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From: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
To: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>, jaegeuk@kernel.org
Cc: chao@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: don't allow rename unencrypted file to encrypted directory
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 21:35:25 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <99c57433-c631-4516-b5a2-e22c79e9a93d@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170308120820.86785-1-yuchao0@huawei.com>

On 3/8/2017 20:08, Chao Yu wrote:
> In commit d9cdc9033181 ("ext4 crypto: enforce context consistency") we
> declared that:
> 
> 2) All files or directories in a directory must be protected using the
>     same key as their containing directory.
> 
> But in f2fs_cross_rename there is a vulnerability that allow to cross
> rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory, it needs to be refused.

fscrypt_has_permitted_context has do the checking as this patch,

168         /* no restrictions if the parent directory is not encrypted */
169         if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(parent))
170                 return 1;
171         /* if the child directory is not encrypted, this is always a problem */
172         if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(child))
173                 return 0;

So, the cross rename unencrypted file into encrypted directory is permitted right now. 

I have a encrypted directory "ncry",  "new" is unencrypted file.

[root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
Operation not permitted
[root@nfstestnic f2fs]# renameat2 -x encry/hello new
Operation not permitted

How do you test it? 

thanks,
Kinglong Mee
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
> ---
>  fs/f2fs/namei.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> index 25c073f6c7d4..8de684b84cb9 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c
> @@ -855,6 +855,10 @@ static int f2fs_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
>  			!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(new_dir)))
>  		return -ENOKEY;
>  
> +	if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_inode) ||
> +		f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir) && !f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_inode))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
>  	if ((f2fs_encrypted_inode(old_dir) || f2fs_encrypted_inode(new_dir)) &&
>  			(old_dir != new_dir) &&
>  			(!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir, old_inode) ||
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-08 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-08 12:08 Chao Yu
2017-03-08 13:35 ` Kinglong Mee [this message]
2017-03-09  1:33   ` [f2fs-dev] " Chao Yu
2017-03-10 21:49 ` kbuild test robot
2017-03-10 22:14 ` kbuild test robot

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