane hack >> > that should never have been supported on 64-bit systems. On arm64, = we >> > no longer call it unless there is a specific need for it (some Ampe= re >> > Altra systems with buggy firmware will crash otherwise). On x86, >> > though, it might be tricky because there so much buggy firmware. >> > Perhaps we should phase it out by checking for the UEFI version, so >> > that future systems will avoid it. This would mean, however, that E= FI >> > code remains in the low user address space, which may not be what y= ou >> > want (unless we do c) perhaps?) >> > >> > b) Run EFI runtime calls in a sandbox VM - there was a PoC implemen= ted >> > for arm64 a couple of years ago, but it was very intrusive and the = ARM >> > intern in question went on to do more satisyfing work. >> > >> > c) Unmap the kernel KPTI style while the runtime calls are in >> > progress? This should be rather straight-forward, although it might >> > not help a lot as the code in question still runs privileged. >> >> At the very least I think we should start printing scary messages abo= ut >> disabling security to run untrusted code. This is all quite insane :/ > > I agree in principle. However, calling it 'untrusted' is a bit > misleading here, given that you already rely on the same body of code > to boot your computer to begin with. I.e., if you suspect that the > code in question is conspiring against you, not calling it at runtime > to manipulate EFI variables is not going to help with that. > > But from a robustness point of view, I agree - running vendor code at > the OS's privilege level at runtime that was only tested with Windows > is not great for stability, and it would be nice if we could leverage > the principle of least privilege and only permit it to access the > things that it actually needs to perform the task that we've asked it > to. This is why I asked for the ability to mark PRM services as > unprivileged, given that they typically only run some code and perhaps > poke some memory (either RAM or MMIO registers) that the OS never > accesses directly. > > Question is though whether on x86, sandboxing is feasible: can VMs > call into SMM? Because that is where 95% of the EFI variable services > logic resides - the code running directly under the OS does very > little other than marshalling the arguments and passing them on. Last time I looked at the calls into SMM (which was quite a while ago), = they were fairly recognizable sequences that would nicely cause VM exits= . So the VM would exit and we would invoke SMM on its behalf. But it=E2=80=99s very very very common for VMX/SVM to be unavailable. Has anyone tried running EFI at CPL3? P.S. Forget about relying on AC to make EFI work. I doubt we can trust E= FI to leave AC set.