From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756696AbcEEJgi (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 May 2016 05:36:38 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:11600 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756329AbcEEJgf (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 May 2016 05:36:35 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.24,581,1455004800"; d="scan'208";a="697138065" From: "Tian, Kevin" To: Yongji Xie , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org" CC: "alex.williamson@redhat.com" , "bhelgaas@google.com" , "aik@ozlabs.ru" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , "paulus@samba.org" , "mpe@ellerman.id.au" , "joro@8bytes.org" , "warrier@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "nikunj@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "eric.auger@linaro.org" , "will.deacon@arm.com" , "gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com" , "David.Laight@ACULAB.COM" , "alistair@popple.id.au" , "ruscur@russell.cc" Subject: RE: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported Thread-Topic: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported Thread-Index: AQHRoIMDw+bjSjW8wkusiJ7fWPCsmJ+muJEA//+EsACAAIcFkP//kPaAgAPMIVA= Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 09:36:31 +0000 Message-ID: References: <1461761010-5452-1-git-send-email-xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1461761010-5452-6-git-send-email-xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-ctpclassification: CTP_IC x-titus-metadata-40: eyJDYXRlZ29yeUxhYmVscyI6IiIsIk1ldGFkYXRhIjp7Im5zIjoiaHR0cDpcL1wvd3d3LnRpdHVzLmNvbVwvbnNcL0ludGVsMyIsImlkIjoiOTUzN2QxYzEtMTA4Yy00ODM4LThiYzYtNjMyOWMzNGQ0MDRlIiwicHJvcHMiOlt7Im4iOiJDVFBDbGFzc2lmaWNhdGlvbiIsInZhbHMiOlt7InZhbHVlIjoiQ1RQX0lDIn1dfV19LCJTdWJqZWN0TGFiZWxzIjpbXSwiVE1DVmVyc2lvbiI6IjE1LjkuNi42IiwiVHJ1c3RlZExhYmVsSGFzaCI6ImFFYWpNdTZJVklxZ3N4MVRUMlNpR2pWRUVwZnAxaGpNSUIycSs2Q0kyR009In0= x-originating-ip: [10.239.127.40] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by mail.home.local id u459ahoZ009560 > From: Yongji Xie > Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 3:34 PM > > On 2016/5/3 14:22, Tian, Kevin wrote: > > >> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyjxie@linux.vnet.ibm.com] > >> Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM > >> > >> On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote: > >> > >>>> From: Yongji Xie > >>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM > >>>> > >>>> This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports > >>>> interrupt remapping which can ensure that a given pci device > >>>> can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it. > >>>> > >>>> With MSI-X table mmapped, we also need to expose the > >>>> read/write interface which will be used to access MSI-X table. > >>>> > >>>> Signed-off-by: Yongji Xie > >>> A curious question here. Does "allow to mmap MSI-X" essentially > >>> mean that KVM guest can directly read/write physical MSI-X > >>> structure then? > >>> > >>> Thanks > >>> Kevin > >>> > >> Here we just allow to mmap MSI-X table in kernel. It doesn't > >> mean all KVM guest can directly read/write physical MSI-X > >> structure. This should be decided by QEMU. For PPC64 > >> platform, we would allow to passthrough the MSI-X table > >> because we know guest kernel would not write physical > >> MSI-X structure when enabling MSI. > >> > > A bit confused here. If guest kernel doesn't need to write > > physical MSI-X structure, what's the point of passing through > > the table then? > > We want to allow the MSI-X table because there may be > some critical registers in the same page as the MSI-X table. > We have to handle the mmio access to these register in QEMU > rather than in guest if mmapping MSI-X table is disallowed. So you mean critical registers in same MMIO BAR as MSI-X table, instead of two MMIO BARs in same page (the latter I suppose with your whole patchset it won't happen then)? > > > I think the key whether MSI-X table can be passed through > > is related to where hypervisor control is deployed. At least > > for x86: > > > > - When irq remapping is not enabled, host/hypervisor needs > > to control physical interrupt message including vector/dest/etc. > > directly in MSI-X structure, so we cannot allow a guest to > > access it; > > > > - when irq remapping is enabled, host/hypervisor can control > > interrupt routing in irq remapping table. However MSI-X > > also needs to be configured as remappable format. In this > > manner we also cannot allow direct access from guest. > > > > The only sane case to pass through MSI-X structure, is a > > mechanism similar to irq remapping but w/o need to change > > original MSI-X format so direct access from guest side is > > safe. Is it the case in PPC64? > > > > Thanks > > Kevin > > Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from > guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we > can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in > normal code path such as para-virtualized guest kernel on PPC64. > Then how do you prevent malicious guest kernel accessing it? Thanks Kevin