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From: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-26827: i2c: qcom-geni: Correct I2C TRE sequence
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 16:44:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e15807be09695bbc35070b558e387237a00c988.camel@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024041842-handrail-distaste-259b@gregkh>

On Thu, 2024-04-18 at 15:05 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 02:56:33PM +0200, Jean Delvare wrote:
> > Hi Greg,
> > 
> > On Wed, 2024-04-17 at 11:44 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > Description
> > > ===========
> > > 
> > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > > 
> > > i2c: qcom-geni: Correct I2C TRE sequence
> > > 
> > > For i2c read operation in GSI mode, we are getting timeout
> > > due to malformed TRE basically incorrect TRE sequence
> > > in gpi(drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c) driver.
> > > (...)
> > 
> > I was assigned the task to backport this security fix to the SUSE
> > kernels. However, from the description, I fail to see how this fix
> > qualifies as a security fix. I can't find the reason why a CVE was
> > assigned to the issue.
> > 
> > What is the considered attack vector? Or if there is no attack vector,
> > what consequence does this bug have, which would put the system
> > security at stake?
> 
> We reviewed this commit as fitting the fact that timeouts due to
> malformed messages would fit into the definition of "vulnerability" in
> the CVE world as it would cause a system to incure "negative impact to
> confidentiality, integrity, or availability".

If the timeout could be triggered on purpose, then I would agree, as
this could possibly be used for a denial-of-service type of attack. But
this isn't the case here.

All we have is a failure to read data from a random I2C device due to
an incorrect programming of the I2C controller. Simple lack of
functionality.

> If as the i2c maintainer, you don't think this would be the case, we
> will be glad to revoke this CVE and just mark it down as a "normal
> bugfix".

Yes, please.


-- 
Jean Delvare
SUSE L3 Support

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-18 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2024041703-CVE-2024-26827-67c1@gregkh>
2024-04-18 12:56 ` Jean Delvare
2024-04-18 13:05   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-04-18 14:44     ` Jean Delvare [this message]
2024-04-18 14:52       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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